WORK AND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE

BY IVES HENDRICK (BOSTON)

I

This paper is a discussion of certain relations between work and the pleasure principle; and especially the argument that the psychosocial activities of the total organism are not adequately accounted for by the pleasure and reality principles, when these are defined, in accordance with Freud and analytic tradition, as immediate or delayed responses, respectively, to the need for sensual gratification. I shall suggest that work is not primarily motivated by sexual need or associated aggressions, but by the need for efficient use of the muscular and intellectual tools, regardless of what secondary needs—self-preservative, aggressive, or sexual—a work performance may also satisfy. I shall call this thesis the *work principle,* the principle that primary pleasure is sought by efficient use of the central nervous system for the performance of well-integrated ego functions which enable the individual to control or alter his environment.

The pleasure principle is itself a remarkable application of the long debated philosophical doctrine of 'hedonism' to the facts of general psychology, and especially to those discovered by the psychoanalytic method. Necessary modifications were several times suggested by Freud himself. He pointed out that the reality principle is also an essential induction, but he regarded this as a modification of the pleasure principle in postponing or altering the mode of gratification in order to avoid future pain. A more radical modification was the theory of the repetition compulsion, whose manifestations he regarded as proof of the nonuniversality of the pleasure principle and evidence of the death instinct.

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With the most general statement of the pleasure principle, that the individual seeks consciously and unconsciously to realize maximal pleasure and minimal pain, and with the biological interpretation of pleasure as the release of tensions produced by biological needs which are called 'instincts', I am in full agreement. The value of the principle interpreted in terms of the libido theory for generalizing and explaining those facts of neurotic and normal psychology on which it was originally based is also unquestioned by me. But modern study of the ego raises problems which are not so satisfactorily interpreted as pleasure defined only in terms of the libido.

In previous papers *(13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19)* I have discussed certain clinical problems whose study has led me eventually to the present formulation of the work principle. My starting point was the observation that psychoses, and certain character problems closely allied to them (for example, schizoid, paranoid, and passive feminine characters), could not be adequately described in those familiar terms of conflict, repression, and defenses against castration anxiety and loss of love, which have sufficed for the generalization of psychoneurotic problems. Rather we should examine with all our resources the significant fact that other personalities show conspicuous primary failures in one or more integrated functions which are usually considered expressions of the ego organization. There is abundant evidence that some essential function, such as repression of infantile fantasies, the reality-testing process, or social self-assertion, is impaired. I therefore proposed to call such personality problems different types of 'ego defect neurosis' *(16)*.

This conclusion, that some serious personality problems result from a defect in ego functions, brought us face to face with the important fact that psychoanalysis had neglected the study of two vast domains of ego psychology: the study of those ego functions which are not primarily defenses against unpleasant experience *(16, 19)*; and, secondly, the ontogeny of these executant functions *(18)*.

Work itself remains a challenging problem.[1] Though work capacity is obviously a most important result of normal ego organization, its essential contribution to biological survival, its utility to the individual and to society, have been taken more or less for granted when no pathology is involved. Work has naturally been accepted by analysts as an essential function, but has generally been considered a sort of matter-of-course function which is automatically restored when a neurosis is successfully treated, rather than as itself the subject for intensive psychological analysis. Thus, in concentrating upon the study of defense mechanisms, anxiety, and the superego, psychoanalysis had almost completely neglected the study of primary functions of the ego, defined as that organization of integrated functions by which we perceive, appraise and manipulate the environment. These I shall henceforth call the *executant functions* of the ego. Furthermore, in contrast to the extensive study and formulation of the development of sexuality and the superego, the development of the ego, or even the obvious idea that the mature ego results from an ontogenic process, had been only occasionally touched upon by analysts. The result has been that our theory of infancy was derived almost entirely from our knowledge of early sensual experience, object relations, and anxiety fantasies, and therefore has failed in many significant ways to depict the infant as it is.

But the executant functions of the mature ego are by definition highly integrated manifestations of perceptual, cognitive, and muscular experience, in short, the psychological and behavioristic manifestations of the central nervous system. And it is obvious that they must develop from those simple forms of sensory experience and muscular adaptations of the infant

[1] Thomas French, however, has made an excellent beginning in the study of work, notably in his papers on learning *(4)* and on cognitive fields *(5)*. Robert Waelder, in his study of the multiple functions of the ego *(24)*, Nunberg, in his exposition of synthetic functions *(23)*, and Hartmann *(12)* have also clearly recognized this problem.

which have been studied by child psychologists, such as Gesell *(11)* and McGraw *(22)*, but not by us. These precursors of the executant functions of the mature ego (such as infantile use of the eyes, ears, fingers, hand, locomotor apparatus, phonation, etc.) I have called *partial ego functions (18)*. The practice of these partial functions provides those tools for effecting control of the outer world which we call work. How their later development is profoundly affected by object relations, frustrations, and identification, I shall discuss in a subsequent paper *(19A)*; the recognition that they are the functions from which the mature ego develops suffices for our immediate discussion of work.

This previously published survey of the ontogeny of the executant functions gives rise to another difficult problem: what instinct provides the energy and the need to exercise the physiological organs available for work, and hence leads to the development of the integrated functions of the ego? We have assumed that all executant functions at any age are responses to an instinct differing in its goal, purpose, and pleasure mechanism from the libido. We have chosen to call this the 'instinct to master' or 'mastery instinct' *(18f)*. It is to be regarded as an instinct, psychoanalytically defined as the biological source of tensions impelling to specific patterns of action. But the aim of the instinct to master is definitive, for it differs from sadism or any other of the sexual or sexualized instincts; its aim is to control or alter a piece of the environment, an ego-alien situation, by the skilful use of perceptual, intellectual, and motor techniques in order to control or alter a piece of the environment. This is the drive impelling to integration and skilful performance, and therefore the incentive to the development and exercise of the ego functions which are mentally and emotionally experienced as the need to perform work efficiently. Work pleasure is, therefore, assumed to be an expression of the instinct to master, and is attained by skilful use of the central nervous system, whereas the affect

which characterizes sexual pleasure is primarily a discharge of tensions in the autonomic system.[2]

I would therefore suggest that work yields pleasure by effective use of the psychological and motor instruments providing mastery of the environment. Let us now consider several ways in which the work principle, as a manifestation of the instinct to master, is closely related to problems which have already been thoroughly studied by psychoanalysis: the reality principle, sublimation, reaction-formation, and the repetition compulsion.

II

Work and the Reality Principle. Cursory consideration of the work principle may suggest that it is no more than a rewording of the reality principle. Indeed there are more than superficial resemblances. The *sine qua non* of both principles is effective reality testing; the simple pleasure principle is consequently modified or negated. Thus a diabetic on a diet who eats a box of candy is clearly acting in accordance with the unmodified pleasure principle; the satisfaction of a craving

[2] In the discussion of this paper, there has been general agreement by such competent critics as Drs. Thomas French, Karl Menninger, and Robert Waelder, that the 'work principle' is a valid and significant formulation. Of equal interest is the fact that the chief criticism of this paper by all, though from different points of view, has been against my interpretation of the work principle in terms of a hypothetical 'instinct to master'. Similar objections were also encountered when I originally proposed this supplement to the instinct theory to provide a dynamic basis for exploring the rôle of partial functions in the development of the ego *(18)*.

The instinct to master is my formulation of a fundamental drive of human beings already studied at length by various men with varying terminology. Freud referred to a *Bewältigungstrieb (10)*, and this idea was developed by Bernfeld *(3)*. Veblen discussed it in his sociology, and Karl Buehler talks of *Funktionslust*. Perhaps the most valuable discussion of all is the recent formulation by Angyal *(1)* of the 'trend to autonomy'. It has seemed quite extraordinary that no one has remarked on the similarity of my concept and Adler's 'will to power', a contribution whose value I fully acknowledge, without following him in rejecting other important contributions of psychoanalysis. As the next paper in this series will discuss these problems and my reason for considering the instinct to master a useful hypothesis, I shall at this time refer merely to the previous fuller discussion of them *(18f)*.

for sweets is not abnormal in itself, but the intelligent diabetic who gratifies it freely is acting childishly. The diabetic who strictly limits his sweets is as obviously acting maturely because he is modifying the pressure of the pleasure principle in order to avoid the disastrous consequences of its gratification. Such behavior is precisely in accordance with the reality principle as defined by Freud, a denial or postponement of an instinctual aim in order to avoid future suffering. The fulfilment of the reality principle is an important ego function, but it is fundamentally a defense mechanism; in the diabetic example, a voluntary inhibition which serves to avoid danger.

The work principle as defined above is something else. It is not primarily a temporary negation of instinct. It is a satisfaction of an instinct by well-organized activity. Thus the diabetic who is controlling his diet normally is reacting with an inhibition according to the reality principle; but rather than satisfying the work principle, he is creating an added though necessary obstacle to its function. To be deprived makes it harder for him to work. Thus the reality principle is served primarily by the defensive organizations of the ego, the work principle by the executant organization. They usually supplement each other, but in such cases as the diabetic's may also seriously conflict, for the suffering which results from sugar deprivation may impair his capacity for work.

It follows that the reality principle, as described by Freud, serves to secure the maximal libidinal pleasures (including the sadistic) with a minimum of suffering, whereas the work principle is fundamentally in the service of the mastery instinct, in that its gratification depends upon efficiency of the intellectual and motor apparatus in the performance of useful tasks.

Sublimation and the Work Principle. Though clinical psychoanalysis has always recognized work capacity (the capacity to obtain work pleasure) as a cardinal sign of mental health, it has by no means generally recognized work pleasure as a primary psychological motivation. Perhaps this is largely a consequence of the recognition of the important fact of sublimation, and the repeated demonstration that work—most trans-

parently, artistic work—provides a gratification of unconscious sexual and aggressive fantasies. The work principle is no contradiction of this often demonstrated fact, but it does raise the question whether sublimation is by itself a comprehensive statement of the total experience. I am proposing that ego organizations which function as work are primarily in the service of the need to perform efficiently, but that such organizations are generally, and perhaps always, utilized concurrently for the discharge of surplus libidinal tension. Work pleasure and libidinal pleasure usually coincide, and their relative significance varies with different samples of work. In general, libidinal pleasure in work is predominant in adolescent activities, in contrast to the greater pleasure in effective performance which characterizes maturity.

The empirical basis for these statements may be illustrated by the comparison of the dilettante and the successful artist: the dilettante often achieves the æsthetic libidinal experience with little effort but does not expend the work essential to technical mastery; the professional artist may, and often does, sacrifice this experience in fulfilling his need for technical mastery, but gains the experience of full utilization of his potentialities for performance. In my terminology, the art of the dilettante is dominated by the pleasure principle, that of the artist by the work principle. This distinction between the proportions of libidinal pleasure and work pleasure in different samples of artistic performance is made clear to every clinician by his observation of the function of dilettante art as the last hope for pleasure in some socially maladjusted people.

Further evidence of the primary importance of pleasure in achieving integration is to be found in the different effect produced when it is absent. Much psychotic behavior, for example, can be shown, even more obviously than the untrained artistic efforts of normals, to be a highly libidinized sublimation even when evidence of pleasure in an integrated effort is conspicuously lacking.

Occasionally, there is direct evidence that the work pleas-

ure resulting from an integrated performance is actually primary. Thus I have have observed a one-and-a-half-year-old child, using a pencil for the first time, make two parallel vertical strokes and some time afterwards point to each and say, 'This is Mama; this is Daddy'. There is a piece of work, and a fantasy representation affording pleasure in almost their simplest terms. Merely for the sake of argument, I should not attempt to refute an opinion that the words 'Mama' and 'Daddy' were here delayed verbalizations of conscious or unconscious ideas which motivated the pencil strokes. But I doubt such an interpretation, and find the assumption that the desire to make pencil marks because there was pleasure in skilful performance was primarily sufficient in itself. Equally instructive was the answer of a three-year-old girl when asked about her scribbling: 'First I make the picture, then I make the story'.[3]

Far more frequent than such observations are the opportunities to watch facile shifting of fantasy in small children when a change in the form of their work object occurs, often because of their technical failures. Thus, a child will first say he is building a house with his blocks, but when he perceives it has no windows he will say, 'No, it is a garage'. Or, he will say he is making a train with his scissors, and then noticing the ragged fringes will say he is giving the paper a 'haircut'. The motivating drive of such performances seems of a qualitatively different sort from the obvious basic fantasy which persists in determining a great variety of games invented by a three-and-a-half-year-old boy in order to play that he is making coffee *(18a)*. In the one, the application of hands or tools to material seems basic; in the other, the desire to use

[3] I am indebted to Mrs. Milton Erickson for contributing this poetical expression of the child's idea:

'I tried to draw a camel,
But it looked more like a horse,
So is that what I want and said it was?
Why sure I did, of course!'
From Little Bennie's Notebook.

any tool which will serve the desire to imitate a coffee machine. In the one, there is easy substitution of imaginative ideas; in the other, a quite compulsive consistency of ideas irrespective of the various technical mediums.

Such characteristics of infants appear to confirm the 'feeling' of many adults that they enjoy the use of tools regardless of the purpose for which they are used, indicating that imaginative associations are sometimes secondary pleasure goals. To other adults, neuromuscular techniques are put almost entirely in the service of their fantasies, just as the fantasy of making coffee motivated a great variety of executant activities in the child. It is not our purpose to go here more deeply into the interrelationships of work technique and fantasy, beyond the point of clearly recognizing that the functional use of minds and hands and tools is a primary pleasure, and that its derivation from the 'need to master' is a more reasonable hypothesis than the assumption—implicit or otherwise—that work is always primarily a sublimation of sexual fantasies.

Work and Reaction-Formation. Because reaction-formations often produce certain types of useful effort, they are related to problems of sublimation, but their differentiation from work is far simpler. Reaction-formations are those attitudes which are determined by a need to deny latent impulses and to act as though they did not exist, whereas sublimation utilizes the ego functions for achieving a substitute pleasure. Reaction-formations are therefore primarily denials—defense mechanisms (though normally useful and essential to socialized life)—whereas sublimation utilizes the capacity to work for the fulfilment of other needs, and is achieved through the libidinal utilization of executant functions. No more fundamental distinction between defense mechanism and an executant function of the ego exists than this, and yet it is often overlooked.

Work and the Repetition Compulsion. The potentialities of the work principle for clarifying psychoanalytic problems is particularly evident when we consider its relation to the repetition compulsion. Freud stated *(6)* that the theory of

the repetition compulsion was his answer to that same problem which led to this paper—that the pleasure and reality principles do not account for some very important psychological facts. Freud illustrated this problem by the transference neurosis, traumatic neurosis, destiny neurosis, and an example of an infant's play. He stated clearly that the repetition compulsion manifested in these conditions was a basic attribute of instinct which produces repetition of certain behavior and experience, irrespective of the striving for pleasure.[4] What I wish to add is that every manifestation of this property of instincts is *prima facie* evidence that the ego is not functioning adequately; when the means of discharging tension by an appropriately integrated act are available, objective and subjective evidence of the repetition compulsion disappears. In other words, libidinal and aggressive instincts are normally subordinated to the work principle in the sense that pleasurable gratification depends upon effective integrations, and it is only when the ego is inadequate that evidence of the repetition compulsion reappears.

In a previous paper *(18b)* I have discussed the most conclusive evidence of this, the fact that during the earliest stages of ego development, the first two years of life, the compulsion to practice each sensory and motor function as it becomes

[4] Freud's attempt to answer this question was inevitably channeled by his lifelong preoccupation with the instinctual interpretation of dynamic psychology; and even his later analysis of the dynamics of the superego and anxiety in the etiology of neurosis had not yet led to considering the basic facts of the development of the executant functions from which our present argument proceeds. That the theory of the repetition compulsion has not been completely satisfactory is indicated by the recent discussions of the problem by Kubie *(21)*, Bibring *(2)*, and others, and by the fact, which Kubie reiterates, that the term 'repetition compulsion' has been used in a number of senses by both Freud and other writers.

Nonetheless, the validity and value of the concept of the repetition compulsion is to my mind beyond question. The multiplicity of usages of the term is due to derived meanings, such as the use of a theoretical term for clinical description, and is implicitly a confirmation rather than a denial of its original meaning. I have previously discussed my agreement *(18c)* with Kubie that the validity of the theory of the repetition compulsion does not depend upon acceptance or rejection of the death instinct theory, that it characterizes sexual impulses as well; and also my reasons for disagreeing with his conclusion that the concept is redundant and unnecessary.

physiologically practicable, such as ocular fixation, prehension, phonation, locomotion, etc., displays the characteristic features of the repetition compulsion; but when mastery of each motor technique is attained, evidence of repetition for its own sake disappears, and the skill then becomes available for purposes which serve other goals of the total personality. These characteristics of the immature partial function I have called 'the stage of the unlearned function'. They seem to me conclusive evidence that all manifestations of the repetition compulsion in later years display a regression to the infantile type of ego organization, a return of that compulsion to repeat which is characteristic of the unlearned function. Thus all psychoneurotic symptoms and character traits manifest the compulsion to repeat, and in doing so disclose not only an instinctual need, as pointed out by Freud, but also a functional defect of the ego—a failure of the work principle. Similar evidence of what I have called *regression to the stage of the unlearned function* appears whenever the ego is inadequate for some reason other than sexual conflict. Thus, the failure to develop certain essential ego functions gives rise to the compulsive repetitions which characterize both psychoses and ego-defect neuroses, and also those which are pathognomonic of traumatic neurosis.[5] It is therefore only by supplementing Freud's interpretation of the compulsion to repeat, as an attribute of instincts not compatible with the pleasure principle, by an appraisal of the executant functions of the ego and their development, that the full import of this phenomenon is made clear.

III

Applications of the Work Principle. I am emboldened to explain this view of the work principle, and its origin in the partial functions of infancy, because it broadens our perspective of many problems of human behavior and motivation in which psychoanalysis is especially interested. I shall now discuss briefly a few topics to show how this viewpoint, while in no

[5]The various situations which display the characteristics of the stage of the unlearned function have previously been summarized by me *(18d)*.

wise disputing general analytic experience and its interpretation in terms of the libido and anxiety theories, supplements older views and provides a more complete understanding of many aspects of human experience.

The simplest illustrations are those physiological functions which provide sensual pleasure, sometimes exquisite, in the satisfaction of physiological needs. Thus the infant's suckling is not only a physiologically necessary and intensely pleasurable act; it is also an early example of the concurrence of highly integrated muscular work and sensual pleasure. Recognition that suckling is a partial function of the ego contributes fundamentally to the interpretation of a variety of clinical data. I may illustrate this statement by reference to observations reported by me *(13)* which showed a relationship between fantasies of ejecting food and rejection of people by schizoid adults. Our present viewpoint suggests that these fantasies reveal an ego defect resulting from pathology of the partial function of suckling, and not merely a denial of libidinal objects.

We come to very similar conclusions when we interpret mental response to a normal bowel movement in terms of its ego as well as of its libido components. A bowel movement is regarded from the 'common-sense' point of view as an essential physiological act; but from the standpoint derived from abundant psychoanalytic material it has been recognized as also a survival of the erotogenic pleasures of infancy, for it is commonly associated with fantasies of anal pregnancy, anal phallus, anal reception, anal retention, etc. But the proven rôle of these fantasies in neurotic, psychotic, and some psychosomatic disorders inclines us to overlook the fact that the great mass of this material was observed in patients suffering from physiological disturbances of this function or from conflict involving the unconscious subjective experience associated with it. Though I find it impossible to estimate the relative contribution of anal-erotic fantasies to defæcation pleasure when no unconscious conflict is involved (the Sears Roebuck catalogue has proved it is considerable and universal), I do not

ignore them. But I do feel that the act also provides an elemental form of satisfaction in 'doing the job' well, in integrating a piece of work successfully, and is, therefore, like sucking and grasping, a primitive and enduring form of work pleasure.

A similar coinciding of fantasy gratification and satisfaction in well coördinated performance is to be recognized in the more complex phenomena ordinarily interpreted as anal sublimations. Thus, when a housewife takes pleasure in cleaning up she is normally not merely finding a substitute for a tabooed pleasure in dirt; nor is she merely preparing a clean genital substitute (her house) for exhibition to her guests that evening; nor simply protecting herself from the reproaches of her finger-snooping mother-substitute lady-friends. She may be motivated by all these libidinal reasons, their relative importance depending upon the individual case. But she is also performing work; and in those hours of house cleaning which yield pleasure (it is only the hours of dutiful or neurotic drudgery which others hear about), the pleasure is primarily again in the job well done, in efficient performance of a useful task.

This obvious fact of normal experience, that there is pleasure in work which has no specific relationship to the fantasies gratified, is of course never denied. But it is lost sight of in the newer knowledge of how unconscious fantasies may commonly be disguised by reaction-formation. It again illustrates the tendency of modern analysis to consider the executant functions of the ego as products of its defensive functions, to confuse the reality principle and the work principle, libidinal pleasure and work pleasure, and to interpret the normal executant functions of the ego in terms of guilt that is avoided rather than in terms of achievement that yields pleasure.

The significance of the work principle is also illustrated by the individual's adjustment to group activity, for example army morale. In his chief contribution to dynamic sociology Freud *(7)* discussed the libidinal organization of an army. He emphasized that such a group, in contrast to a mob, is dependent upon the interidentification of its members in the love

of a father ideal represented by a commander (one point for which the Nazis should not have burned his books). Other authors, Waelder, Fromm, and Alexander, for example, have from time to time discussed other aspects of this problem, that battle is socially permissible murder, that the unconscious goal of war is the rape of the forbidden female, that the displacement of aggression onto an enemy of one's country enhances the ability to love one's friends at home without ambivalence, etc. These are very important components of war morale, but particularly of civilian and noncombatant morale. Yet the morale of the efficient soldier under combat conditions cannot be fully understood without taking into account the work principle; fantasy fulfilment is trivial when the soldier is actually confronted by the reality of battle. When his morale is fully put to the test under such conditions as trench warfare in 1917, the libidinal motivations of the soldier are largely liquidated. The national ideal soon becomes meaningless to the individual, the heroic ego ideal is rarely encountered, hatred of enemy soldiers is supplanted by identification attitudes towards them, and officers are as often hated as admired. Yet the soldier continues to fight unto death. To the best of my knowledge, the soldiers who stood this test were those whose fantasies of victory and a pleasant future had become meaningless; they kept on fighting because it was a soldier's daily job, and to do the job was the only motivation that was still meaningful. The ultimate dependence of an army upon men who can still function effectively under such conditions is the sublime test of men's will to perform their work effectively.

The work principle has also many applications to clinical problems, perhaps none more important than the evaluation of cases of marital discord. Analytic experience and successful therapy have tended to produce the erroneous impression that marital problems are entirely a consequence of neurotic conflict. But there are some marital problems, or more frequently important components of the total marital relationship, which are conflicts between the ego structure of the partners,

and not entirely the consequence of conflicts within the personality of one or both. The usual layman's ascription of marital discord to differences of 'temperament' and 'background' is often justified, though the mere statement of the fact, without intensive analysis of the how, is of no therapeutic value. There are probably not only differences in those physiological rhythms described by Foster Kennedy *(20)* determining sexual incompatibilities, but differences in hours of sleep, meal habits, energy release in social and other activities. Such differences, to some extent constitutional, are productive of different egos, of incompatibility of work capacities and particularly of work goals.

Extreme examples of such discord can be found among marriages of schizoid and cyclothymic people, neither of whose personalities may produce serious maladjustment outside of marriage. A less obvious source of marital incompatibility, not fully evaluated because the analytic recognition of the œdipus complex has tended to make the patriarchial family our standard of normalcy, is that between partners one of whose egos is organized around a matriarchal, the other around a patriarchal, fantasy. Either is compatible with our cultural framework, but they dictate different family patterns which may be irreconcilable in marriage. Incompatibilities of temperament and ego will provide constant conflicts, each of which is a fuse to whatever neurotic problems are latent. But often incompatibilities of the demands for work pleasure, rhythms of work pleasure, and patterns are basic.

As our final example of the usefulness of the work principle in appraising clinical problems, we shall mention again the starting point of this series of articles, the defective ego functions which characterize psychoses *(19)* and such personalities as schizoid, paranoid, and passive feminine men *(16)*. In all such cases there is evidence of infantile object relations, retaliation anxiety, and prominent defense mechanisms more primitive than repression and reaction-formation. And there is also abundant evidence of defects of executant mechanisms, particularly of reality testing and, except in restricted fields, of

the capacity to gratify the need to master by mature and useful work. This inability to cope normally with the environment (it might be called the 'ecological conflict') does not however indicate a lapse of the work principle, as defined above. It indicates that in the absence of certain functions essential to an adequate adult ego, the work principle is effected by infantile techniques. These primitive executant functions should be carefully disinguished from the defense mechanisms, such as repression and reaction-formation, which result from the handling of a neurotic conflict by a healthy ego.

Maladjusted schizoids, for example, reject most normal competitive situations, and thereby disguise their intense need to master. Nonetheless, the need for mastery underlies both the obvious and the masked negativism which characterizes them. This technique of refusal to seduce or comply is almost a replica of the infant's most formidable weapon, providing him with the subjective experience, 'You are powerless to influence me; so I am strong, not you'.

The typical psychopath, presenting antisocial conduct without defective reality sense, is subjectively controlling the world very much as the little child who strikes at its mother and thereby sustains its fantasy, 'You, not I, are small and helpless'. The paranoid shows a basic inability to distinguish or compare his intuitions of the deep hostility of others and their manifest behavior, and acts like the child who says, 'I am kitty; it isn't I, it is kitty who wet the bed'. The passive feminine man is conspicuously lacking in the capacity for mature self-assertion, has many devices for playing at mastery, resembling a child's recourse to toys when he feels: 'I cannot make big people do what I want, but I can make my little engine'. These represent very different types of ego, but what they all have in common is that the work principle is manifested in an infantile way. The desire to master is not lacking, but the ability to gratify it by adult types of work is defective.[6]

[6] I am indebted to Dr. Jenny Waelder (Boston) for a striking example of the effectiveness of an immature technique of ego mastery in a boy of nine. He was brought for treatment of frequent and intractable refusals to obey

This is no attempt to generalize the personality structure and maladjustments of ego defect neuroses completely. But it is an attempt to call emphatically to attention that ego defects are clinical problems of a quite different sort from those produced by defenses against œdipal phobias. It is not a solution of these problems which is sought here, but a statement of the importance of investigating extensively the ontogeny of the executant functions, and the relations between certain types of adult failure and normal infantile responses to the drive to integrate effectively. Typical neurotics punish themselves and exhibit themselves as unconsciously castrated in their work failures; basic maturity of the ego is shown during analysis when work improvement follows the conscious experience of castration anxiety. The cases we are discussing satisfy the need for work pleasure, but obtain it in immature ways.

IV

Conclusions. 1. The work principle has been formulated as the need of human beings for the pleasure afforded by effective integration of the neuromuscular and intellectual functions. It has been emphasized that although generally experienced together with libidinal pleasure, work pleasure is not, primarily, displaced or sublimated sensual pleasure.

2. It has been recommended that the work principle be regarded as an expression of an instinct to master whose goal is control or alteration of environmental situations through the effective development of integrated intellectual and motor functions. This hypothesis would seem to provide an adequate theory of the need to integrate which impels development and

his mother, leading to physical struggles with her. This pattern of stubborn disobedience was immediately reproduced in his reaction to the therapist. Only after months of work did he confide to her that he had overheard his parents' discussion of plans for separation and their agreement that his mother was to take the patient. The patient then decided he would prevent the plan to separate him from his father by deliberately acting intractable. His passive feminine attitude to his father and to stronger boys expressed a deep neurotic conflict. But his aggressive disobedience was itself not a compulsive expression of repressed instinctual needs; it was a conscious and deliberate use of the most adequate means available to prevent a realistic disaster.

use of the executant functions of the ego, and by so doing it would simplify the application of instinct theory to ego psychology and pathology.

3. Evidence presented in a previous paper *(18)* has been summarized to show that the first objective evidence of the work principle is to be observed in the development of each 'partial function' during infancy, when the stereotyped repetition of the function is replaced by the ability to modify the function effectively and adapt it to tasks which satisfy the need to master. The work-principle should therefore be regarded as evidence of maturity of an ego function, and the repetition compulsion as evidence that the ego is functioning inadequately for the skilful performance of a certain task.

4. These considerations introduce us to the study of the normal executant functions, their development and integration; and they emphasize that such study is an essential supplement to analysis of the defense mechanisms. This point of view has the advantage of adequately recognizing the rôle of ego defects in various clinical problems, and of their ontogenetic relation to imperfections in early ego development.

In conclusion, let me say that I feel that possibly my discourse is after all only a fancy version of plain 'common sense'. Yet it is a common sense which the best analysts have always applied in their appraisal and treatment of human ploblems. But perhaps it is the inclusion of this common sense, as well as of specialized knowledge, within our formal theoretical framework, that our science needs.

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CONCERNING THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF CONVULSIVE DISORDERS

BY LEO H. BARTEMEIER (DETROIT)

In an article entitled Dostoevski and Parricide, which appeared in 1929, Freud provided us with our first clear understanding of affective epilepsy through his painstaking psychological study of the life and character of the famous Russian novelist. His careful investigation showed us the specific connections between the severe emotional disturbance which Dostoevski had suffered as a child and his later epileptic attacks. It revealed that his seizures were the more violent manifestations of the very same impulses which had troubled him in his boyhood, and it portrayed convincingly why the murder of his father in his eighteenth year became the precipitating factor which determined the outbreak of his convulsive disorder. Here for the first time we could trace the earlier and later effects of the murderous feelings of a son towards his father. In his childhood they had resulted in morbid fears about his own death, and in his adolescence, following the actual murder of his father, he began having epileptic seizures of the *grand mal* type. These violent attacks represented his own deathlike punishment. He had wished to kill his father in order to be in his father's place. In his seizures he was his father, but the dead father. Freud therefore regarded Dostoveski's epileptic attacks as the symptoms of a hystero-epilepsy or a serious hysterical neurosis and he took care to differentiate it from those convulsive seizures which are organic in origin. Freud saw Dostoevski as a man who had a marked bisexual predisposition and one who was possessed of a very strong destructive impulse which throughout his life was directed mainly against his own person. In his article he said of him that 'in little things he was a sadist to others, in bigger things a sadist to himself, that is, a masochist, who is the mildest, kindliest, most helpful

human being possible.' [1] In his general remarks about epilepsy Freud said that 'the similarity of the external symptoms (i.e., the convulsion—in organic and in affective epilepsy) seems to demand a functional conception, as if the mechanism of the abnormal impulsive discharge were organically prepared in advance, to be called upon in quite different conditions, both during disturbances of the cerebral activity due to serious histolytic and toxic affections, and also in case of inadequate control of the psychic economy, the action of the energy working in the soul in a crisis. But beyond the division (that is, between organic and affective epilepsy) we glimpse the identity of the fundamental mechanism of the impulsive outlet. . . . The "epileptic reaction," as this common element may be called, without doubt also places itself at the disposal of the neurosis, the essence of which is to get rid, by somatic means, of masses of stimuli which it cannot deal with psychically.' [2] These statements show that Freud regarded the convulsion as an organically prepared mechanism, existent in all human beings and capable of being elicited for the purpose of discharging masses of tension which are derived either from organic sources or from disturbances within the psychic economy. Our common observation that convulsions can be produced artificially in every person—as in shock therapy—attests to Freud's theory that the convulsive mechanism is organically preformed in every human being. The similarity of this to the complex of anxiety which can also be called out in every person under appropriate circumstances is most striking and more will be mentioned about this later. In connection with these ideas we should recall that according to Freud it is the function of the psychic apparatus to distribute and discharge the quantities of psychic energy streaming into it from the instinctual sources and from the external world. Every neurotic symptom, even though it is painful, signifies a discharge of a quantity of psychic energy and consequently a reduction of tension within the psychic apparatus. In this connection I am reminded of a man who

[1] Freud: *Dostoevski and Parricide.* The Realist, I, No. 4, 1929, p. 19.
[2] *Ibid,* p. 21.

suffers from *grand mal* seizures which are invariably nocturnal. His mother knows days in advance that he is going to have a convulsion. She observes that he becomes increasingly moody and irritable, and that he has a wild look in his eyes. After his convulsion she always remarks that 'he is himself again', by which she means that he is once more pleasant and cheerful. Through his seizures he discharges against himself masses of excitation to which he cannot give normal expression, and it is clear to see how the mechanism of his convulsions restores his psychic equilibrium.

Freud discovered that from a psychological point of view perfect mental normality does not exist because everyone shows numerous defects in mental functioning. His discovery that these are brought about by similar psychological mechanisms as those operating in the neuroses, bridged the gap which had always existed between mental health and mental disorder, and which are now distinguished from each other only by quantitative factors. This elimination of any line of demarcation between those who seemingly enjoy good mental health and those who are neurotic leads us to ask the question: what manifestations may we observe in the psychopathology of everyday life which correspond to the *petit mal* or *grand mal* seizures of the epileptic? Before discussing this, it is necessary to indicate in advance that we shall not expect to find involuntary patterns of behavior which are identical in all respects with the typical epileptic seizure. It may be as it is with anxiety: instead of a fully developed attack of acute anxiety we often observe only part-manifestations. We may, for example, observe nothing more than a moderate tachycardia, a little perspiration coming from the axillæ or an undue and irregular blinking of the eyes of the patient.

Before presenting some of the involuntary motor responses from everyday life which may have the same meaning, and which appear to be patterned after the convulsive mechanism, permit me to refer briefly to an article by Shanahan published in 1928. Shanahan makes the following significant observation: 'Any person may at some time of life have some sort of an epileptiform reaction. In fact, some writers say we are all

epileptics . . . compare sleep starts with myoclonic jerks, absent-mindedness and daydreams with *petit mal,* and one appreciates the lack of sharp definition between normal and perverted function of the living human mechanism.' [3] These statements, which are based on years of clinical experience and observation, are in full agreement with Freud's opinion that the epileptic reaction is organically prepared in all human beings and that there is no sharp demarcation between those who suffer from neuroses and those whom we regard as well adjusted.

Among the phenomena which occur frequently in everyday life and which correspond to convulsive attacks, I wish to consider the sleep starts referred to by Dr. Shanahan. They happen to a great many people who ordinarily attach no significance to them. A sleep start may be described as a sudden and rather violent contraction of large muscle groups in the lower extremities which is accompanied by an unpleasant or somewhat painful sensation; the person who experiences it is either partially or fully awakened by it a few moments after he has entered upon a light sleep. This phenomenon is quite immediately followed by a seemingly deeper type of sleep. I am of the impression that the neurophysiologists who refer to this phenomenon as a presomnescent start are of the opinion that it occurs in that moment when the cortical control over the lower centers is removed and that it is therefore a normal physiological process in connection with falling asleep. We might be inclined to agree with this theory were it not for the fact that it does not take place in all people and that it is frequently accompanied by a dream in which the person is reaching for an object, stumbling or falling forward. Persons who experience this phenomenon usually refer to it by saying that they 'jump' in their sleep. The fact that it invariably occurs after the onset of sleep, that it is a very sudden and seemingly violent muscular process, and that it is followed by a deeper sleep, suggests the idea that it is a mechanism of discharge of tensions and that after the release of these the

[3] Shanahan, William T.: *Convulsions in Infancy and Their Relationship, If Any, to a Subsequent Epilepsy.* Amer. J. of Psychiatry, VII, 1928, p. 604.

person is better prepared for sound sleep. In this connection, I wish to direct your attention to the advice given by a lay person for the overcoming of insomnia which recently appeared in the New York Times.[4]

It was recommended that instead of counting sheep, reading or listening to music, those unable to fall asleep should lie on their backs, stretch their arms, clench their fists and then let themselves go. Similarly, it was recommended to lie on the bed face down, to grasp the bedposts and stretch, and then relax. Finally, it was suggested to draw up the knees tightly to the chest, tense the muscles, and then let the legs drop on the bed.

These exercises for overcoming insomnia appear to be artificial reproductions of sleep starts, and the directions suggest that the one who formulated them sensed the value of generalized muscular contractions and sudden relaxation for getting rid of accumulated affects in order to make sleep possible. By all of this I wish to suggest that the involuntary sleep starts which I have been describing seem to serve the same need in otherwise healthy persons as do the convulsions to the epileptic. This need is the discharge of accumulated affects and the restoration of psychic equilibrium. We know, too, that satisfying sexual intercourse, which also has its convulsive component, is highly conducive to sleep. Freud reminds us that 'the earliest doctors called coitus a little epilepsy' and he tells us that 'they recognized in the sexual act a mitigation and adaptation of the epileptic irritation outlet' [5] (i.e., the organically prepared mechanism).

In his article, Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality,[6] Ferenczi wrote about the hallucinatory stage of wish fulfilment in the child which is 'characterized by the occurrence of motor discharges (crying, struggling) on the occasion of disagreeable affects. These are now made use of by the child as magical signals, at the dictation of which the satisfac-

[4] New York Times, February 17, 1942.

[5] Freud: *Dostoevski and Parricide. Loc cit.*, p. 21.

[6] Ferenczi, Sándor: *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis.* Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1916, pp. 223–224.

tion promptly arrives.' Ferenczi said, 'When I search in pathology for an analogy to these discharges I have always to think of genuine epilepsy'. He called attention to the fact that 'epileptics are known to be uncommonly sensitive beings behind whose submissiveness frightful rage and domineeringness can appear on the least occasion. This characteristic has, up to the present, usually been interpreted as a secondary degeneration, as the consequence of repeated attacks. One should, however, think of another possibility, namely, whether the epileptic attacks are not to be considered as regressions to the infantile period of wish fulfilment by means of uncoördinated movements. Epileptics would then be persons with whom the disagreeable affects get heaped up and are periodically abreacted in paroxysms. If this explanation proves to be useful we should have to localize the place of fixation for a later affliction of epilepsy in this stage of uncoördinated wish manifestations.' Ferenczi concluded these views with the following statement: 'The irrational stamping of the feet, clenching of the fists, and grinding of the teeth, etc., that are to be seen in outbursts of anger would be a milder form of the same regression in otherwise healthy persons.'

This theory, which regards outbursts of rage that are constructed according to an infantile pattern as milder regressions of the same process that occurs in epilepsy, finds confirmation in the language we employ to describe both phenomena. We speak, for example, of a fit of rage and we use the same word when we refer to a convulsion.

Among the involuntary motor responses of everyday life which appear to be identical with certain aspects of an epileptic seizure, we think of the unintentional biting of the tongue, the grinding of the teeth during sleep as well as during waking life, and finally, the clenching of the jaws during sleep. Each of these manifestations, which occur in persons not known to be suffering from any mental disorder or any central or local irritation, comprise involuntary discharges of oral destructive impulses. Biting the tongue or the inner surface of the cheek is invariably sensed as an accident by the person to whom it happens, and the sufferer occasionally has some awareness that he

hurt himself instead of someone else. Grinding the teeth while asleep or awake, and clenching the jaws during sleep, are usually regarded as 'habits' by those in whom they occur and they are ordinarily classified as epileptic equivalents. Some persons are aware that when they become angry during the day they 'set' their jaws in an effort to suppress and, at the same time, to discharge at least a portion of their rage. They are people with a great amount of oral aggressiveness who, while appearing to control themselves very well, nevertheless direct their rage against themselves in clamping their jaws. I think that unintentional grinding of the teeth represents a regression to that period in infancy when the jaws are the most powerfully developed portions of the muscular apparatus, and that such automatic behavior is an isolated part of which the epileptic seizure is the whole. There are persons who irregularly grind their teeth throughout their lives and who never have convulsions.

The study of a six-year-old boy who suffered from severe seizures of *petit mal* which I reported in 1932,[7] showed that his attacks were the manifestations of a conversion hysteria. The momentary immobilization of his expressive apparatus together with the suspension of consciousness represented his identification with his younger sister in her death which he had so guiltily desired. In his fourth year his parents had observed momentary periods of inattentiveness which they later came to regard as transitory deafness. By the time he was five years old these brief lapses had changed into moments of unconsciousness and as they increased in frequency they gradually assumed the more characteristic features of *petit mal.* This progressive development from moments of inattentiveness, which did not impress his parents as being abnormal, to the final appearance of deathlike faints, suggested that the initial manifestation of his disorder was only the milder form of the later pathological process.

Moments of inattentiveness, brief periods of absent-minded-

[7] Bartemeier, Leo H.: *Some Observations of Convulsive Disorders in Children.* Amer. J. of Orthopsychiatry, II, 1932, pp. 260–267.

ness and occasional staring into space are correctly regarded as normal characteristics of psychic functioning. We think of them ordinarily as momentary devices of surcease from the unpleasantness of reality, and it is only when they occur frequently, when they are prolonged and increase in depth, that they take on pathological significance. In addition to the satisfaction which the everyday withdrawal mechanisms afford, however, it is often apparent that they also include the passive release of varying quantities of aggression in interpersonal situations.

We imagine therefore that these insignificant incidents of our daily lives resemble the hysterical symptom formation of *petit mal* because they obviously sometimes combine discharge of and release from tensions which are unpleasant to bear. The difference therefore between these everyday occurrences and *petit mal* appears to involve only the quantitative factor.

I should like to describe one hysterical symptom which in a measure was identical with a *petit mal* attack. This occurred in a prepsychotic character who complained of unpleasant feelings of numbness of her face, particularly in the areas of her eyes. In addition, she experienced a twitching of the eyelids and sharp pains as if her 'eyes would fall out'. This suffering represented a turning against herself of strong impulses to scratch out and tear out the eyes of others. This, as we have seen, was the mechanism in the six-year-old boy who suffered from *petit mal* and in the case of Dostoevski whose convulsions were *grand mal* in character.

I can state my preliminary conclusions as follows: convulsions are a general way to discharge destructive energy autoplastically. While all human beings have this innate, preformed possibility of discharge, the predisposition of those who finally develop a convulsive pathology consists in their predilection for the convulsive way of discharge. If the energy quantum is high enough and other ways are blocked, even the non-predisposed individual will turn to convulsions in order to relieve the mental apparatus of tension, and to a minor degree every individual will show convulsive manifestations in some way or other.

SUBLIMATION

BY GÉZA RÓHEIM (NEW YORK)

Sublimation is admittedly one of the crucial problems in psychoanalysis. While it seems to me that nobody who has analyzed even a single case can have the slightest doubts about the existence of the process of sublimation, yet we find that some opponents of psychoanalysis (in the freudian sense) regard it as a 'questionable guide'.[1] A recent writer on culture makes the surprising statement that the word has almost disappeared from technical literature.[2] In Civilization and its Discontents Freud says: 'Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural evolution; this it is that makes it possible for the higher mental operations, scientific, artistic, ideological activities to play such an important part in civilized life. If one were to yield to a first impression, one would be tempted to say that sublimation is a fate which has been forced upon instincts by culture alone. But it is better to reflect over this a while longer.'[3]

The discussion of sublimation which follows is based mainly on my own clinical experience.

Patient A is being analyzed because of his recurring depressions. This is his second analysis, and after a few months a memory of the age of three is revived. His father had left for another country a short time before. A brother was born and he distinctly remembers how he was standing on a table, stretching his neck to get a glimpse of his mother. There was a group of people standing around the mother and the baby and he could not see them clearly. He remembers now that there was great excitement in the family after this because the infant nearly died in consequence of his circumcision, and the

1 Kardiner, A.: *The Individual and His Society.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, p. 486.

2 Unwin, J. D.: *Sex and Culture.* London: Humphrey Milford, 1934, p. 314.

3 Freud: *Civilization and Its Discontents.* New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1930, p. 63.

whole family traveled to the capital of the country to see a famous specialist.

The fantasies connected with this memory make its significance quite clear. He throws an axe at his mother and at the baby which cleaves both at a stroke. He splits his mother (or his wife or other women) right open, investigates the inside very carefully, and then scoops or cuts everything out till only a clean surface is left. Or he climbs up a ladder and pours a caldron of scalding hot water on mother and child. Innumerable body destruction fantasies in which the mother is sometimes replaced by a ship, a whale, a cupboard, or anything else radiate from this event. In another form of the archetypal fantasy (I mean the fantasy which is directly connected with the revived memory) the object thrown at mother and child is a boomerang and all the aggressions are turned against the ego. These aggressions turned inward *are* his neurosis, his depression. Neurosis is an archaism (Freud), but an archaism of a specific kind. The personality holds on to or is under the sway of a traumatic situation.

Patient B is being analyzed for impotency. The crucial point in his analysis is the return of his father at the end of the World War. He must have been about three years old when this happened. Till then he slept with his mother but after he was not allowed to sleep in her bed any more and was put into a crib. He remembers his father's gruff voice and his top boots. His father had gone to the front shortly after his birth, so it was now a total stranger who appeared on the scene to oust him. At the age of three he was thus degraded from the status of a husband to that of a little boy. So now he was showing that such a thing could never happen again. He refuses to be a man, refuses to love women. He will not work because if he gets a job he might be thrown out again. In his helplessness he gets vicarious satisfaction because he keeps his mother worried about his state of health.

The neurosis is a repetition, not necessarily of a trauma as in these cases; it may also be a traumatic situation. A young girl

who always does everything too late, and always denies that the analytic hour has come to an end when it has actually ended, was the youngest of three siblings. Her father showed a marked preference both for her elder brother and elder sister, and when later the father's affection turned to the patient she rejected his love with a fierce hatred. Everything in life came too late for her.

Vilma Kovács describes the case of a patient who came to be analyzed because of his agoraphobia and impotency. As a young boy he had been in a sense seduced by his mother and his sister, who was eight years older than himself; that is, they both played with his penis and admired it. The birth of a younger sister separated him from close physical intimacy with his mother and was the first defeat he suffered in life. The curious thing, however, was that he continually sought just those situations which were fraught with anxiety for him.[4]

Every neurosis seems therefore to be in a sense similar to shell shock, in which the traumatic situation is repeated in an undisguised motor form.[5] In a recent paper, The Repetitive Core of the Neurosis, Kubie writes: 'Neurosis arises out of the interplay between basic biological drives, their inevitable frustrations, and the resulting repressions of rage, guilt, and terror. . . . The neurotic process is . . . a pathological distortion of repetitive processes.' [6] Vilma Kovács believes that neurosis originates when the tendency towards an unconscious repetition of the traumatic situation is opposed by the experiences gathered by the conscious ego.[7]

Neurosis, of course, is not the only aspect of human nature in which a childhood situation is repeated. Leonardo da Vinci had a fantasy, or rather a cover memory, in which a vulture flies to him when he is still in the cradle. The vulture opens the

[4] Kovács, Vilma.: *Wiederholungstendenz und Charakterbildung.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XVII, 1931, pp. 450–451.

[5] *Cf.* Freud: *Jenseits des Lustprinzips.* Ges. Schr., VI, p. 191.

[6] Kubie, Lawrence S.: *The Repetitive Core of Neurosis.* This QUARTERLY, X, 1941, p. 39.

[7] Kovács, Vilma: *Op. cit.*, p. 463.

child's mouth with its tail and presses against his lips several times.[8] Freud shows how this fantasy can be understood as a composite formation based on the situation of the infant with the nipple in its mouth and of the many kisses showered on the child by a loving mother.[9] Moreover, we know that the first attempts at sculpture undertaken by this great genius were representations of laughing women and of children.[10] Freud shows that many of his greatest works of art, like the portrait of Mona Lisa or the 'Mettertia' (Anna the mother of the Virgin with the Virgin and the Infant Christ), are reproductions of the infantile situation of Leonardo who had a good stepmother and a grandmother who both loved the child.[11] As these works of art are undoubtedly what we call a sublimation, it seems that a sublimation is also the repetition of an infantile situation, but with this difference: neurosis represents infantile tragedy; sublimation the happy union of mother and child, or at least infantile happiness, a traumatic situation that has been successfully mastered. In a case analyzed by Lorand we have the nucleus of the whole situation. Lorand describes how a child who was left alone by his mother all the time becomes an inventor, and how the inventions in the dream all represent the infantile situation, himself in happy reunion with his mother.[12] In a case of severe compulsion neurosis which I analyzed, the patient, a doctor of medicine, was completely dependent on his wife financially. When the analysis had progressed far enough so that he was about to break away from this dependency, he suddenly invented a number of things, although he had never thought of doing anything of this kind before. All his inventions represented the dependency situation, a child hanging on to a mother, himself held by his wife. The sublimation in this case obviously represents a neurosis that has been mastered.

[8] Freud: *Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci.* Ges. Schr. IX, p. 393.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 421.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 423.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 427.

[12] Lorand, S.: *A Note on the Psychology of the Inventor.* This QUARTERLY, III, 1934, p. 30.

According to Hermann, libidinal strivings directed toward the mother and the libidinal cathexis of the hand form the basis of the art of drawing.[13]

Another case throws some light on the meaning of sublimation. This is a character analysis with one outstanding symptom. The symptom is an anxiety that he will choke, and gasping for breath. The personality is of the perfectionist type, that is, he must always have the best of everything, a demand which he carries to extremes. If he buys a shotgun or radio or automobile or anything else, the slightest unevenness or abrasion on the surface, or the fact that it is anything but the best and most recent in quality, is enough not only to make him reject it but also to go into a veritable temper tantrum about it. Daily he finds something wrong about his wife, and in his rage he even goes to the length of beating her. Analysis reveals a common denominator in these symptoms. The trouble with shotguns, automobiles, etc., is that they are bought in order to deny his castration anxiety. The slightest abrasion on the surface, however, is enough to deprive them of this therapeutic value. It seems simply impossible to get a perfect and indestructible penis, and castration anxiety transformed into rage is the result. In the case of his wife the trouble is simply that she is a woman, that she has a vulva and not a penis. One of his early infantile memories is that of the 'black vagina'. He saw a woman urinating on the street and had a mysterious and uncanny feeling in connection with this sight. This was at the age of about five. This black vagina was that of an unknown woman, but in his associations it becomes confused with his mother and a nurse. The nurse was a peasant woman with jet black hair, who told him all sorts of things about magic and spells. In his dreams he exercises a powerful magical influence, has a magic weapon, or has invented a supernatural machine. His magic is the answer to the nurse's (mother's, woman's) magic; the erection is the answer to the castration threat repre-

[13] Hermann, I.: *Beiträge zur Psychogenese der zeichnerischen Begabung.* Imago, VIII, 1922, p. 54.

sented by the sight of the vagina. Another angle of the castration anxiety is represented by his relation to his father. He must be perfect to fight father or to protect himself against him. His opinion about his father is that he never gave him anything voluntarily; everything had to be fought for. In the course of the analysis he gradually finds out that this opinion is exaggerated, and that his father was much kinder to him in his childhood than he thought. A scene that had been repressed is remembered in the analysis. He must have been a boy of about three when he saw a circumcision. He remembers the blood and he is quite certain that the infant was sitting on his father's lap, and that his father was holding it while it was being circumcised. Both aspects of the castration complex were worked through: the father as castrator and the 'vagina dentata', that is, the penis being castrated by the black vagina. The father as castrator was determined both by the father's general behavior and by the traumatic scene, and it was not until the latter was remembered that the castration anxiety was diminished and the whole personality began to change. Previously, as I mentioned before, the patient would reject anything he bought if there was the slightest scar or unevenness on the surface. He explained this himself when he described how happy he was when his son was born and what a perfect baby it was. But after the circumcision he fancied that the surface left after cutting off the foreskin did not heal completely or quite evenly, so for a few days he lost all interest in his son and had the notion that 'he was going to send him back where he came from'.

The emotions connected with the memory of the black vagina were also connected with castration anxiety, but not because this was a proof that the penis had been cut off. The vision of the black vagina rather meant sexual excitement and the loss of the penis as the possible climax of an orgasm.[14] His great anxiety symptom, his quick breathing and fear of choking,

[14] *Cf.* Ferenczi, S.: *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie.* Vienna: Int. Psa., Verlag, 1924, pp. 40–41. (Trans. by H. Alden Bunker: *Thalassa, A Theory of Genitality.* Albany, New York: The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 1938.)

was also connected with castration anxiety. The symptom originated when he was a little boy of five and was expected to say his prayers in Hebrew before supper. His mother supervised the proceeding, but he always got a terrific fit of anxiety and would gasp for breath so that his mother had to interrupt the prayers and take him out of the house. The latent meaning of all this was a rebirth ceremony. His mother had to give birth to him again and thus rescue him from the wrath of God, of Father, of the Castrator.

His neurosis was mainly a denial of his castration anxiety, or one could also call it a sublimation that partly failed. But only partly, because on the basis of his fantasies about his indestructible and permanently erect penis, and of his perfectionism which developed from this fantasy, he actually achieved great perfection in his work and great pleasure in his profession. The neurotic aspects were not, however, mastered by this reaction formation, so that the latter had to be exaggerated and maintained at great cost in displaced energy. The main thing, however, is that the sublimation in this case clearly represented a mastered anxiety, a happy solution of a difficulty.

In a paper, Psychic Trauma and Productive Experience in the Artist, Lowenfeld writes: 'As long as the patient's artistic work, relatively uninhibited, could serve as an outlet for her tensions, she was able to spare herself the formation of neurotic symptoms. In her work of this period, as in her dreams later on, she repeatedly portrayed the traumatic experience of childhood as well as the traumata of later life.' Lowenfeld believes that the psychopathology of the artist is characterized by heightened bisexuality and hence complications in the resolution of the œdipus complex.[15] 'The artist projects his ego in polymorphous transformations into his work, that is, he projects his inner experiences into an imagined outer world.' Lowenfeld quotes Schiller: 'All creatures born by our fantasy in the last analysis are nothing but ourselves. But what else is friendship or platonic love than a wanton exchange of existences?

[15] Lowenfeld, H.: *Psychic Trauma and Productive Experience in the Artist.* This QUARTERLY, X, 1941, pp. 122–23.

Or the contemplation of one's self in another glass? . . . The eternal, inner longing to flow into and become a part of one's fellow being, to swallow him up, to clutch him fast, is love.' [16]

The origins of human civilization in general are the same as the origins of art, that is, mankind differs from other animal species in the same way as the artist differs from other human beings.

It is well known that all our tools are duplications or projections or symbols of our organs. The model of the spear is the penis that penetrates into the vagina; our cutting tools and weapons are based on our nails; the club is a fist; receptacles are based on the mouth or the vagina, a spoon is a tongue, and so on.[17]

My own experience in Central Australia with Pitjentara children shows primitive mankind's reactions to environment. These children had never seen anything like toys before, and their first reaction when confronted with these objects was to run away. Slowly they began to come back. They would look at the toys and declare that that was the mouth, that was the anus, that is where it eats and that is where it defæcates. They did this not only with a doll or a toy goat but also with inanimate toy objects such as a trumpet. The toys could be approached if they were beings like themselves. Later their initial anxiety was thoroughly mastered by genitalization; all the toys became penis symbols and were used in a universal coitus game.[18] Environment or reality means danger; the psychological weapon we use to counter the anxiety is libidinization.

The prolongation of our infancy is the key to human nature. 'The increase in body size was attended by a lengthening of the period of immaturity and of the life-cycle as a whole. This change took place independently in both the pre-human

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[17] *Cf.* Ferenczi. S.: *Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik.* Imago, V., 1919, p. 394.

[18] Róheim, Géza: *The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Culture.* Int. J. Psa., XXII, 1941, pp. 147–69.

and the pre-ape stocks. In fact it represented a general primate trend that merely continued to operate beyond the ancestral anthropoid stage.' [19] If man is born in a stage of relative immaturity, environment naturally presents itself in a menacing and hostile light. This is the factual truth behind the point of view adopted by Karen Horney, who says that neurotic anxiety is a *Realangst* because environment or reality is really bad.[20] Environment is the same for *Homo sapiens* and for the wolf, but we are not ready for it. Or rather, we are ready for it in a way that is all our own, i.e., on a fantasy level.

The phenomena we are discussing are not, however, merely fantasies. We have transformed our fantasies into realities. If initial helplessness is the key to human nature there is also obviously a process going on in us which decreases this initial helplessness. This process is growth. Gesell puts forth the thesis that mental growth is a patterning process, a progressive morphogenesis of patterns of behavior.[21] 'The poor newborn babe, like a seaman wrecked thrown from the waves, lies naked o'er the ground. . . . But in the brief space of a year this helpless creature is on his two feet, cruising, prying, exploring. . . . His personality and his diversified abilities at one year of age are the product of an extremely swift season of growth.' [22] This process of growth is probably the physiological basis of ego development. The findings of the English school of psychoanalysis (Melanie Klein and others) regarding the id and the superego as dominating the scene in the infant, and the gradual development of the ego, are thus confirmed by an independent type of observation.

Speaking broadly, we might say that we can see human beings as acting in three different ways, or that human personality is organized around three different nuclei. In *neurosis* we find

[19] Warden, Carl J.: *The Emergence of Human Culture.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936, pp. 84, 85.

[20] Horney, K.: *New Ways in Psychoanalysis.* New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1939, p. 74.

[21] Gesell, A.: *The First Five Years of Life.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940, p. 7.

[22] *Ibid.*, p, 16.

that the conflict of the superego and the ego ends with the defeat of the latter. The ego pleads guilty and acts accordingly—is in a state of perpetual mourning. In other words, the basic element of a neurosis is melancholia.

In *sublimation* and cultural activity we have the opposite situation. The ego allied with the id is victorious and ousts the superego. In neurosis the depressive state predominates, in sublimation the manic.

However, there is also a third nucleus of our personality. Here we find all those activities which are based on the stimulus-reaction pattern. The gradual development of these functions, that is, growth, decreases our initial helplessness and forms the basis of our ego. In this group of activities ego and id are acting together in harmony, and the superego is absent. It is neither victorious nor defeated, it is simply absent. Sublimation means a sublimation of the erotic drive, a substitute for coitus or some other type of libidinal activity. How and in what sense this substitution takes place is far from clear.[23]

To take up again the case of the perfectionist, we find that his sublimations were based on the fantasy of an erection, and this in turn was a defense against castration anxiety. We see therefore that sublimation is a reality-adjusted activity based on an infantile fantasy. This fantasy of course always conforms to the pleasure principle; it is an erotic fantasy (oral, anal, or genital) in which an anxiety or frustration is dealt with.

Jekels and Bergler have shown that one function of the state of being in love is to protect the ego from the inroads of the superego.[24] Euphoria is based on the same mechanism, and so is sublimation as a mild form of euphoria. If we speak of sublimation as a substitute for coitus, we are really saying that

[23] *Cf.* Sterba, R.: *Zur Problematik der Sublimierungslehre.* Int. Ztschr. Psa., XVI, 1930, pp. 370–377; Bernfeld, S.: *Zur Sublimierungstheorie.* Imago, XVII, 1931, p. 404; Bernfeld, S.: *Bemerkungen über Sublimierung.* Imago, VIII, 1922, pp. 333–344; Klein, M.: *The Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States.* Int. J. Psa., XVI, 1935, 145–174.

[24] Jekels, Ludwig, and Bergler, Edmund: *Übertragung und Liebe.* Imago, XX, 1934, p. 16. The authors go even further; according to them, love is based on guilt.

both sublimation and coitus or love are means by which the ego seeks to protect itself against the inroads of the superego. A sublimation is always based on an *infantile* erotic activity or fantasy.

This aspect of the question has been recognized and emphasized by Ernest Jones. 'Any sublimation that occurs in adult life is but a feeble copy of the enormous extent to which it goes on during childhood, especially during the first half of this; in fact, the weaning of the child to external and social interests and considerations which is the essence of sublimation is perhaps the most important single process in the whole of education.' [25] 'A child, for instance, who has conquered a sadistic love of cruelty, may when he grows up be a successful butcher or a distinguished surgeon, according to his capacities and opportunities. One in whom exhibitionistic fondness for self-display was pronounced may develop into an actor, an auctioneer, or an orator. There comes to my mind a patient who as a child had shown an unusually strong interest in the act of micturition, in the guidance of the flow, in the force of it, and so on. When a little older he was passionately fond of playing with streams and puddles. He is now a well-known engineer and has constructed a number of canals and bridges.' [26] In the light of what we know at present, we can add to this that infantile activity itself (exhibitionism, urethral erotism) which appears to be the basic element in sublimation is really the triumphant denial of a specific anxiety situation.

Levey describes a sublimation that originated in an analysis. 'The content of the poems in successive cycles reproduced serially the various defensive solutions with which she had attempted to master her conflict during childhood.' [27]

[25] Jones, Ernest: *The Significance of Sublimating Processes for Education and Re-education.* J. of Educational Psychology, 1912. In *Papers on Psychoanalysis.* London: Bailliere, Tindall, and Cox, 1923, p. 606.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 610.

[27] Levey, Harry B.: *Poetry Production as a Supplemental Emergency Defense Against Anxiety.* This QUARTERLY, VII, 1938, p. 232. See also two other papers by the same author on the subject: *A Critique of the Theory of Sublimation.* Psychiatry, II, 1939, pp. 239–293; *A Theory Concerning Free Creation in the Inventive Arts.* Psychiatry, III, 1940, pp. 229–273.

In the case of a musician whom I analyzed, music meant killing his siblings or getting rid of them in the form of fæces. He was inhibited in his musical activity by the superego. Analysis made it possible for him to indulge in this infantile fantasy in a sublimated, i.e. symbolic form, and to go on triumphantly denying the traumatic situation of his infancy, the existence of rivals. The basic element is an infantile fantasy; the neurosis starts when the activity derived from the fantasy is repressed by the superego.

If we remember the definition Freud gave of the difference between primary and secondary or real repression,[28] we should say that repression is active both in neurosis and sublimation. In neurosis, both the original and the symbolic or derived concepts are repressed; in sublimation, only the former. Translating this into the psychoanalytic terminology we use today, this would mean that the fundamental situation is always that the superego represses the id strivings. In sublimation, however, id strivings reconquer the ground in a disguised form, and if they are not again subjugated by the superego, neurosis is avoided. In contrast to the prevailing view, this would mean that in sublimation we have no ground wrested from the id by the superego, but quite to the contrary, what we have is superego or ego territory inundated by the id. We grow up through our fantasies; we accept reality if we can cathect it with libido.

In discussing Paul Morphy and the problem of chess, Jones says: 'The impulses behind the play are ultimately of a mixed nature *but the essential process seems to be a libidinal one.*[29] I conceive that the parricidal impulses were bound by an erotic cathexis, actually a homosexual one, and that this in turn was sublimated.' [30]

[28] Freud: *Die Verdrängung.* Ges. Schr., V, p. 468, 469.

[29] My italics.

[30] Jones, Ernest: *The Problem of Paul Morphy.* Int. J. Psa., XII, 1931, p. 22. Although less decisively, Dr. Glover comes to the same conclusion: 'If we take a wide enough view it cannot be said that the upshot of sublimation is invariably to promote *Lust* and diminish *Unlust.* . . . This does not exclude the possibility that there is a pure sublimation which has such an effect.'

It is clear that a sublimation is a *defense mechanism,*[31] but it is questionable whether, like other defense mechanisms, its aim is primarily that of a defense against id impulses. Dr. Jones is of this opinion. 'By discharging id energy along a deflected path, and particularly by transforming a sexualized aggressivity it protects against the dangers to the ego which we know to proceed from excessive accumulation of that energy.' [32] Yet what happens in the case of Paul Morphy? When chess as a sublimation fails him, he succumbs to paranoia, i.e., he is left defenseless against the persecution of the projected superego. Hanns Sachs emphasizes the importance of guilt in the creation of a sublimation.[33] Hermann's views on the masochistic basis of deep thinking should also be quoted in this connection.[34]

The restitution theory of sublimation is not so very different from the view set forth in this paper. Thus, according to Ella Sharpe, the first drawings were animals that primitive hunters killed for food, that is, they were recreating the animals they had destroyed. Sharpe describes sublimation in the following terms: 'The hostility of the incorporated object no longer menaces the ego; the sublimation is a reparation, a control, a nullification of anxiety.' [35] This is really not very different from a fantasy in which the existence of the frustrating superego is denied.

At this point we also see that the roots of sublimation are

Glover, Edward: *Sublimation, Substitution and Social Anxiety.* Int. J. Psa., XII, 1931, p. 290.

[31] Freud, Anna: *Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen.* Vienna: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1936, p. 52. (Trans. *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense.* London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1937.)

[32] Jones, Ernest: *The Problem of Paul Morphy. Op. cit.,* p. 23.

[33] Sachs, Hanns: *Gemeinsame Tagträume.* Vienna: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1924, p. 36.

[34] Hermann, I.: *Intelligenz und tiefer Gedanke.* Int. Ztschr. Psa., VI, 1920, pp. 193–201.

[35] Sharpe, Ella Freeman: *Certain Aspects of Sublimation and Delusion.* Int. J. Psa., XI, 1930, pp. 17, 18, and *Similar and Divergent Unconscious Determinants Underlying the Sublimations of Pure Art and Pure Science.* Int. J. Psa., XVI, 1935, pp. 186–202.

always in an erotic activity, either pregenital or genital. It may be defæcation or erection or urination or the drinking of milk. In the cases quoted above we had the musician who defæcates his brothers, or the physician whose personality is based on the fantasy of a perpetual erection. Or to quote from a case discussed by Sharpe from the point of view of sublimation: 'She is, in singing then, the powerful parents. Her very body is the breast and the penis. The voice is the milk, the water the fructifying semen.' [35] 'Pleasurable bodily states of rhythmic functioning' are the basic experiences which are reëxperienced in creative art.[36]

This is just what magic means: the emphasis on the autoerotic aspect of pleasure,[37] the denial of object-relationship, and the withdrawing of libido from the mother, i.e., the child emerging from the dual-unity situation. The child in growing up cathects its own body with libido. Gesell describes the two-year-old child: 'When he plays with other children he refers chiefly to himself. He contacts his playmates physically but his social contacts are few and brief. For the most part he limits himself to solitary or parallel play. . . . This is a natural condition of growth.' [38] Ives Hendrick calls this an 'instinct to master,[39] but I think the usual analytic terminology is better. Growing up or maturation as an inherited pattern and sublimation thus run on parallel lines.[40]

Human or social reality is different from animal or environmentally conditioned reality; it is a combination of environmental forces and of a man-made world, i.e., a world based on fantasy. By a normal person we mean somebody in whom

[36] Sharpe, Ella Freeman: *Similar and Divergent Unconscious Determinants*, etc., *Ibid.*, p. 191. *Cf.* Sperber, H.: *Über den Einfluss sexueller Momente auf Entstehung und Entwicklung der Sprache.* Imago, I, 1912, p. 405.

[37] *Cf.* Róheim, Géza: *Das Selbst.* Imago, VII, 1921, pp. 1–39, 142–179, 310–348, 453–504. I am now writing a new book on magic, the results of which are taken into account in this formulation.

[38] Gesell, A.: *Op. cit.*, p. 391.

[39] Hendrick, Ives: *Instinct and Ego During Infancy.* This QUARTERLY, XI, 1942, pp. 33–58.

[40] *Cf.* Hermann, I.: *Die Regel der Gleichzeitigkeit in der Sublimierungsarbeit.* Imago, X, 1924, pp. 431–433.

sublimations are ego-syntonic, that is, the repetition of 'happy childhood' situations takes place in harmony with reality adjustment, while the repetition of the infantile frustration situation only occurs under the pressure of environment, that is, where there is reason for it.

The three main libidinal types described by Freud correspond to a certain degree to this view of the three cores of personality. The neurotic center of personality corresponds more or less to the obsessional type. The triumphant fantasy element of our personality with sublimation and culture is Freud's narcissistic type.

Finally, when we speak of a stimulus-reaction and growth pattern, this might be equated with the erotic type,[41] although in this case there are obvious discrepancies.

The neurotic part of our personality is the Past; the maturation or stimulus-reaction part is the Present; sublimation, although also based on the Past, stands for the Future or the assurance of a future of Paradise Regained.

41 Freud: *Libidinal Types.* This QUARTERLY, I, 1932, pp. 3–6.

A THIRD FUNCTION OF THE 'DAY RESIDUE' IN DREAMS

BY EDMUND BERGLER (NEW YORK)

In discovering the meaning of the 'day residue' in dreams, Freud has provided us with one of the most significant guiding posts in the interpretation of dreams. In the first edition of his *Traumdeutung*, published in 1899, the founder of psychoanalysis was already able to prove that there was no simple repetition of the day's events in sleep, but that a selection took place. From the multitudinous mass of thoughts, things read, things experienced, only those were chosen which seemed particularly suited to represent unconscious material. Hence the significance of the 'day residue' could be described as an 'acceptable package wrapping in which contraband articles are smuggled across the border'. 'We . . . learn', says Freud, 'that an unconscious idea, as such, is quite incapable of entering into the preconscious, and that it can exert an influence there only by establishing touch with a harmless idea already belonging to the preconscious, to which it transfers its intensity, and by which it allows itself to be screened'. Freud gives the example of a dentist practicing in a foreign land who protects himself against the law by associating himself with a native doctor of medicine who then serves him as a signboard and legal 'cover'. 'We thus see that the day residues, among which we may now include the indifferent impressions, not only borrow something from the unconscious, when they secure a share in dream formation—namely, the motive power at the disposal of the repressed wish—but they also offer to the unconscious something that is indispensable to it, namely, the points of attachment necessary for transference.' On the other hand, the cathexis of the unpleasant residue is offset by the wish fulfilment of the dream, and so the dream is preserved as the protector of sleep. 'We may succeed in provisionally disposing of the energetic cathexis of our waking thoughts by decid-

ing to go to sleep. . . . But we do not always succeed in doing it, or in doing it completely. Unsolved problems, harassing cares, overwhelming impressions, continue the activity of our thought even during sleep, maintaining psychic processes in the system which we have termed the preconscious. The thought impulses continued in sleep may be divided into the following groups:

'1. Those which have not been completed during the day, owing to some accidental cause.

'2. Those which have been left uncompleted because our mental powers have failed us, i.e., unsolved problems.

'3. Those which have been turned back and suppressed during the day. This group is reinforced by a powerful fourth group:

'4. Those which have been excited in our unconscious during the day by the workings of the preconscious; and finally we may add a fifth, consisting of:

'5. The indifferent impressions of the day which have therefore been left unsettled. . . . But what is the relation of the preconscious day residues to the dream? There is no doubt that they penetrate abundantly into the dream; that they utilize the dream content to obtrude themselves upon consciousness even during the night; indeed, they sometimes even dominate the dream content, and impel it to continue the work of the day; it is also certain that the day residues may just as well have any other character as that of wishes.'

To this first function of the 'day residue', Jekels and myself added a second function, which we described in our paper, Instinct Dualism in Dreams,[1] first presented at the International Psychoanalytic Congress in Lucerne in 1934. In this paper we showed that the residue also represents, either in direct or symbolic form, a *reproach* of the *superego*. We came to the conclusion that every dream not only gratifies the repressed wish, but *also refutes the repressed reproaches of the conscience,* hence fulfils *two* functions. This we demonstrated

1 Imago, XX, 1934; This QUARTERLY, IX, 1940.

in a number of clinical examples, and also in Freud's classical example of a wish-fulfilment dream, The Dream of Irma's Injection.

Eight years have passed since we reported on this second function of the day residue in dreams. Since that time I have had occasion to analyze several thousand dreams, and in them I found our above-mentioned findings confirmed. With the exception of two colleagues who have also fully confirmed these findings, I am unaware to what extent others have been able to verify or disprove our assumptions. Nevertheless, I am now venturing to propose a third function which seems to be contained in the 'day residue' of the dream. This third function serves the purpose of *contradicting* the *reproach of the conscience which is contained in every dream.* This formulation may seem confusing, since it has been pointed out that the day residue represents a reproach of the superego as well. How can the day residue represent such a reproach and at the same time contradict it? The answer is that a high degree of condensation takes place involving contradictory tendencies having their origin in different regions of the unconscious part of the personality.

Accordingly we can say that the day residue present in dreams contains three elements condensed into one, varying only in a quantitative sense. In other words, three functions are served by the day residue:

1. 'Package-wrapping for contraband articles', that is, id wishes (Freud).

2. 'Symbolic representation of superego reproach' (Jekels-Bergler).

3. An attempt to refute the reproaches of conscience (Bergler).

In what follows, I will analyze six dreams which serve to illustrate this third function.

First Dream

'I was in Prague, and I bought a pillow made of rubber, and a pair of spectacles.'

This patient suffered from ejaculatio præcox. Through his analysis and just previous to the time he had this dream, he had slowly been gaining insight into his aggressive feelings towards his wife. These became especially clear to him after he was forced to admit that he had no special reason for being constantly unfaithful to her. He had first explained it by saying that she failed to satisfy him, but then he admitted that he also suffered from premature ejaculation with his present mistress. This mechanism of playing one woman against the other for aggressive reasons, and the realization that it had its roots in a childhood situation, invoked in him intensive feelings of guilt. These increased when he began to understand that the symptom itself contained this chronic act of denying pleasure out of oral revenge [2]: what he gave was only a caricature of the act of giving, since it came at a time when his wife could have no pleasure from it.

His associations to the dream were as follows: The element 'spectacles' he related to a residue of the day before, namely a letter he had received from his eleven-year-old son, who was away on a ski trip. The son wrote that he had lost his sun glasses, and asked his father to send him another pair via special delivery. This angered the father but he complied with the request. Furthermore, the patient has strong scoptophilic tendencies, especially of the voyeur type, but also at times exhibitionistic. The day before, although in the company of his wife, he had turned around rather pointedly to look at some woman. His wife upbraided him for this.

To 'rubber pillow' he associated a joke that he had in common with his mistress. During a *coitus a tergo,* he had compared her buttocks to rubber pillows. This woman's name, by the way, contained the word 'brown'. It had already become evident that the anal-urethral wish to soil (Abraham) was an important issue with the patient.

[2] *Cf.* Bergler, Edmund: *Ejaculatio Præcox.* Psychiatrische und Neurologische Bladen, Amsterdam, 1936; and *Die psychische Impotenz des Mannes.* Berne: Hans Huber Verlag, 1937.

The element 'Prague' was significant because the patient had been brought up there as a child.

Interpretation:

The id wishes: Voyeurism, and aggressive soiling of the woman.

The superego reproach: You are only interested in satisfying your vulgar desires, and do not pay attention to your family (son).

The ego compromise: I am neither a voyeur nor aggressive towards women. I am a good family man, the proof being that I sent the glasses to my son. Anyhow, why shouldn't one 'lie soft'? (rubber pillow). It is true that my relations with Mrs. Brown speak against me, but why should I be held responsible for my childhood neurosis (Prague)? Furthermore I am doing everything I can to cure myself, since I am being analyzed, which helps me to see (glasses). And for the rest, my relationship to Mrs. Brown is of no importance since I only regard her as an object for sexual gratification (rubber pillow, for sleeping). It is not true that I *deny;* I give (he bought the glasses). And finally, if I were such an evil person, I would have married for money and not for love.

Accordingly, the dream attempts to function as a fulfilment of the id wishes, and a refutation of the reproaches of the superego. For our purpose, the dream element 'glasses' is of the greatest significance. It contains all three of the elements characteristic of the 'day residue', as described above:

1. 'Package wrapping for contraband articles' (the id wishes): voyeurism.

2. The reproach of the superego: You are only interested in your lowly voyeur wishes (as indicated in the street scene with his wife); you are aggressive, and a bad father.

3. Refutation of the superego reproaches: I bought the spectacles, therefore I am a good father; furthermore I am being analyzed (opening up my eyes), hence I am struggling against my neurosis.

Second Dream:

'I was in a museum, where they were exhibiting early American living quarters and furniture. A provincial-looking couple spoke to me. I explained, with a great display of authority and self-assurance, that one could draw conclusions regarding the characteristics of the occupants of the house from their furniture. For instance, one could judge their height from the height of the chairs and height of the ceilings. The woman looked at me admiringly, and declared that I had given her more information in a few minutes than her husband had done during many years. The husband had described himself as a steel magnate of high standing; in reality however, he merely had a subordinate position as salesman. He gave the impression of being a boastful person.'

This dream occurred in the third week of analysis. The patient's situation at that time was as follows: He had lost, by reason of his provocative behavior, a position which he had held for some time. Consequently his wife had urged him to undergo an analysis, to which he consented. She had previously been treated by me, and she feared quite rightly that her husband would be continually ruining his chances through his masochistic provocative behavior. This was the third time he had lost a position in this manner. He was a talented man and had repeatedly obtained important and remunerative positions which he retained for some little time, only to lose them in a logically incomprehensible manner as a result of his quarrelsomeness. In his last position he was discharged with the explanation, 'Your personality does not fit into our organization'.

He entered analysis shortly after this occurrence, although he was of the opinion that there was nothing wrong with him, but rather that he was the victim of adverse circumstances. What he did admit was that he had a 'perverted sense of humor' which led him into difficulties. He also asserted that he was a very independent person, never lowering himself for others, and, perhaps, 'nice with the wrong people'. He always got along well with his subordinates; it was only with his supe-

riors that the difficulties began. Towards analysis he adopted an attitude of ironic incredulity. He considered nonsensical the idea of a connection between 'real' conflicts and childhood fantasies and experiences. He was of the opinion that analysts complicated things unnecessarily. After he had been to see the musical comedy, Lady in the Dark, he declared ironically to his wife that even he could be an analyst. He did not believe at all in the therapeutic value of analysis, and as far as the theory was concerned, 'one could argue about that'.

The patient demanded that I tell him how I knew he had a neurosis, since he denied that there was any sure evidence of it (namely, the fact of chronically losing his position because of his provocative behavior). I told him that his neurosis must be a complement of his wife's neurosis. I showed him how he and his wife played into each other's hand, so to speak, with regard to their conflicts; then I explained that this could not be merely the result of chance. The man was exceedingly astonished, had no answer to this, but said instead that I could never understand him because I was not an expert in the steel industry (this was his occupation). Without any special knowledge of his field I would not be able to help him, he felt. In this he remained obdurate, treating me with contempt because of my ignorance of his branch of business. I pointed out to him that his argument was a rather futile one, since it was impossible for an analyst to become acquainted with all occupations and fields of endeavor. I suggested, however, that he explain to me the particularly complicated facts in his field, and that we would both learn something then, for he in turn would be learning something about analysis.

To return now to the dream, the patient had no associations, was blocked completely, except for the statement: 'The only thing I can say is that I live in the neighborhood of a museum'.

Interpretation:

The dream was intended to make fun of analysis (reconstruction), and to offer the patient narcissistic gratification by making him the object of admiration and respect. At the

same time, his conscience did not allow him to draw a very complimentary picture of himself.

Reproach of the superego: You are a boastful windbag, who pretends to be a steel expert, although you are hardly anything more than an agent. (The patient is obviously represented both by himself and by the provincial gentleman in the dream.) You have grandiose ideas that you can do everything better than another person. (Remark about the Lady in the Dark, and his covert sarcasm about the 'reconstructions'.) Furthermore, in reality, you do not know anything about yourself. This stranger (analyst) knows more about you than you do yourself.

The id-wishes: These are only evident indirectly, most likely the retention of the masochistic wishes.

The ego defenses and the compromise: It is not true that there is such an art to analysis, that it requires special knowledge. Any lay person can produce those ridiculous 'reconstructions' (the irony about the reconstructions in the museum). One can impress a provincial woman (referring to, and belittling his wife) with such nonsense, but not me. In addition, this foreigner (the analyst) knows nothing about an American's childhood (*'early* American living rooms'). Accordingly it is all a fraud, and I need not fear any narcissistic mortification.

The three functions of the 'day residue' (here the 'reconstruction' or the 'museum') can be described as follows:

1. 'Package wrapping for the id wishes': concealed behind the mask of narcissistic superiority lie masochistic tendencies.

2. The reproach of the superego: You are a fraud, who pretends to know everything better than everyone else; it is valuable and informative to reconstruct the history of your childhood during analysis; the analyst can tell you more in an hour than you can tell in years of your idle talk.

3. Refutation of the superego: I do not believe that such reconstructions are of any significance, but even if this should be true, any one could do it; it leads to a nonsensical result, which can only make one laugh. And even if it did make sense, such a reconstruction could certainly not be made by

this ignorant foreigner, who puts on airs (the husband in the dream evidently combines the figures of the patient *and* the analyst). And finally, even if these reconstructions of my childhood were correct, their only value is that of a historical (museum) document. ('Analysis has no therapeutic value.')

Third Dream:

> He is in an automobile somewhere in London during an air attack. A policeman stops him, accusing him of having parked in a 'No Parking' area. He is ordered to appear in court on Saturday.

The same patient had the above dream. Associations to the dream element 'London': The patient, unemployed for the reasons given before, informed his wife on the day preceding the dream that a friend of his had offered him a job in London for the postwar days. His wife, who is quite worried about her husband's future, suggested moving to London immediately, that is, still in time of war. The patient reiterated that the job is intended only for the postwar days. To the dream element 'Saturday', the patient had no associations. I reminded him, however, that his wife, who had been visiting her family for some time and had returned only the day before, had requested her husband to make an appointment for her with me. He had suggested Saturday. He was rather opposed to this visit because he assumed that his wife intended to complain about him. He suggested Saturday because he thought I did not have my regular appointment schedule on that day, since he himself came five days a week, Monday through Friday.

Interpretation:

The dream is an attempt to refute the reproach of the superego that he had masochistically provoked his discharge from employment. His aggression, that of denying (money, position, social contacts), is 'justified' if he can 'prove' that his wife is unjust, and that he consequently must be aggressive in self-defense.[3] In his attempts at justification, he is saying: 'My

[3] This 'Mechanism of Orality' has been repeatedly pointed out by me as pathognomonic for the oral neurotic. Such individuals are constantly forcing

wife is so cruel that she is even willing to send me to London, although she realizes my life would be in danger, just in order to have security and money'. At the same time, the dream is supposed to indicate to what extent he is sacrificing himself for his family. The policeman (analyst) is going to call him to account on Saturday. In reality, however, his wife is the one who is going to pay me a visit on Saturday. The (feminine) identification with his wife means here, among other things, 'We are both ill, and nobody can be held responsible for a neurosis'.

The function of the 'day residue' (London, Saturday):

1. 'Package wrapping' for id wishes: Saturday is the day of the analytic Criminal Court. The element London represents the masochistic situation.

2. Reproach of the superego: You wish to be masochistic after you have again proved that your wife is 'cruel'. You are distorting the facts, since she does not intend to send you to London alone, but to accompany you.

3. Refutation of the superego reproaches: My wife is cruel; she just wishes to take advantage of me. She never seriously intended to go to London with me. (In the dream, his wife is not with him.) I do not aggressively deny my family; on the contrary, I am sacrificing myself for them (London). And for the rest, if my actions are neurotic (parking in the wrong place), then I am neurotic, and, as a result, absolved from blame. For that matter, we are both neurotic.

Fourth Dream:

'I have dirty feet.'

This patient entered analysis because of a complicated potency disturbance of oral origin: psychogenic oral aspermia.[4]

certain persons in their environment to deny or refuse them. The latter represent the phallic mother of their precœdipal development. They are thus furnished with an excuse to be aggressive, without having a guilty conscience, and obtain masochistic enjoyment from the situation. For a more comprehensive analysis of this mechanism, *cf. Die psychische Impotenz des Mannes, op. cit.*

[4] *Cf.* Bergler, Edmund: *Some Special Varieties of Ejaculatory Disturbance Not Hitherto Described.* Int. J. Psa., XVI, 1935; also *Further Observations on the Clinical Picture of 'Psychogenic Oral Aspermia'.* Int. J. Psa., XVIII, 1937.

Besides some anal-urethral components, his difficulties were centered in a revenge pattern (denying) because of supposedly not having received enough love (milk, etc.) in the precœdipal phase of his development.

His occupation kept him on his feet all day long. He suffered from excessive perspiration of his feet, because of which he took a foot bath daily. His wife was very sensitive to the odor of perspiration.

Interpretation:

The reproach of the superego: you are acting aggressively towards your wife in denying her everything (sexual pleasure, potency, sperma). The only thing you do not deny her is the odor which she abhors.

Id wish: ridiculing aggression toward his wife (denying).

Ego compromise and defense: It is not true that I am aggressive and denying towards my wife; on the contrary, I work myself to the bone for this parasite. It is only my hard-earned money that interests her, whereas my sore feet and their perspiration revolt her. Naturally her reaction to money is different: *non olet* (an allusion to the familiar words of Vespasian in regard to the taxes imposed on public comfort stations in Rome.) Furthermore, it is not true that I deny my wife sexual gratification (foot-penis); I'm merely tired in the evening. It is not my intention to make her endure the obnoxious odor, but how can I help it if I suffer from excessive perspiration?

The function of the 'day residue' (here, foot = urethral-anal conception of the penis):

1. 'Package-wrapping' for the id wish: aggressive use of the pregenital penis.

2. Superego reproach: You wish to be aggressive in that you offer your wife your penis merely in the form of an obnoxious odor (an anal-urethral use of the penis).

3. Refutation of the superego reproach: *'Non olet'*, I am ill, and really suffer from excessive perspiration of the feet; I sacrifice myself for my wife; she is unjust. I do not wish to play with my penis through anal-urethral fantasies, but rather I want to 'wash myself clean' (analysis).

Fifth Dream:

'Something about an undershirt. I was supposed to go to the tailor.'

This patient's analysis was centered around his exhibitionistic difficulties. He was an opera singer, that is, he studied singing, but had such strong inhibitions with regard to performing in public that his singing teacher suggested that he undergo an analysis. When I began to interpret his repressed exhibitionistic tendencies, he was both astonished and furious, especially with reference to their connection with castration fantasies on the one hand, and, simultaneously, with the denial of castration. Through the act of opening his mouth on the stage (identification of mouth and vagina), he indicates his castration and at the same time denies it by showing his tongue and producing song.

Associations: For weeks he had been intending to go to the tailor but had continually postponed it, presumedly because he had no time. He admitted that he hated to go for fittings, and especially to undress 'in the presence of others'.

To the dream element 'something about an undershirt', it suddenly occurred to him that as a child he had been teased for years in regard to a certain incident. He had once walked into the parlor wearing only an undershirt while his parents were entertaining, and had been greeted with uproarious laughter. His next association was not an association at all, but a long argument in an attempt to depreciate the fact of exhibitionism, and an expounding of the theme: 'You will naturally try to exploit this harmless memory for your own purposes, whereas it really means nothing at all'.

Interpretation:

Due to the pressure of the analytic situation, feelings of guilt regarding exhibitionistic impulses had been mobilized. The dream described above represents at the same time a confession, and the attempt to refute or at least to dilute the confession.

The reproach of the superego: Why do you deny the exist-

ence of these exhibitionistic tendencies and castration wishes? Don't you remember the incident of your childhood in which you exhibited yourself? And what about your 'queer feelings' when you have to go to the tailor? Also, you are exhibiting yourself in analysis, in that your mind is thrown open to the analyst.

Id wishes: Exhibition, and castration wishes (tailor).[5]

Ego compromise and defense: It is not true that I wish to exhibit myself; on the contrary, I am ashamed to undress myself in front of my tailor, and to appear in my undershirt before a man (!). However, the reason I do not go to the tailor is because I have no time. I am a serious-minded person who has no time to indulge his vanity (exhibitionism). And for the rest, I do not exhibit myself in analysis, but am here for the purpose of being cured.

Function of the 'day residue' (tailor):

1. 'Package-wrapping' for the id wish: exhibition and passive castration wishes.

2. Reproach to the superego: The warning of the scene in his childhood where he had exhibited himself; furthermore, symbolic representation of castration.

3. Refutation of the superego reproach: It is not true that I wish to be castrated and to exhibit myself. The only reason I do not go to the tailor is that I have no time. And for the rest I am allowing myself to be treated.

Sixth Dream:

> 'I attempt to take a bus to Boston, but an employee informs me sullenly that trips are cancelled because the company is on strike. I upbraid him.'

This female patient is a frigid hysteric. In her analysis she is struggling desperately for male status. It angers her, although able to understand it, that male identification and the possibility of having an orgasm could not be achieved simultaneously; at the time she had the above dream, she was going

[5] In German, the word *schneiden* means *to cut,* and *Schneider* means *tailor.* This play on words, here referring to castration, cannot be reproduced in English.

through a period of extreme antagonism towards men, and collected details to demonstrate how despicable they were and how they never 'entirely accepted' the woman. On the one hand she would like to have the respect due her as a woman, but on the other, she resents any intimation that would suggest to her that there is still some distinction between a man and a woman. For instance, she was infuriated by the following article in the New York Times which reported a lecture given by Sinclair Lewis, entitled 'Had Modern Woman Made Good?' [6] Mr. Lewis felt that a man should be able to talk to a woman as he would to a man on any subject without the woman interrupting with the reminder, 'I am a lady'. In answer to a question from the floor later he gave his definition of a 'lady' as 'a woman so incompetent as to have to take refuge in a secluded clan like kings and idiots who have to be treated with special kindness because they can't take it'.

Associations: The patient is a native of Boston, and comes from an 'aristocratic' family. She had had no contact with them for many years, and is proud of being a 'self-made *man*'. Although she hated them she had incorporated most of their prejudices, which were hidden only by a very thin layer of 'revolutionary' ideas. On the day preceding her dream, she had read the following newspaper article:

'Ohio Charwomen's Pay Fight Halts Line's Buses Here and in Boston

'All Service Out of Cities on Two Branches of Greyhound System Is Stopped in Sympathy with 7 in Cleveland

'A dispute over the wages of seven cleaning women in a Cleveland garage halted all service out of New York and Boston yesterday on buses of the Central and New England Greyhound Lines. The sympathy walkout affected 125 drivers and 70 mechanics in this city and 100 drivers in Boston. All strikers are members of the Amalgamated

[6] The New York Times, November 20, 1941.

Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Operators, A. F. of L.

Although the stoppage forced cancellation of all runs out of this city after 2.15 P.M., Jay L. Sheppard, vice president of the two bus companies, said there had been little real inconvenience to passengers. The terminal at 245 West Fiftieth Street remained open and ticketholders got transportation on other bus lines or railroads to Buffalo, Syracuse, Rochester and other points where they could pick up Greyhound buses.

There was no interference with operations of buses of the Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines.

In Cleveland, where the controversy over the cleaning women arose, Dan F. Hurley, a Federal conciliator, began conferences with union leaders and representatives of Central Greyhound Lines. The union contends that the seven women, hired at the company's Cleveland garage two weeks ago, were receiving only 40 cents an hour, against a 60-cent minimum fixed in the union's contract with the company. The management maintains that the women were not covered by the contract.

Mr. Sheppard said the union posted a picket line outside the Central Greyhound garage at 12–12 Forty-third Avenue, Long Island City, Queens, early yesterday afternoon and that *all but twenty of the ninety mechanics employed there walked out in sympathy with the Cleveland charwomen.*' [7]

Immediately upon reading this article the patient was extremely put out, first because she had the impression that the newspaper was making fun of women, second because only seventy of the ninety employees went on the sympathy strike for the seven charwomen. She herself remarked with a certain irony, however, that here she was complaining about the fact that too few men went on strike, whereas usually she was criticizing labor severely for creating too many strikes. This reminded her of a remark that I had made to the effect that her anger was primary and the search for some object upon which to abreact this anger was secondary. Her anger and

[7] The New York Times, December 6, 1941.

the object of her anger had little in common, since the anger itself originated from some other source.

In connection with this lack of stability in her behavior a recent incidence in her analysis occurred to her. In order to demonstrate to her that her opinion that all married women were slaves was a fantasy and no more, I repeated to her what another patient had said to me. This man, who had been treated ignobly by his wife, and who had been analyzing his passive-maochistic tendencies, remarked, 'You seem to have very continental ideas about marriage relationships. In this country, the man does not wear a wedding ring on his finger but through his nose!' My patient was amused at the other's rationalization of his condition of 'slavery', but added at once indignantly that women only received that respect which they 'deserved'.

To 'employee whom I upbraided', she had the following associations: 'He was a cross between my husband and a cousin of mine'. This cousin had been present at one of the typical scenes between her husband and herself, to which he had remarked that her husband had an astonishing amount of patience with her. Her husband had responded by 'nodding his head sullenly'. This remark infuriated her, because it agreed in essence with a similar remark made by the analyst. The 'employee' is evidently the analyst as well, since she repeatedly asked me if I was not going to lose patience with her.

Interpretation:

Id-wish: I wish to return to my family (Boston), even if it would not be as a successful woman but in a more humble rôle. (She was contemptuous of persons who traveled by bus, considering them 'paupers'.) To this we must add the symbolic sexual meaning of bus and pauper. The first element represents coitus which, however, she assumed as only done by 'paupers'. Part of her hostility towards working men is unconscious envy regarding their sexuality, which was denied to 'aristocrats' in her childhood fantasies.

Reproach of the superego: Your hatred of the family is not

justified; your neurotic fantasies about men's tyranny is nonsense and only conceals your penis envy; here for instance, men strike to aid women. You envy those who are active sexually (bus). You will continue to play with fire until your husband becomes 'sullen' and repulses you. You are not very logical in your desire to identify yourself with the male, since you wish to be treated both as man *and* woman at the same time.

The compromise created by the unconscious ego: It is not true that I wish to return to my family in Boston. I would never travel in a bus (which means to accept 'vulgar' sexuality). I was merely interested in the bus because I wanted to gather some information. I wished to see to what extent the men on strike were standing solidly in back of the women on strike. If I find out that they are only half-heartedly in sympathy with the women on strike (70 to 20), I will have a valid reason for hating them, and not a neurotic one.

Function of the 'day residue' ('bus' and the 'injustices connected with being a woman'):

1. 'Package-wrapping' for id wishes: bus as a means of returning to her family and infantile sexuality.

2. The reproach of the superego: the bus strike is proof of the fact that men are not such despicable and tyrannical creatures as you have assumed them to be. All your hostility is merely neurotic penis envy.

3. Refutation of the reproach of the superego: Men are unjust, since not all of them (70 out of 90) are willing to offer assistance to women. And if they do do it, they are 'sullen' about it. Therefore I am justified in despising and upbraiding them.

It is only to be expected that this threefold function of the 'day residue' can be demonstrated fully on 'perfect' dreams, that is, dreams which are complete and successful wish fulfilments *and* refutations of superego reproaches. Some dreams end with a defeat for the ego, and in the same way the ego is not always

successful in building up its defenses in the dream. This might almost lead one to the assumption that the more completely the 'day residue' fulfils the third function, that of refuting the reproaches of the superego, the more successful a dream it is. Consequently, the *choice* of the 'day residue' could also be used as an indicator as to which of the three functions had been victorious in any given dream.

NEUROTIC MANIFESTATIONS OF THE VOICE

BY MORRIS W. BRODY (PHILADELPHIA)

It has long been recognized that the voice is a sensitive reflector of emotional states. Speech, as Hughlings Jackson said, is not always used solely for the communication of meanings—'propositional speech', as he called it—but may also constitute the expression of feelings, in which case it may have less propositional value. This fact is so universally recognized that there is danger of it being taken for granted and overlooked. The analyst may tend to concentrate his attention solely on what the voice is saying.

Disturbances of the voice and of voice production occur not infrequently as an outward manifestation of emotional conflict, in short, as a symptom of neurosis. Bunker recently discussed disturbances of the voice as symptoms of neurosis and psychosis and described a male patient who made a fetish of the female voice *(1)*. Subtle changes in timbre, the inflections or monotony, the rate of speech, pitch and intensity or deviations in the use or grouping of words, may all be expressions of an underlying emotional conflict. Failure on the part of the psychiatrist to recognize consciously these deviations from the 'normal' can lead to delay or even to failure in understanding the unconscious conflicts depicted thereby. The purpose of this paper is the presentation and discussion of cases illustrating the use of the voice by the ego as a vector for symptoms and defense mechanisms. At no time are voice changes resulting from central lesions or structural alterations of the vocal apparatus referred to. All patients were adults free from the physiologic voice changes of puberty and all were neurologically normal.

Infants react with anxiety to certain tones of voice. Long before language is developed the child expresses pleasure and displeasure by the tone of the sounds it emits. As it grows

older it recognizes when it is being loved or rejected simply by the tone of the parent's voice and while the highly complicated process of language is developing the child mimics these tones *(2)*.

Since the tone of voice is such an important medium of expression in infancy and childhood, it can later readily express unconscious emotional conflicts originating at that time. These unconscious values are most easily appreciated when the patient himself is conscious of the fact that he uses more than one tone of voice or when changes of voice have become the chief complaint. They are recognized with more difficulty when alterations in the voice are subtle and remain outside the awareness of the patient. Even then, their sudden change and inconstancy tend to give them away. They are recognized with most difficulty when the altered voice is part of a neurotic character and is used with such constancy that it is looked upon as the normal voice for that individual.

It is well known that the ego institutions, in their effort to master instinctual drives, work in a manner contrary to the analyst's efforts and frequently regard his purpose as a menace *(3)*. We learn of these libidinal strivings and of the defensive operations against them, not only through free association, but also from the patient's total overt behavior. The way he walks, his facial expression, manner of dress, what he does and says and how he says it, may all express his conflicts to a greater or lesser degree. The study of speech itself, as a part of overt behavior expressing unconscious conflicts, has not undergone extensive analytic investigation. This is especially true of certain defensive operations expressed by the voice which are usually so cleverly concealed that they are unnoticed. These defensive operations may be compared to the ruse employed by a criminal who seeks shelter in prison for a minor offense while in hiding for a previously committed major offense. He feels that prison would be the last place he would be sought. Thus when these operations are taking place within the very voice that tells of them, the analyst recognizes them with surprise.

The following case neatly demonstrates these points. The situation occurred in the early hours of the analysis of a thirty-two-year-old female school teacher. She presented a dream to which she had no associations and the analyst was unable to understand the sources of her resistance. After a while she told of having been raised on a farm and the shame she felt about her provincialism. Suddenly the analyst noticed that the patient was not speaking in her usual clear firm tone of voice. Her speech sounded weak, timid, faltering and questioning. Her attention was drawn to the phenomenon and though mystified, she concurred in the accuracy of the observation. She then told of her life as a freshman in college where she keenly felt her lack of sophistication and described herself as a 'hick' when compared to the other students. She feared they would make fun of her rural ways and felt alone and different. With almost conscious deliberation she began to speak freely to everyone of her small town background and her wondrous amazement at the big city. Her colleagues were amused by her behavior, felt sorry, and undertook to sophisticate her. Since she was a threat to no one, she was universally accepted. The meaning of the weak voice was now clear. The patient felt stupid in comparison with her analyst. She believed that she had no ability in interpreting her dreams while the analyst was quite sophisticated in such matters. This was a continuation of the attitude she had had towards the students and, before them, towards her mother who would only accept her when she was dependent and submissive. Her tone of voice represented this attitude with which she attempted to mask strong, repressed feelings of rivalry. Her mother was also a school teacher and, despite her submissive attitude, the patient secretly considered herself a superior educator. Her submissiveness alternated with aggression which she could not vent openly but expressed in a 'school teacher voice' of which she was quite unaware. At these times her voice was strong and clear. Each sentence was studied and grammatically perfect and every phrase was carefully enunciated with a nice inflection. In the transference situation her tone of voice

alone indicated that she was talking to the analyst as though he were one of her pupils. Her wish was to talk down to the mother in the same manner the mother spoke down to her. An interpretation of a change in the tone of voice often impresses patients very forcibly and confronts them with a fact they can scarcely fail to recognize.

Another patient, a male twenty-four years of age, had for many years consciously recognized a strong dependence on his mother who had always babied him. The father apparently had little to say regarding the boy's upbringing. At the age of seven he was already aware that he differed from the other boys and was being referred to as a sissy. Determined to change things, he established himself in a 'tough guy' rôle with a fair degree of success. In college he became a rather good athlete. However, when he had a date with a girl he would experience such severe abdominal distress that he was either compelled to cancel the engagement or to spend the evening in misery. In his own words, 'Girls seemed to make me sick'. When physical examination disclosed no basis for the complaints he sought psychiatric help. His voice attracted no attention and seemed normal until one day, when he was berating his mother for having tried to treat him as though he were a girl (which she did in an effort to deny her incestuous wishes), it suddenly assumed a deeper, more manly quality. However, his attempt to act like a man was only partially successful because one could detect a break which sounded almost like a sob which attested his yearning to remain a child. The bass voice was repressed in an effort to retain his mother's love. This incident took place in such a dramatic manner that words do not do it justice.

The psychopathology in this case is almost identical with one of the cases reported by Ferenczi in his description of psychogenic disturbances of the voice *(4)*. Ferenczi's patient used a hoarse falsetto although his normal voice was a deep bass. This patient's mother, the real head of the family, would not endure the bass voice as she sensed its incestuous meaning, and he also avoided using his bass voice so that his mother would continue to love him. In this patient, however, the

voice disturbance was markedly exaggerated and was recognized as part of the problem, whereas in my patient the voice changes had not been appreciated.

Another type of neurotic voice disturbance was observed in an elderly man. Born and raised a Catholic, he taught in parochial schools. His early years were spent in an atmosphere of rigid moral training with cruel punishment for the slightest transgression. The father was a brutal uneducated person who occasionally beat the patient with an ax handle. Despite such treatment the patient spoke of the love and respect he held for his father. The mother, although a much kinder person, was despised.

In his late twenties he developed severe compulsive behavior. He renounced his religion and gave up teaching to study law. In his late thirties he was preoccupied with paranoid ideas and was suspicious of everyone, especially his wife, who he believed was living a life of promiscuity. Despite the severity of his illness he continued the practice of law without interruption. He would occasionally question the reality of his suspicions. Although there was no history of overt homosexuality, he had obsessive ruminations concerning homosexuality. He was preoccupied with sexual ideas about women although he led the life of a celibate and had no sexual relations with his wife for many years.

The patient was slight and puny, although he wanted to believe he was strong and powerful like his father. Obviously unable to compete with his father in physical strength, he competed in the realm of learning, gained tremendous book knowledge, and read and spoke Latin fluently. In addition he displaced this competition from his father to the priest.

When expressing sexual ideas the patient's voice assumed a low chanting tone as if he were praying. This tone of voice acted as a means of avoiding punishment. At other times his voice seemed to carry all the incantations and inflections used by the clergy as if he were not really expressing his sexual ideas but were delivering a sermon on sexuality. In this way he tried to undo the feeling of wickedness about his ideas and

to deny his rivalry with his father. By means of these defense mechanisms in the tone of voice, assisted by his identification with the priest, he was able to talk like his father (the father used profanity freely) and thus to compete with him. It is noteworthy that when the patient's attention was drawn to his change of voice and he felt that he was expected to speak normally, he was then unable to bring himself to talk about sexual matters.

Still another type of voice disturbance was seen in a thirty-six-year-old attorney, an extremely docile person, who was struggling with marked feelings of passivity. Although he came from a poor family, his high ideals and ambitions drove him to attain quite a degree of success in life through hard work. However, the very success he strove so hard to achieve caused him great discomfort because he keenly felt the envy of his colleagues. After several preliminary interviews the analytic rule of free association was explained and treatment started. In one of the first sessions he began to express autistic ideas entirely unrelated to each other. This was quite surprising because the patient was not schizophrenic. He had no suitable explanation for the phenomenon and said he was only trying to carry out the analytic rule. However, when his attention was drawn to his voice which had assumed a certain mysterious, mystical quality, he laughed and said, 'I guess I was attempting to out-Freud Freud'. He had taken the analytic rule so literally that he threw himself into a trancelike state. The incident was understood as the attempt of an intimidated individual to meet a dangerous situation by complete self-subjugation. In addition to this complete surrender to the father the reaction also expressed his desire for an immediate outdoing (and overthrow) of paternal authority. As the patient said in his own words, he was 'trying to out-Freud Freud'. It is to be noted that it was not until his attention was drawn to the peculiar change in his tone of voice that he suddenly understood his behavior. This almost invariably happens when a patient is made aware of a change in his tone of voice, but should the phenomenon still remain

beyond his awareness the analyst on occasion may imitate what he heard in the voice. However, this is an aggressive technique and must be carried out cautiously.

Another common vocal symptom was observed in an elderly woman whose chief complaint was that she had no friends and felt that people did not like her. It soon became obvious that she was a very submissive person struggling against her unconscious passive wishes. In talking of her troubles she spoke in a rapid, harsh, loud, almost shouting voice. Her tone of voice alone was sufficient to scare people away. Hill *(5)* has discussed hostility as a defense. He described how his patients exploited hostility to sidetrack the analyst from the fear which appeared in a friendly setting. This patient, unable to tolerate kindness, did not use words expressing anger but spoke in a voice that sounded angry and hostile for the same purpose.

The most difficult voices to recognize as pathologic are those arising from very vigorous defensive processes in the past which have become dissociated from their original situations and have developed into permanent character traits—'the armor plating of character' (*Charakterpanzerung,* as Reich calls it). Among these are the vocal symptoms commonly connected with overt homosexuality. Thus a young male physician who lived a completely homosexual existence had all his life spoken with a weak, unconvincing voice. Since he was a tall, strongly built person his timid voice sounded rather ridiculous. His analysis, which continued for more than four years, yielded excellent results and a radical change in his mode of life. The most striking change was in his tone of voice; he spoke in a much stronger, self-assertive manner. During the course of analysis the weak voice was often the focus of attack and the patient would bring himself to talk for a time in a more normal manner. Sometimes he would express surprise at the ease with which he could use the stronger voice. Almost from the onset of treatment it was pointed out to him that his weak voice was just as much an expression of sickness as the rest of his behavior and his increasing insight bore out this contention.

The patient was raised by a strongly aggressive, dominating mother and a weak father. The problem centered about his difficulty in dealing with the œdipus situation. In an effort to hide his incestuous wishes from the castrating mother his normal male voice was suppressed. He also had to use his female voice to avoid his father's punishment on the same score. A more curious phenomenon was his use of the female voice as a means of gaining his father's love. This desire for his father was repressed early in life out of fear that the father would use him as a woman, and since female genitalia reminded him of this castration fear he felt that sex was safer with a person with a penis than one without. In other words, in order to keep his castration fear repressed, the patient became overtly homosexual. A seeming acceptance of the female rôle thus solved both conflicts. As those unconscious conflicts were resolved his voice became more masculine, along with other character changes.

The most commonly observed speech disturbance is stuttering, but it is not our purpose in this paper to discuss its psychopathology. The literature on this subject is voluminous and most observers feel that a strong psychological background is the rule. Superficial observation reveals that the stutterer has his greatest difficulty when emotionally disturbed. A thought heavily charged with emotion about which the individual is ambivalent comes to mind. He wishes to express it but is afraid to and finally expresses it with great difficulty. Such attacks of stuttering appeared in a young lady whenever she exhibited strong resistances in her analysis which were caused by thoughts of a sexual nature about the analyst. When such a thought entered her mind she became embarrassed and would hem and haw, while seeking to compose herself. In order to gain time she would also reiterate questions asked of her as though she had not understood them. The attack of stuttering was precipitated whenever she was urged to continue expressing her thoughts. On one occasion when she was on the verge of a stuttering attack she suddenly blurted out that she could not talk because thoughts of the analyst kept coming to her mind

and she was afraid that they might emerge. At the same time she felt uneasy, squirmed on the couch, and was apparently sexually excited, although she exerted a great deal of effort to hide the motor activity. Her speech, however, openly revealed her embarrassment. The stuttering was an expression of a supreme effort on the part of the ego to check any sexual idea from emerging which she at the same time wanted to say.

The timid voice, the overly gentle or overly maternal, the perplexed voice, may all be expressions of character disturbances. Whimpering, whining voices are also frequently encountered, the individual talking as though already punished and thereby seeking to avoid anticipated punishment. Speech disturbances consisting of the abnormal use of words have been studied by various authors. Menninger *(6)* investigated a case of habitual mispronunciation. He says speech is a characteristic expression of the personality and eccentric deviations can be clarified in some instances by analysis. Oberndorf *(7)* studied a case of verbigeration and offered the opinion that it represented a reassurance against an unconscious negative attitude.

One can see from these examples that the voice is a sensitive reflector of emotional states and is used by the ego as a vector for neurotic symptoms and defense mechanisms. To hear the voice solely for what it has to say and to overlook the voice itself, deprives the analyst of an important avenue leading to emotional conflict. The defensive operations of the ego are the tools with which the analyst must work and since resistances are constantly being acted out by means of the voice (and with much less shame than in other types of acting out), it is doubly important that such behavior be exposed and analyzed. Interpretations regarding voice changes are usually effective because they are readily appreciated by the patient. Finally, the most difficult voices to recognize as pathologic are those arising from vigorous defensive processes in the past which have developed into permanent character traits.

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SOME PROBLEMS OF WAR PROPAGANDA

A NOTE ON PROPAGANDA NEW AND OLD

BY ERNST KRIS (NEW YORK)

1. The Distrusts of Propaganda

Discussions of propaganda in this world crisis tend to be highly practical; they usually culminate in recommendations on how to propagandize. Without adopting the pretense of detachment, to which I have no claim, I shall attempt in this paper to widen the scope of the discussion by reporting on two concepts of propaganda upon which, explicitly or implicitly, I believe propaganda practices are based. These two concepts are to some extent opposed to each other; they coincide largely with two systems of government, if those systems are taken as 'ideal types' (Max Weber), and with two doctrines of men. Antitheses like democratic and totalitarian propaganda, good and bad propaganda, have been used to describe them. Another antithesis may be even more telling: the psychological hypotheses underlying the concepts here discussed are different in their relation to modern psychological insight, the one being based on an overage psychology, the other on what more recent findings suggest. We may therefore speak of propaganda, old and new.[1]

Without discussing the definition of propaganda, I here use the term in the widest sense of communication from authority and start with the assumption that in every society some means

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[1] *Cf.* The University of Chicago Round Table (March 1, 1942) on *Propaganda Good and Bad,* in which Archibald MacLeish, Harold Lasswell and Richard MacKeon participated. (The University of Chicago Round Table, No. 207, with bibliography.)—The views expressed in the following pages partly supplement a trend of thought first developed in an article on *The Danger of Propaganda* in Amer. Imago, II, 1941, p. 1, ff.

of social control of this nature exist, which establish contact between the responsible leaders and the community. The scope of such communication is largely determined by the situation in which the group lives, by the reality it has to face. The situation of 'being at war' is one which tends to stigmatize all such communication. Men of all ages, Thucydides, Dr. Johnson, John Dewey, have stressed the high degree of uniformity of all war propaganda, of the theme 'Our cause is right, we will win' echoed througout time. Thus modern war propaganda was compared to the battle cry of yore, which was meant to encourage one's own group, frighten the foe, and impress those who did not participate in the fight. A similar division of the functions of modern war propaganda is in fact widely accepted. We distinguish propaganda in war time directed to the home front, to the enemy, and to neutrals. In the following pages reference is made only to the first—home propaganda. In the war of 1914–1918 it was successful. Waves of enthusiasm and hatred were aroused, and swayed even those who before the outbreak of war had championed other and higher ideals. The phenomenon was not limited to one nation; it happened in all belligerent countries.

In this war all seems different: propaganda has not been able to 'do the job.' The crisis of propaganda is one common to Western civilization, which in this case includes our European enemies. (No statements on conditions in Russia, China or Japan are possible at present.) All forecasts made before the war were proved false—men went to war in sadness and in silence, not only in the democracies but even in the totalitarian states.

The course of the war has not decidedly affected the picture. The belligerent governments continue to be faced by the distrust of propaganda existing among their people. It is to some extent independent of the form of government. It is not limited to countries where mass communication is monopolized, planned, and linked to coercion. It exists in the democracies, where free enterprise in mass communication prevails, where only the outgoing military news is controlled, where

there is no relationship between communication and coercion.[2] This leads to the quest for the origin of this distrust. It may tentatively be related to two phenomena, here isolated for the purpose of analysis: the *disappointment in government* and the *inflation of persuasion*. Both developed fully after the last war, at different times in each of the countries of our civilization. The first, the disappointment in government, is related to the feeling that the world has grown out of control. It is a phenomenon apparently typical of industrialized mass society under the impact of war and postwar conflicts. It is connected with the weakening of religious and other traditional values and with a diffidence to the ideals of progress. The economic crisis in all countries, though at different times and with different intensity, has heightened the disappointment in government into a feeling of general insecurity.[3]

The reaction to this disappointment has taken various forms. One reaction—known in the development of the child after the discovery that 'parents are human'—is the search for new ideals and new 'imagines'. The manipulation of this disposition by reactionaries who financed and by militarists who supported demagogues, has contributed to the rise of dictatorships in Europe. No such successful manipulation occurred in the democracies, protected by greater wealth and by a greater adaptability of government rooted in tradition. In the democracies, too, demagogues—those who did not make demands for sacrifice—had their chance; hence the success of irresponsible government, of Tory appeasers in Britain, and of isolationists in the United States.

The distinction between the general disappointment in government and the reaction to the inflation of persuasion is, we

[2] *Cf.* Kris, Ernst: Mass Communication Under Totalitarian Government, in *Print, Film, and Radio in a Democracy*. Ed. Douglas Waples, University of Chicago Press, 1942.

[3] *Cf.* Lasswell, H. D.: *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1935; Mannheim, K.: *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1939.

said, artificial.[4] The term inflation of persuasion indicates the increase in publicity which during and after the last war swayed the world. Two of the three media of mass communication were introduced in these decades—radio and film—and the impact of publicity on life has grown from year to year. In the United States, where research has provided reliable data, distrust, so far as we know, is not essentially a distrust of commercial advertising. It applies to the relation of the average American to persuasion in politics; even when more than three fourths of the media of communication supported one candidate, this did not change the results of the election.[5]

The Western world is propaganda conscious. In the democracies this was initiated after the last war, when members of the propaganda committees wrote their memoirs, described 'how it all was done' and how they swayed their people. This was followed by the consumer movement and the antipropaganda drive. The latest of the attempts at debunking is still fresh in memory: the propaganda phobia which pretended to inoculate the public by teaching them to analyze not the content of statements but the 'intention' of those who made them.

The sequence of reactions was different in Germany. The distrust of propaganda was canalized soon after the war by the slogan of the broken promises of Versailles. It was turned against democratic propaganda and finally democratic government. Under the National Socialist regime the distribution of trust and distrust was at first related to political allegiance; later, especially after the outbreak of war, distrust and apathy became very general phenomena. Many independent observers

[4] Persuasion in this sense describes psychological techniques without reference to the social context. For a psychoanalytic discussion of general problems of persuasion in relation to propaganda see: Zilboorg, Gregory: *Propaganda from Within.* The Annals of the Amer. Academy of Political and Social Science, 1938. Since I recently discussed my own views on this subject at some length (*The Danger of Propaganda, loc. cit.*), I do not here refer to this problem area.

[5] *Cf.* Waples, Douglas and Berelson, Bernard: *Public Communications and Public Opinion.* Graduate Library School, University of Chicago, April, 1941 (mimeographed).

agree that few people read the papers, listen to the radio, or go to the movies before the news reel is over.[6]

In both totalitarian and democratic countries measures were adopted or recommended to deal with this situation. Here our problem crystallizes: what were these methods and on what general psychological assumptions were they based? While we cannot here discuss whether or to what extent the views of our enemies have changed since the outbreak of the war, a brief case study will show how they attempted to adapt their techniques to the existence of distrust.

The views expounded in the democracies are not homogeneous. Everybody agrees that truth should prevail. Beyond this, difference of opinion exists. There are two extremist groups: those who stand for intensification of propaganda, for the use of all devices of publicity and advertising in order to create enthusiasm—the radicals among them state that the methods adopted by the Nazis are the best possible. This group of experts professes not only an absolute trust in the various promotional activities; they also advocate in propaganda directed to the enemy a most aggressive and violent attitude.[7] And then there are those who refuse to give any credit to propaganda. The community, they say, will be united if existing grievances are eliminated. Then, they seem to assume, there will be no need for propaganda.[8]

Apart from these extremists, a vast body of opinion advocates a new type of propaganda. Its principles are not yet well established, the consequences of the new approach are not yet clearly visible, but the attempt exists; a propaganda

[6] *Cf.* Kris, Ernst: *Morale in Germany,* Amer. J. of Sociology XXII, No. 3. In this paper, written in June, 1941, some of the more recent lines of German propaganda were predicted.

[7] The unconscious meaning of this point of view was revealed to me in the analysis of a professional propagandist, broadcasting to one of the enemy countries: words have become magic weapons, speech is supposed to kill. Phylogenetically this leads back to the origin of the battle cry; ontogenetically this 'aggressivization' of speech was related to oral fantasies.

[8] *Cf.* Shulman, Marshall D.: *Planetary Gang-Busting.* J. of Educational Sociology, XV, No. 7, 1942.

based on the *'strategy of truth'*, to quote Mr. MacLeish on 'Facts and Figures', and integrated into the process of democracy at work. Thus a new and an old concept of propaganda oppose each other. While in reality the differences may frequently be blurred by the demands of a given situation, the problem is clarified if the comparison is extended to that of psychological concepts.

2. Hypnotism and Gustave Le Bon's Theory of Propaganda

The competence of psychoanalysts to comment on this problem of social technique is well founded in the history of the subject. The concepts upon which the old type of propaganda is based, and which found expression in the propaganda of the first World War and more generally in the inflation of persuasion, are closely linked to pre-freudian psychopathology. Social psychology at the end of the past century stood under the shadow of the great newcomer to the science of man, hypnotism. The effect of the admittance of this neophyte on the development of psychopathology recently has been described.[9] Its influence on social psychology is as yet not always realized. The later works of Hippolyte Taine are linked with those of the Italian pupil of Lombroso, Sighele, with the great and frequently misinterpreted concepts of Tarde, and finally with the work of Gustave Le Bon, whose Psychology of the Crowd was first published in 1895. The central problem in the work of these men was the transformation of the individual into a member of the crowd, i.e., what we today know to be one aspect of regression.[10] The model of this behavior is found in the dynamics of the hypnotic situation.

The doctrine gained popularity in Le Bon's presentation. It is one in which the emphasis is shifted from science to politics: the fact that the crowd is easily influenced by the hypnotist and leader may be used for purposes of control—the leader

[9] *Cf.* Zilboorg, Gregory: *History of Medical Psychology.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1941.

[10] *Cf.* Herma, Hans and Kris, Ernst: *Gustave Le Bon and the Totalitarian Theory of Propaganda.* (In preparation.)

may manage the crowd. Le Bon's Psychology of the Crowd was, in his own words, written as a reëdited Machiavelli. Born in 1841, the author was one of those French reactionaries who had seen revolutions in plenty. He was terrified by the specter of socialism. His life—a peculiar sequence of endeavors on the fringe between journalism and science—was intrinsically devoted to warding off this peril. A physician by training, he started as a physical anthropologist. He returned from India imbued with the idea of the danger to the white race. What he wrote in the eighties against extending European education to the colored was repeated fifty years later by Oswald Spengler.

In Eastern Europe, this pupil of Gobineau learned to hate the Jews. In his own country he opposed the forty-eight hour week, the abolition of child labor, the expansion of education to the lower-income groups. In the eighties Le Bon won fame by a detailed study of the training of horses, written for the use of the French cavalry. The subject, he said, taught him much which was applicable to human affairs.[11]

This is the atmosphere out of which grew the Psychology of the Crowd, the first treatise on psychological management in the modern sense. It is written with considerable psychological acumen and with complete cynicism. The mental life of crowds is, according to Le Bon, on the level of hallucination, dominated by images; all ideas presented to the crowd merge into such images, and there is a craving in the crowd for a steady supply of ideas: the illusions. Leaders have to create the illusions as means of domination. (It may be worth recalling that the Bible is to Le Bon a textbook of managerial con-

[11] Here is the bridge to the doctrine of conditioning. The impact of this theory on that of propaganda and advertising, though considerable, will not here be discussed. Dr. Ley, the leader of the National Socialist Labor Front, in describing the training and selection of the party elite, says: 'We want to know whether these men have the will to lead, to be masters, in one word, to rule . . . we want to rule and enjoy it . . . we shall teach these men to ride horseback . . . in order to give them the feeling of absolute domination over a living being.' (Ley: *Der Weg zur Ordensburg.* Sonderdruck des Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP; quoted by Heiden, Konrad: *One Man Against Europe.* New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1937, and Fromm, Erich: *Escape from Freedom.* New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1941.)

trol, full of obscene absurdities—and much of what he says in this connection might well be quoted as from Rosenberg.)

The student of the history of ideas will note in Le Bon the parallel with Nietzsche and the reaction to Marx, but he will also be able to quote chapter and verse in order to prove how closely statement after statement by Le Bon reappears in the concepts of propaganda developed by Hitler and Goebbels.[12]

The success of Le Bon's writings, especially of his Psychology of the Crowd, was largely dependent on a public of specific occupation: translations, except into English and German, were sponsored by Grand Dukes, Ministers of Justice and General Staffs. His biography was written by a Japanese Foreign Minister. When Mussolini came to power he professed the influence of Le Bon's doctrine. Le Bon, almost ninety years of age, became the admirer of the 'new order' in Italy. His closest contacts in France were members of the military elite.

The contamination of science with politics does not negate the truth of a doctrine. The content of truth in Le Bon's analysis of social events is considerable if limited to its object of investigation. He has described, in terms of his generation, the psychology of mob formation, of man under the spell of a temporary regression. He has erred in extending the concept to human group behavior at large; the crowd to him has become mankind.

The function of propaganda in Le Bon's scheme is clearly outlined. Its model is the address of the orator; its function is to drive the crowd into submission and to promote its regression. If one rereads how Hitler, with the experience of the agitator of genius, has elaborated these thoughts—age-old thoughts of the demagogue—one will find that the attack upon reason under various disguises is paramount: let the audience

12 This influence, direct or indirect—i.e., conveyed by some of Le Bon's vulgarizations—gains in significance if we hear that years after the publication of the Psychology of The Crowd, in one of the many books which reiterate the basic thesis of the managerial control of the masses, Le Bon developed in his *Psychologie de la politique* (1910) a blueprint of fascism; shopkeepers and militias were entrusted with social defense since the upper classes of France had refused to see the danger.

be tired, the lesson be repetitive, then all depends on the propagandist's conviction. The essence of National Socialist propaganda before and throughout this war has been to reconstitute on a nation-wide scale the conditions of the assembly place, and on a world-wide scale conditions approximating it. The strategy adopted, the tactics used, and the devices so ingeniously varied have one common goal: ultimately to establish between the propagandist and his audience a relationship akin to that between the hypnotist and his medium.

3. Some Comments on Prestige, Prophecy and Initiative in German War Propaganda [13]

German home propaganda consists to some extent of repetitions and variations of Hitler's own views. Each of his speeches is a blueprint of propaganda. Before each speech some of the themes come up, then he summarizes them, and then the radio waves carry the message daily and with due variation. The main lines of propaganda are under his authority.

The image of this authority, however, has undergone changes. As long as he was not independent of his industrialist and militarist promoters, he was a brother figure—a savior. After that time the build-up of omnipotence started. The pathway was that of success: every success was hinted at so that when achieved it could be represented as a fulfilled prediction. Thus each of the fateful steps—the German rearmament, the march into the Rhineland, etc.—was described in terms of an achieved goal. In wartime the manipulation of predictions naturally is handled with the greatest care; planning and preparation, omniscience and foresight, are daily enacted. Studies conducted at the Research Project on Totalitarian Communication illustrate this point. The analysis of words indicating

[13] The following is based mainly on material provided by the Research Project on Totalitarian Communication, directed by Hans Speier and myself. The material analyzed is contained in the Daily Digest of Foreign Broadcasts, published as a confidential document on behalf of the British Ministry of Information by the British Broadcasting Corporation and released by courtesy of the B.B.C. for research purposes to the Research Project on Totalitarian Communication, at the New School for Social Research.

foresight and planning, the essential qualities of magic leadership, in German High Command communiques, show that reports on and reference to military success gradually take the place of such words. A technique of 'Let the facts speak for themselves' becomes the substitute for other means of prestige building. It is this publicity technique which helped to create the impression of irresistible and supreme, omnipotent organization.[14]

Another study, the results of which may here briefly be summarized, deals with the use made of predictions of German actions in their radio home news bulletins. A first finding shows that predictions are generally frequent before action. Without specifying what concrete events are to happen, they create a situation in which success of action will reflect upon the wisdom of the predictor. Such, for instance, was the situation in the spring of 1940, before the campaign in Norway, the Low Countries, and France. After victory less manipulation was thought to be required. At that time distrust was allayed by conquest.

Predictions increased, however, later in the year and early in 1941, when the Battle of Britain was lost. Not all predictions at that time were fulfilled. A crisis of the technique became apparent in the Russian campaign. A host of predictions accompanied initial successes and when late in the autumn of 1942 the failure became evident, a new device was adopted—that of 'negative predictions'. Not action, but the failure to act was forecast. In this sense, Herr Hitler's announcement of November 29, 1941, in which he proclaimed that from now on the German Army would renounce the offensive in Russia, is unique in military history. It is, however, in line with the psychological technique here described. Prediction is the implement of omnipotence and thus of initiative. Passivity is identical with or even more dangerous than

[14] As an illustration of this technique, the following well-documented device may here be recorded. In a German town eggs have arrived. They are *not* distributed; rather it is announced that in three weeks at four o'clock, two eggs per head will be available.

temporary failure. Thus while the German Army was harassed by the cold and by an undaunted enemy, and while the people at home went through hardships of unexpected severity, in this war's third winter, the grim news was advertised. Plight and sacrifice were as repetitiously discussed as planning and success in more fortunate times. While here, as in all similar cases, various psychological appeals were carefully blended, one device was outstanding. In discussing the bad news the appearance of frankness was given, and a 'we can take you into our confidence' technique was adopted whenever possible. In this sense activity remained with the leader.[15]

This survey naturally is misleading by its very brevity, since it does not discuss how the manipulation of trust in the deified leader is supplemented by the manipulation of distrust against information coming from enemy countries. While we cannot in detail scrutinize what evidence there is of failure or success of the National Socialist propaganda management of the German people, there are indications that it fails when its roots are shaken; i.e., when success, even though temporarily, recedes. In the winter of 1941–1942 the broadcast day of the German radio had to be reorganized; light music was given preference over all other programs. In order to attract the attention of a propaganda-weary audience, propaganda was sandwiched between entertainment programs. In those days of intense cold, spring was described by propagandists as the time when special announcements of victories would be broadcast once more. When later in the spring of 1942 the German offensive in Russia started and the Russians retreated, German propagandists were busily attempting to reëstablish the older pattern. Every suitable quotation from Hitler's speeches was produced

[15] Finally in January, 1942, the traditional history of Hitler's career was rewritten. Instead of an irresistible rise to power, it became the history of success painfully interrupted by set-backs. For the first time Hitler's own personality was measured against one of German history. A new film of Frederick of Prussia's life was hastily arranged, and all official comments stressed the historical parallelism. Here, too, there was victory in spite of set-backs—and the conquest of destiny by endurance was added to the paternalistic equipment.

in order to show that he had predicted that the Russian winter offensive would fail and the German spring offensive succeed. Thus German propaganda was directed toward recuperating the prestige lost throughout the winter. Not the present, not the future—the past was of paramount importance.

Only when seen as part of the National Socialist concept of propaganda, based as it is on the model of the hypnotic situation, can this policy fully be appreciated. The propagandist who wishes to address a spellbound audience cannot afford any gap in his record. Complete success and complete submission are closely linked to each other.[16]

In turning now for a moment to democratic propaganda under similar conditions, the differences are obvious. The democracies, unfortunately, had in this war more occasion to justify failure to their people than totalitarian states. There are certain patterns of justification which are ubiquitous. Victorious enemy forces generally are described as superior in numbers, the gallantry of defeated troops generally is stressed, the tendency to distract attention from the theater of war where defeat was suffered to other theaters where one's own forces were successful is equally general. At first sight one might well be inclined to say that differences between totalitarian and democratic communication are in this respect differences of degree only. This, however, is only a first impression, on the whole misleading, which is corrected by experience provided by every further month of war.

At no time in the democracies did criticism vanish. But while in the first year of the war mainly the French and also to some extent the British Government covered their news and propaganda policy with the mantle of secrecy, in Britain the sequence of defeats gave more and more importance to the

[16] In a survey of German propaganda throughout the war, Dr. Goebbels stated of late that only once was a prediction wrong: in the autumn of 1941, when the Russians were underestimated. It is significant also that in the campaigns of 1942, German propagandists were explicitly instructed to refrain from any prediction. A second failure might be fatal and seriously endanger the concept of paternalistic omnipotence.

criticism of government by parliamentary institutions and public opinion; later the compensatory patterns such as 'the numerical superiority of the victorious enemy' were dropped—we refer to the discussion of the British defeat in North Africa in spring, 1942—and concerns for home morale no longer reduced the bluntness and vehemence of criticism. In ever increasing measures detailed information is given, limited only by the requirements of military secrecy, and nonmilitary experts participate increasingly in what the people are being told.

Thus, while defeat in the totalitarian system leads to a crisis, in the democracies it led to a process of gradual adjustment of paternalism and participation.[17]

4. The New Propaganda

The methods used in order to influence public opinion are closely linked to the system of government. The concept which totalitarians have in mind is that of the people as the crowd which follows the leader; that prevailing in the democracies refers to integrated groups.[18] For more than thirty years the discussion of similar problems has played a decisive part in social psychology. It started out from the criticism of Le Bon's work and the confusion created by his extension of the crowd concept to any kind of community. Freud's contribution in this connection was rarely, if ever, fully taken into account although it facilitates greatly a clearer formulation of certain psychological aspects of that difference.[19] His Group Psy-

[17] This process of adjustment accounts to my mind for organizational failures such as those much discussed by the British Ministry of Information and the Information Services in Washington. Out of trial and error the new patterns develop. The importance of free controversy for morale was discussed by French, Thomas M.: *Social Conflict and Psychic Conflict,* Amer. J. of Sociology, XLIV, 1938–1939.

[18] *Cf.* MacIver, Robert: *Society.* New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1937; and Waelder, Robert: *The Psychological Aspects of War and Peace,* Geneva Studies, X., New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

[19] In Freud's presentation this formulation is implied and only part of it is explicitly stated.

chology and Analysis of the Ego [20] was not written as a treatise in social psychology. Problems are only discussed so far as they contribute to his main objective, to clarify further the structural model of the personality which he was developing at the time. The main conceptual tool used is that of identification. To the best of my knowledge, no satisfactory attempt has as yet been made to exhaust fully the catalogue of problems to which Freud refers when discussing 'further problems and lines of work'. They include the study of motivation and origins of group formation, of the differences between types of groups according to types of leadership, of the unifying function which common interests, wishes, and ideals may have.

In order to apply Freud's basic concept to our specific problem, I should like to elaborate on a model frequently used by him. I refer to the construct on the origin of ritual and social communication. In a schematic form it permits us to describe changes of function of both leadership and communication, as a change of mechanism used in participation.

On a first level, that of tribal dance, the reaction of the group to the communication of the leader is total: they act together. Individual differences on this level are of little importance. Action, however, is not always essential. In rituals of communication, such as the holy mass, where the leader functions not as the supreme authority but rather as a representative of the supreme ideal, actions are reduced to symbols—but instead, a rigid code prescribes the emotional reaction members of the group are expected or required to have.

A different level is reached where the ritual is gradually secularized and the leader develops from priest to bard or poet. The conformity of reaction then vanishes. The message may mean something different to each member of the group—according to his individual experience. While on the level previously discussed the unity of response was institutionalized, here response is free, only the stimulus is common to all.

[20] Freud: *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego.* Vienna. Int. Psa. Verlag, 1922.

Differences in reaction develop gradually into differences in evaluation and in agreement. On this level criticism comes into play. Criticism, however, presupposes a new type of identification: one in which the critic identifies himself with the criticized, to however small an extent, in adopting an attitude of 'I in his place . . .'. Such criticism may bear on the content of the message or on the way it is presented; it may be rough and unreasonable, or it may be that of the expert. It does not necessarily destroy the fascination which the message may inspire. It introduces, however, a process of testing and of scrutiny as a new element. Some psychological aspects of this process are apparently most accessible to analysis if we turn to the appreciation of art. The response of the audience is an æsthetic one if to a slight degree the audience identifies itself with the artist as creator of the work of art. Only if such an even distant approach to connoisseurship is realized, the æsthetic illusion is maintained and is achieved in what Coleridge calls 'the willing suspense of disbelief'.[21]

In reformulating these types of participation in terms of processes of identification, two main cases may here be distinguished: one in which the leader and communicator is 'accepted as ego ideal'—we may here speak of 'identification in the superego'—the case of the ritual dance; and one in which identification in the superego is supplemented by ego identification . . . this case is linked to what we described as the birth of criticism.[22]

The two concepts of propaganda, the totalitarian and the democratic, easily can be related to this differentiation: totalitarian propaganda clearly is based on the assumption that the message of the leader should be fully 'accepted as ego ideal'. Identification should take place in the superego. Democratic

[21] *Cf.* Kris, Ernst: *Probleme der Ästhetik.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXVI, No. 2, 1941.

[22] The case represented by rituals of communication might be described as one in which a 'partial' superego identification with the communicator takes place, while the 'total' identification concerns the ideal shared by both communicator and audience.

propaganda, on the contrary, is based on a concept in which two types of identification, identification in the superego and in the ego, are more evenly distributed.

So general a formulation clearly describes ideal types of attitudes. In the social reality we may expect to find more complex pictures which require more refined concepts. In the present context devoted rather to preliminary clarification than to a detailed analysis, we may well stress the outstanding contrasts. Totalitarian propaganda, we said, aims at establishing conditions approximating the market place. This was more than a metaphor. If one of the totalitarian leaders addresses his people, he regularly speaks from a mass meeting—and the nation as a radio audience is made to participate in it. They hear how the meeting assembles, they hear the music, they wait in tension, and when the leader appears and while he speaks, they are made to watch the carefully staged reaction of the multitude of which they are made to be a part. Thus the organized spell of the crowd extends to the radio homes. This, then, is the situation which creates the conditions under which the submissive type of identification grows. It grows where individuals have renounced their intellectual and moral independence, where regression rules.

Democratic leaders speak from their study. They address the individuals in their nation, their speeches are 'fireside chats', from one home to another. Not a difference of prestige or power, but one of responsibility exists between the speaker and the listener who is left to weigh, to test, and to consider. Attempts to sway his judgment are rare.

This clearly does not mean that there are no Germans who, in listening to Hitler, can resist his spell. There are many, we know; nor does it mean that we are not touched, although we may guard it as a secret, when we listen to those legitimately speaking for our cause. Rationality does not determine the life of the free; they, too, are subject to enthusiasm of various kinds, and normally so. We all know that we are suggestible and, while we are aware of it, many of us let ourselves for a time be carried away.

The antithesis of regression and ego control, of irrational and rational behavior, is a dangerous simplification. No such exclusion exists. To put it in the negative: he who cannot *pro tempore* relax, let loose the reins and indulge in regression, is according to generally accepted clinical standards ill. Regression is not always opposed to ego control; it can take place, as it were, in the service of the ego.[23]

We started our discussion with remarks on distrust and disappointment; we may refer to them now. Many observers have complained about the fact that enthusiasm in this war seems to be suspect in the democracies. Spy fever or hate campaigns are rejected by the people—even by those who, like the British, have gone through the ordeal of total war. They want victory; they do not want orgies of hate.

Thus, based on the experience of the last war, they strive for more and more reasonable apprehension, for more and better information; and have, by their very attitude, created an atmosphere in which the new propaganda may grow. It will, I believe, by later historians be classified as the third revolution in psychological techniques to occur within half a century. And seen together the three revolutions are one. First came the new psychotherapy; the new education followed; the new propaganda is about to emerge.

The essence of the revolution in psychotherapy is well known to us. The command of the hypnotist was replaced by the guidance of the psychoanalyst. We do not in psychoanalysis renounce all elements of suggestion, but they are reduced to a minimum. Some trust and confidence of the analysand is a precondition. The ultimate therapeutic aim is, however, increased self-awareness and increased ego control. It is

[23] In a paper read at the International Congress in Lucerne, 1934, I tried to establish this as one of the assumptions necessary to explain human reaction to the manipulation of symbols—in art or social control. *Cf.* Kris, Ernest: *The Psychology of Caricature.* Int. J. Psa. XVII, No. 3, 1936. *Cf.* also Hartmann, Heinz: *Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXIV, 1939; and *Psychoanalysis and the Concept of Health.* Int. J. Psa. XX, 1939. The clinical aspects of the problems discussed here were of late mentioned in various papers by Otto Fenichel.

achieved in the ideal case by lifting the veil of infantile amnesia and thus replacing the compelling forces of fixations by newly and freely made decisions; it is in this sense that Freud termed psychoanalytic therapy reëducation.

The new education was born out of many impulses. The one which came from Freud undoubtedly was decisive. Authoritarian was replaced by coöperative education; automatic obedience, the repercussions of which had become known, by agreement based on understanding. Again authority was not discarded—where it was, it had soon to be reintroduced—but it was modified in its function.

It was and is a painful revolution. It was easier and quicker to cure by hypnosis; but what cures there were, were no longer satisfactory. The scope of therapy had grown. It was easier to educate by stern command, but the results did not meet any longer with general approval; the necessity for more and better guidance had become obvious in the ever-expanding complexity of our lives.

It is now similar to what here is termed the new propaganda. It does not require less; it requires more labor. Again guidance cannot be discarded; it has to be reoriented. Talking down or inciting will no longer do. The task is to explain. H. D. Lasswell, one of its advocates, has lately stressed what he calls balanced presentation—a presentation which states alternatives and thus enables independent evaluation of facts.[24] Were this principle fully adopted, an agreement would have been reached on the essentially educational function of the new propaganda: to make his social and physical universe understood by man. This is a task so great, so necessarily integrated with the dynamic process of expanding democracy, that an increase of graded communication beyond all precedent seems warranted. The traditional channels hardly will suffice, and a new per-

[24] *Cf.* Lasswell, H. D.: *Democracy Through Public Opinion.* Menasha, Wis.: George Banta, 1941; Communication Research and Politics, in *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy,* Ed. Douglas Waples, University of Chicago Press, 1942. See also Smith, Bruce L.: *Democratic Control of Propaganda through Registration and Disclosure.* Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring Number, 1940.

sonnel will be required. Training may gradually fill the gap, but at least initially the job to be done is more general. It is clearly one for the opinion leaders, for the educational elite.

If we return for a moment to the model of participation we studied we may now say that what we described as the place of expertness and connoisseurship in the growth of criticism illustrates the function of a democratic elite. Their function as intermediaries between the communication emanating from a representative leadership and the people, may be said to represent the equivalent of their educational status. Their function is essential and irreplaceable—and may well be clarified by reference to its opposite. 'Opinion leaders' in totalitarian countries are the elite of the party, the supervisors of the people, the specialists in violence. They organize totalitarian life with its sham participation, its parades and marches. In their hands, propaganda becomes a supplement of violence, and violence a prerequisite of propaganda. And thus psychological management supplants guidance of public opinion.

In the democracies, on the other hand, the new propaganda, in agreement and sooner or later in coöperation with the other newly developed psychological techniques, aims at individuals of higher freedom and greater responsibility. It is that aim which, for the psychoanalytic therapy, Freud formulates in saying: 'Where id was, ego shall be'.

The oldest meaning of the word propaganda encourages so utopian a view. A moral philosopher of the third century A.D., who wrote under the name of Cato, said:

> *Disce, sed a doctis, indoctos ipse docto*
> *Propaganda etenim est rerum bonarum doctrina.*

IN MEMORIAM

Isador H. Coriat
1875–1943

After a brief illness of only about ten days, Isador H. Coriat died on May 26, 1943. He was born on December 10, 1875 in Philadelphia, where he lived and studied until 1897. He obtained his M.D. degree in 1900 from the Tufts Medical College (Boston). It is noteworthy that his active scientific career began before he graduated from the medical school; conjointly with Dr. A. E. Austin, he wrote A Laboratory Manual for Clinical and Physiological Chemistry, which was published in 1898. But Coriat evidently decided not to devote himself to organic medicine, for as soon as he obtained his medical degree he became an assistant physician in the Worcester State Hospital. His first two years of psychiatric apprenticeship were thus under the tutelage of Adolf Meyer, who at the time directed the clinical and pathological work of that hospital. Coriat often spoke feelingly of these years, leaving no doubt that, like so many others, he was deeply influenced by Dr. Meyer. After five years of psychiatric interneship he entered private practice in Boston, where he lived and worked until he died.

Coriat's psychiatric career was that of an energetic and versatile scientist. Even a rapid survey of his activities and productions shows that he actively participated in everything new that came into being in psychopathology from 1900 until his death. Indeed, his works reflect the development of psychopathology in this country during this century.

Towards the end of the last, and the beginning of this century, Boston was the scientific center of psychopathological study and experimentation. Modern psychiatry was represented by Adolf Meyer, while Morton Prince, Boris Sidis, and others devoted themselves to the psychopathology of the French school. Under the editorship of Morton Prince, the

Journal of Abnormal Psychology continually published stimulating articles on hypnotism, dual personality, and allied topics. Dr. Coriat was an active participant in this upsurge and wrote interestingly about hypnotism and related subjects.

It was also during this period that the Emanuel Movement was brought here from England, and for a time flourished vigorously in Boston. In collaboration with Dr. Worcester and Dr. McComb, Dr. Coriat wrote a work entitled, Religion and Medicine, The Moral Control of the Nervous System (1908). In 1910 he published his first book, Abnormal Psychology, which was based on material collected from the time he entered the Worcester State Hospital. This work presented a scholarly and comprehensive discussion on abnormal mental mechanisms which were very popular at that time.

Coriat became interested in psychoanalysis shortly after I introduced it here, but it was not until after Freud's visit to Clark University that he began to take an active part in the subject. By 1911 psychoanalysis supplanted all his other interests. The readers of the QUARTERLY need not be told that he played a leading rôle in the development and promulgation of psychoanalysis in this country.

Dr. Coriat not only wrote many papers on the clinical aspects of psychoanalysis, but he was one of the first in this country to apply psychoanalysis to literature. In 1912 he wrote a work on The Hysteria of Lady Macbeth (second edition 1919), which was widely read by both physicians and laymen. In 1915 he wrote a paper on The Meaning of Dreams, and in 1917 another on What Is Psychoanalysis?, which he presented in the form of questions and answers. These works were more or less elementary, but conformed to the psychoanalytic level of the time. Coriat knew how to evaluate his readers.

As time went on Coriat changed the tone of his writing. In 1925 he read a paper at the International Psychoanalytic Congress at Bad Homburg in which he promulgated his theories on stammering. He later enlarged the lecture into a book, Stammering, a Psychoanalytic Interpretation. This

work has been favorably received and extensively read not only by psychoanalysts, but by others interested in speech disturbances. In 1926, when gestalt psychology was introduced here by Koehler, Coriat wrote on Form Psychology and Psychoanalysis. In 1939 he wrote on Humor and Hypomania (Psychiatric Quarterly), in 1940 on The Structure of the Ego (Psychoanalytic Quarterly), and in 1941 on The Unconscious Motives of Interest in Chess (Psychoanalytic Review).

These papers demonstrate only a small part of his activities. There was no phase of psychoanalytic literature in which Dr. Coriat was not vitally interested.

Dr. Coriat was just as active in the psychoanalytic movements of this country and abroad. He was twice President of the American Psychoanalytic Association (1924–1925 and 1936–1937). He was the prime mover of the Boston Psychoanalytic Society, and its President (1930–1932) as well as an energetic teacher and executive of the Boston Institute.

Coriat married Etta Dann in 1904, and they lived very happily together for thirty years. There were no children.

An *aperçu* such as this gives only a barren description of Coriat and his life's work. He was a genial person of catholic interests, an energetic worker and to me, a sincere friend. Through his death we have lost an active and faithful co-worker and one of the leading standard bearers of the first generation of psychoanalysts in this country.

A. A. BRILL

BOOK REVIEWS

WAR IN THE MIND. The Case Book of a Medical Psychologist. By Charles Berg, M.D. London: The Macaulay Press, 1941. 272 pp.

This is a book written in popular form for the average lay reader, but unlike the usual popular accounts of the facts and theories of psychoanalysis, it is composed of a series of case histories. In the sense that case histories in popular form are presented here, it is unique and the first of its kind so far as can be ascertained. There are twenty-six case histories, six of them war neuroses, the whole preceded and concluded by theoretical chapters. The greater part of the clinical material is verbatim, the rest reproduced in condensed form. Direct quotations of questions and remarks by the analyst are included. Towards the end of each case, sometimes dispersed throughout, interpretations are cited. A facsimile of a letter from Freud written four months before he died serves as frontispiece. The author's style is strikingly pithy, direct and simple. The clinical material is fresh and colorful.

Dr. Berg states in his preface: 'Though this book is meant to appeal to every class of reader, I should be very pleased if some of my colleagues also find interest and relaxation on this familiar ground'. The reviewer found not only interest and relaxation but stimulation and provocation, doubtless anticipated by the author.

What follows is the reaction of the reviewer to several questions of evaluation of this novel book. First, the choice of material: although nosologically the clinical material is varied, the bulk is the classical clinical material of psychoanalysis: hysterias, phobias, anxieties, and compulsion neuroses. In this regard the author's patients vary from the common run seen here. Although they come from much the same social and economic strata, they are relatively more naïve and much more sexually repressed. They are reminiscent of Freud's case histories, especially the early Studies in Hysteria. The majority are transference neuroses, with atypical neuroses, depressions, diffuse inhibitions, and character disorders playing an insignificant rôle. But are Dr. Berg's patients really different in type from those seen here? Or

does he choose to present only the classical categories and exclude the mixed neuroses, character and borderline disorders which increasingly form the bulk of the American cases? Or, if the clinical material is approximately the same, does he choose the classical transference fragment that is present in all cases and exclude the rest? These questions recall to mind the antithetical emphasis of the English School upon the most primitive aspects of the instinctual forces seemingly on the basis that the clinical material they deal with contains traumata and fixations at these very earliest levels.

The choice of material acquires more significance by examination of the interpretations which represent a kind of psychoanalysis. It is a very limited kind. Repeatedly and in diverse situations he offers the same dynamics: the repression of sexual impulses, as demonstrated by 'going against his animal nature', and the displacement of affect. The causation is likewise the simple and unvarying 'excessive discipline'. Inadequacy here constitutes error. We find almost no practical application of the concepts of narcissism, aggression, ambivalence, sado-masochism. Anxiety, though correctly characterized as the foundation of nervous illness, is theoretically discussed only at the outset, and hardly applied to the discussion of case material. The only forms of defense treated seriously are repression and displacement of affect, other forms being almost ignored. The dynamic forces of therapy are circumscribed by (1) removing the repressions, (2) reliving the traumatic events, and (3) discharging the repressed or displaced affect. The phenomena of transference are dealt with in only one case. Consequently complicated problems become very simple phenomena. On several occasions Dr. Berg gives the impression of overidentification with his patients as for example when he accepts at face value and without comment (to the reader) the 'love' of a narcissistic patient, or the reality of accusations of a patient with paranoid trends.

Perhaps the most convincing are the war neuroses, which are treated or described more completely. Here six cases are offered to illustrate one type of disorder. 'There are sufficient number of war neuroses cases to demonstrate that these patients differ in no essential particular, except ease of curability, from the average case with which the medical psychologist has to deal. Any case of psychological illness may have a traumatic precipitating

factor, and it makes little difference to the nature of the case if that factor be war or peace.' To this reviewer it would seem that the traumatic neuroses probably differ from the 'average' in other essential particulars than ease of curability which in itself might represent the result of a radical difference.

We now approach the problem of popular presentation. Freud puts it succinctly in his letter to the author. 'You will understand that I entertain certain suspicions against the technique of analysts who have made the popularization of analysis their aim. It suggests to me a very difficult if not impossible task. The man in the street is not likely to swallow and digest our conception of the unconscious mind nor will he be ready to agree to the emphasis we put on the primary urges. Psychoanalysis might never become popular. Yet I'm glad to say, I think you are doing good work.'

Granted widespread resistance and the fact that psychoanalysis may never become popular, the fact is that Freud himself and others have effectively addressed themselves to the educated lay reader. As a result we have such classics as the Introductory Lectures by Freud both old and new, The Origin of Species by Darwin, and the Lectures to Workingmen by Huxley and Ruskin. These classics do not write down to the lay reader; their sole task is to serve truth. Because truth is never simple it is best served only when completeness and clarity are the goal rather than any simplification.

The author of this book indicates his knowledge of these facts. He has succeeded admirably in his main attempt to present 'live people expressing their relatively uninhibited thought and feelings, mostly in the exact words they used in the consulting room'. Many of his interpretations are convincing and brilliant; a few are eloquent. However, the introduction of a case book in popular form as an improvement upon a book of theories in popular form creates almost as many problems as it hoped to avoid. The book deserves a large audience among analysts as well as the general public.

I. PETER GLAUBER (NEW YORK)

SCIENCE AND SANITY: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. By Alfred Korzybski (Second Edition). Lancaster: The Science Press, 1941. 798 pp.

Structure alone is the only possible content of knowledge and hence, according to Korzybski, the aim of science is to construct

a language which will provide formulations invariant for any and all systems of reference, thus separating automatically the intrinsic characteristics of an event or phenomenon from those characteristics which belong only to the observer and his language system. The only language system which at present possesses the requisite flexibility is mathematics, best exemplified by the tensor calculus.

The language of the common man of any culture would be adequately suited to his needs providing he were to make legitimate use of its elements by realizing, as do (some) mathematicians in their field, that every word or symbol is an abstraction and *is not* the object or the event itself. Moreover a good deal of meaningless if not harmful twaddle would be more easily recognized for what it is if we could devise a means of distinguishing between orders of abstractions which words or symbols represent in differing contexts. This recognized *multiordinality* of words would result naturally in a *multivalued* (non-Aristotelian) process of thinking and would automatically release us from the confusions, 'false-to-fact identifications' and disturbing affects which are so troublesome in our interpersonal relations, our social, economic, political and scientific ways of behaving.

This in short is Korzybski's thesis.[1] One means he has devised to facilitate the non-Aristotelian revolution, which he feels is necessary if there is to be any sanity in the world, is a device called the structural differential which is designed visually to enforce 'consciousness of abstracting'. Simple enough to be taught to children, the structural differential is nevertheless a device of unique potency. Training in its use if widespread enough (Korzybski envisages its ultimate use by parents, educators, physicians, scientists, statesmen—in fact by practically everyone) would insure 'universal agreement' on all issues. 'It is amusing to discover, in the twentieth century, that the quarrels between two lovers, two mathematicians, two nations, two economic systems, etc., usually assumed insoluble in a "finite period" should exhibit one mechanism—the semantic-mechanism of identification—the discovery of which makes universal agreement possible, in mathematics and in life.'

There is little doubt that 'consciousness of abstracting' and a

[1] A more detailed exposition of this thesis may be found in Markus Reiner's review of the first edition of *Science and Sanity*, This QUARTERLY, III, 1934, pp. 641–651.

continual awareness of the multiordinality of terms would be of great value in the realm of discourse where (as every psychoanalyst would agree) confusion rules. For this reason and because there is unfortunately no better exposition of a multivalued logic and its benefits known to the reviewer, this volume is recommended for study—serious study—by any one who employs rational discourse as an aid in demonstration or in influencing others. It should be of considerable value to the psychotherapist. Nevertheless Korzybski is guilty of the most naïve rationalism and falls into the error of the 'identification' he so eloquently deplores by imagining that the whole of life is a debate in which we have only to clarify the rules of rhetoric in order to set everything running smoothly. Unfortunately there is nothing in his system which could possibly lead him to the simple insight that life is really not a debate and that the reason he makes this 'false-to-facts' identification is because he *wishes* it were. The concept of the wish, of purposive behavior simply does not exist in his system any more than it exists in the equation

$$e^{i\pi} - 1 = 0$$

which is incorrect as it stands and will remain so because in itself it experiences no inner disturbance, no need, no 'wish' to right itself and achieve equilibrium.

The fact is that Korzybski really does not deeply, feelingly understand the organic, much less what is meant by the 'mental' or 'spiritual'. His is a deep dread that in the final ordering of the structural universe something left over will be found, something strange, unaccountable, something inexplicably unassimilable by even that conveyor belt, mass production technique of symbol manipulation called matrix calculus. Curiously, in attempting to explain life, growth and 'mind' in colloido-mathematical terms he virtually succeeds in doing the opposite. The more facts from widely diverse fields he brings up to buttress his case, the more does it become apparent that what is left unaccounted for in all instances is an organizing principle, that which is beyond structure in the logico-mathematical sense because it can never be fully actualized in the present. But this doesn't bother Korzybski (for whom in the beginning there was the word) any more than it bothered Laplace who when asked by Napoleon where in his *Mécanique céleste* there was room for the Deity is said to have replied, 'Sire, I have no need for such an hypothesis'. The story

goes that when Napoleon repeated this to Lagrange, the latter remarked, 'That, Sire, is a wonderful hypothesis'.

Unfortunately the second edition of Science and Society incorporates the same defects and inadequacies which characterized the 1933 edition, because there has been no textual revision outside of a new introduction and some additional bibliography. The text is still annoyingly repetitious, rambling and often filled with semantic nonsense and pseudo demonstrations which would have to be put down as examples of *non-sequitur* in any system, Aristotelian or non-Aristotelian. The immense scientific erudition of the author is too often spewed up in an undigested or semidigested state and too frequently used without relevance to arguments whose threads seem to get lost somewhere en route. Book III, dealing with the structure of mathematics and the empirical universe could be profitably revised in the interest of clarity as well as unity: for instance, the chapter on the semantics of the differential calculus seems less lucid than Osgood's textbook on which it is admittedly based.

Finally, it might be suggested that to an excellent bibliography of 751 items there be added a 752nd, the Novum Organum of Francis Bacon, that staunchest of all empiricists who, having had the profoundest insight into the magic of words and the effect of word-tracks on our thinking processes, managed nevertheless to escape the error of knocking an 'idol' down merely to stand it up again on its head.

JULE EISENBUD (NEW YORK)

FAMES, LIBIDO, EGO. By Professor Dr. A. Austregesilo. Buenos Aires: Nocito y Rañó, 1941. 155 pp.

Professor Austregesilo is a clinical neurologist with some forty years of neuropsychiatric practice behind him. This book represents his reaction to psychoanalysis. In spite of its brevity it is repetitious, with constant reiteration that the freudians are on the right track but that neuroses are the joint product of the three elements mentioned in his title: fames, libido and ego. *Fames* is of course the Latin word for hunger, which he introduces by analogy to *libido,* but which he uses to signify in general the nutritive needs. A disturbance in the fames economy would be, for example a vitamin deficiency; and he assures his readers that psychoanalysts in practice are prescribing tonics and vitamins.

His conception of psychoanalysis is derived heterogeneously from early writings of Freud, popular freudian writers, and many quasi-freudians. Although the author is evidently impressed by the sexual material that turns up in his 'analyses', he fails to apply a truly dynamic psychology nor do his studies seem to resolve his problems concerning his cases. A strong impression that Freud knows what he is talking about is opposed by the author's previous training and insufficient analytic education, and the result is an honest conflict which he tries to settle in this book. The translation from the Portuguese into Spanish, by José Lorenzo Rañó, is adequate.

B. D. L.

THE SUCCESSFUL ERROR. By Rudolf Allers, M.D., Ph.D. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940. 266 pp.

Rudolph Allers is no mean adversary, and it would be trivial to dismiss his attack upon psychoanalysis simply because he is an impassioned Catholic. Nevertheless, we need not take too literally his protestations of scientific objectivity, however well implemented by great erudition they may be. A man who condemns psychoanalysis as a heresy, however casuistically he may justify such an epithet, can hardly expect to be considered objective except by the faithful. His book appears to have been designed to stifle the influence exerted upon Catholics by the views of Dalbiez, Maritain and the Adler of previous years. The psychoanalyst, in Allers's words, 'cannot help transmitting to his patient the contagion of an anti-Christian spirit'. 'One has to conclude that a Catholic ought to beware of getting too close a contact with Freudian ideas . . . he ought to be warned away.'

Allers presents the 'basic notions of psychoanalysis' fairly accurately as far as he goes but significantly fails to describe Freud's concept of the personality as a functioning whole. He then makes an attack on the structure of psychoanalysis based on this omission and accuses Freud of a kind of atomistic disintegration of the 'person' (in the philosophic sense), meanwhile assuring his readers that this view of the personality has long since been given up by most psychologists!

True to his scholastic bias, Allers presents certain *a priori* objections which he claims invalidate the methods of psychoanalysis.

He terms these 'the logical fallacies of psychoanalysis'. 'The insistence that a special method has to be acquired and that only this one method is capable of yielding certain results is in itself rather remarkable.' *A posteriori,* if his objection to this general approach were valid not a single scientific discipline would remain standing. The accusation that psychoanalysis suffers from the fallacy of *petitio principii,* of which the writer makes so much, is more justly levelled against his own reasoning. A particularly cogent example of this kind of fallacy is afforded by his discussion of free will. 'The fact of free will', says Allers, 'exists [because] man feels that he experiences free will', and if free will is an illusion, 'its persistence and impressiveness would be rather astonishing'. Here is *petitio principii* indeed! Furthermore, he accuses Freud (whom he lumps indiscriminately with all other determinists) of, lightly and without evidence, dismissing free will as an illusion, in seeming ignorance of the extensive and carefully documented literature on the unconscious factors determining choice.

A detailed analysis of Allers' argument would be too lengthy but the following example will show one of its abiding deficiencies which is an utter disregard of clinical facts. In attacking the concept of resistance of which he rightly says, 'in truth it implies many of the theoretical views of Freud's system', he remarks, 'The observed phenomena—namely the interruptions occurring in the chain of free associations and the so-called efforts to be made by the person analyzed and the analyst—are viewed as an ocular demonstration of resistance. Resistance itself, not the mere objective facts enumerated above, is what is "observed" according to the psychoanalysts. But all that they are observing is that no association occurs to the patient.' Following this unwarranted assumption, that the concept of resistance rests on such flimsy evidence, psychoanalysts, it seems, take resistance for granted and find it everywhere in the patient. Not a word is mentioned by Allers of the rich psychic and somatic manifestations upon which the concept of resistance is really based, nor of the flood of material which so commonly emerges when it is analyzed.

As he goes on, the author destroys, with increasing fervor, any pretense at objectivity. Psychoanalysis becomes 'dangerous', 'preposterous', in a word, 'an immense error'. He dismisses Freud

because his 'philosophic system' is a materialistic one, and he attacks psychoanalytic insight in relation to religion, ethnology, medicine, and above all, education.

A final word concerning the author's objection to 'scientism' is relevant. He triumphantly points to the fact that men, repeatedly disappointed in the efforts of science to give them satisfactory values, have again and again turned back to the Church. Let us reverse this observation. Disappointed again and again in the Church, men have turned to science to give them satisfactory values. A terrible yearning to achieve permanent values in a vastly complex world, in which the individual's stay is so transitory, is hardly sufficient basis on which to posit the validity of one's convictions. Instead, it has frequently stifled man's resurgent need to resolve his problems in a more mature, if infinitely more difficult way.

NATHANIEL ROSS (NEW YORK)

PRACTICAL CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY. By Edward A. Strecker, Franklin G. Ebaugh and Leo Kanner. Fifth Edition. Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1940. 728 pp.

That this text has had five editions printed in fifteen years is sufficient proof of its popularity.

The present edition has been expanded to include, among other additions, a chapter by Leo Kanner, M.D., on Psychopathological Problems of Childhood from the child guidance point of view, a description of the Rorschach test as a contributory method of examination, and a note on Surgical Procedures in the Treatment of Psychoses. In the chapter on Manic Depressive Psychoses, shock therapy and prolonged narcosis are described in the section on therapy.

In all sections, the clinical material is well presented. The sequence followed is traditional, beginning with the organic and ending with the psychoneurotic reaction types. This serves to emphasize the unpsychological character of the text as a whole.

It is an open secret where psychobiology picked up its exclusive 'genetic-dynamic' orientation. The debt to psychoanalysis is omnipresent and liberally unacknowledged in accordance with the custom of the '. . . psychotherapeutists who warm their pot of soup at our fire without indeed being very grateful for our hospitality' (Freud).

It is conceded (p. 5) that, 'The Psychological school has had (and still has) [*sic*] many eminent adherents (Charcot, Babinski, Janet, Bernheim, Dubois, Dejerine, Freud, Bleuler, Jung, Adler, etc.) who have made noteworthy and sometimes epochal contributions'.

Psychoanalytic psychotherapy is called 'Freudian Psychoanalytic Catharsis' (p. 605). 'In our practice, we have utilized some of its conceptions, but have not found many patients for whom we felt a formal analysis would be beneficial. It should be considered if the disability produced by the psychoneurosis is sufficiently disabling; if its genesis cannot be uncovered by other methods; if other methods of therapy are ineffective, and if it seems unlikely that the patient will be damaged psychologically by the procedure.'

R. G.

FOUNDATIONS FOR A SCIENCE OF PERSONALITY. By Andras Angyal, M.D., Ph.D. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1941. 398 pp.

Psychiatry has reached a point today where knowledge and comprehension are bursting the bounds of well-established concepts and vocabulary. Semantic difficulties confront every progressive student in discussing studies which involve the comparison of diagnostic categories; they reinforce imponderable barriers between the important theoretical systems; and our terminology fails to express the basic premises of psychosomatic fact and theory, except when we resort to elaborate explanation of the meaning of each word.

This is the problem for which Dr. Angyal seeks a solution. He despairs of mere clarification and improvement of classical concepts, and courageously seeks his solution by the ingenious and carefully thought through creation of a new concept of the interrelations of personality, biology, and environment. He says explicitly: 'A set of new concepts which are appropriate to the holistic character of personality must be developed to permit discontinuance of the use of inappropriate concepts borrowed from the segmental sciences' (p. 374). This book is proof that he is fully competent to practice the dictum which he preaches.

His principles are derived chiefly from gestalt psychology. His method is the statement of basic concepts, their definition in his own vocabulary, and the careful logical analysis of their implica-

tions for science, especially for biology, psychiatry, and the social sciences. Though philosophical in tenor, Dr. Angyal's thought is valuable to scientists because it is invested with a thorough knowledge of clinical and experimental psychiatry and more than a smattering of biology, physiology, and anthropology. He does not ignore the data and interpretations of other scientists; he reinterprets them in terms of his own theoretical structure.

His fundamental idea—an immensely valuable version of the 'holistic approach'—is that environment and organism constitute a system, in which every change affects the system as a whole. 'According to our point of view', he says, 'the life process does not take place *within* the organism, but *between the organism and the environment*. . . . Organism and environment are the two indispensable poles of a single life process' (pp. 31–32). He calls this system, created by the interactions of organism and environment, the 'biosphere', and emphasizes that it is a true system in the sense that subdivisions, each itself a process, are determined by their relation to the system as a whole, and are not to be regarded as component parts whose total is an additively determined aggregate. Personality is defined as 'the process of living', and this, both in its details and in its inclusive manifestations, is apparent as the interaction between two fundamental tendencies: the 'trend to increased autonomy', and the 'trend toward homonomy'.

'Autonomy', in his vocabulary, is the tendency of the organism to extend its control and subordination of the environment. This concept is practically identical with this reviewer's definition in recent papers [1] of the 'instinct to master' as the force impelling to the development and skilful use of intellectual and motor instruments, except that Dr. Angyal insists his idea of autonomy is to be regarded in a descriptive and not a causative sense. The trend to homonomy is the tendency of organisms to become a part of a larger universe. It is apparent in the formation of family and cultural groups, and in æsthetic, ethical and religious aspirations. Psychological manifestations, including emotional and conative phenomena, are considered as the 'symbolic' aspect of the biosphere, and soma and psyche as two aspects of the personality as a whole,

[1] Hendrick Ives: *Instincts and Ego During Infancy*. This QUARTERLY, XI, 1941, pp. 33–58; and *Work and the Pleasure Principle*. This QUARTERLY, XII, 1942, pp. 311–329.

but not as contrasted or parallel entities. The author's theory culminates in a discussion of the problems of integration from the standpoint of the relationship of 'segmental functions' to the biosphere. The philosophical root of this dissertation, and the most difficult portion to assimilate because it is really not so much a new idea as a new orientation contradicting our habitual modes of thought, is Dr. Angyal's insistence that the subdivisions of the biosphere, for example a blood cell, a movement of the hand, a fantasy, or a cultural institution, are all to be regarded not in their causal or temporal relations to each other, but only in their relation to the system as a whole.

Psychoanalytic contributions, both empirical and theoretical, are repeatedly acknowledged by the author and utilized in his own way. He displays a more comprehensive knowledge of analysis than its practitioners would take for granted, and their usual criticisms, when analytic views are adapted to other systems, such as naïveté and absence of clinical comprehension, are not generally valid here. Dr. Angyal denies the theory of the unconscious though he acknowledges the data from which it is derived. He believes the theory is an unwarranted 'psychologizing' of 'non-symbolized' events, but scarcely escapes confusion himself when he discusses the 'unsymbolized content' of *Fehlhandlungen.* Dr. Angyal fully recognizes that the 'trend to homonomy' is represented psychologically by the superego as described by Freud, but he does not appear to recognize that his concept of the 'interference of systems' is essentially a restatement of the analytic concept of conflict; nor that the statement 'psychological phenomena have biological significance only in relation to those primary processes *which they represent*' [2] (p. 378) was made in almost the same words by Freud.

Dr. Angyal not only thinks clearly, he writes clearly and with an extraordinary simplicity, aptness of illustration, and lucidity of definition, in view of the unavoidable abstruseness of his theme. There is a fair index. The book leaves the reader pondering a question he cannot answer: is it one of those products of a superior mind, appealing to a few kindred spirits who like to reduce their abstract thought to symbols but leaving most of their fellow scientists amused or unaffected; or can it be Dr. Angyal is talking

[2] Author's italics.

a conceptual language which will be more or less taken for granted by a future generation, a generation which will regard our efforts to discuss the total organism in a vocabulary modeled on laboratory science as quaint and stifling? Certainly the author seems in the right when he claims that 'the human being is more than a mere aggregation of physiological, psychological, and social functions', and that the 'study of the total person is not a mere combination of the results of those sciences . . . but an *entirely new science*' [3] (p. 4).

IVES HENDRICK (BOSTON)

OBJECTIVE AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY. (Second Edition.) By D. Ewen Cameron, M.D. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941. 390 pp.

The past two decades have seen a growing interest in the application of objective and experimental methods to psychiatry. The term 'experimental psychopathology' has become familiar. As long ago as 1910, Gregor published a book with this title in German but it was chiefly concerned with the possible application of the methods of Wundtian experimental psychology to psychiatric subjects. G. V. Hamilton pleaded for the laboratory approach in his Objective Psychiatry published in 1925. Despite several excellent journal summaries, outside of these two books both of which are now out of date, no major summary of the field has appeared in book form. In the meantime projective testing, conditioned reflex techniques, experimental neuroses in animals, psychosomatic studies, and topological psychology have all developed and show a more or less healthy growth. It is hence with the greatest expectations that a reviewer starts the perusal of a book entitled Objective and Experimental Psychiatry, whose purpose, according to the dust cover, is 'to bring together all the material concerning human behavior which is of an objective or verifiable nature and which may be useful to those particularly interested in experimentation in the fields of psychiatry and the other social sciences'. This is a big order and an important one and the reviewer regrets to report that Cameron's book almost completely fails to fill it.

The plan of the book is logically good and as a blue print leaves little to be desired. After two introductory chapters on the

[3] Author's italics.

scientific method and the nature of the organism, the first of which is rather commonplace and the second of which is poorly digested, the pertinent literature on objective and experimental techniques and findings is reviewed. The various psychic and somatic functions are treated in order in terms of their adaptability. Thus learning and memory functions come first, followed in order by functions such as personality, facilitative functions, autonomic and endocrine functions and ending with heredity.

The task is important and well formulated but very poorly executed. There are serious weaknesses in the manner of presentation and even more serious errors of omission in the matter presented. The text reads throughout like a series of partially completed abstracts. There is outside of the general chapter plan no clear cut plan of presentation. The material is rarely critically evaluated and when evaluated, this evaluation is that of the authors quoted rather than that of the author of the book himself. Implications of the studies and suggestions for further research are almost entirely lacking. The effect on the reader is that of an ill-digested piling up of abstracts.

Such a piling up of abstracted material would be of great value in itself if it were complete, but it is far from complete and this brings us to the errors of omission. These the reviewer believes to be quite serious. Indeed in his opinion the techniques and findings which are unmentioned in the book are probably more important than those given more or less fully. There is in the first place no discussion of the whole field of projective testing and the field of concept formation tests is quite inadequately handled. To find a book with this title that has not a single reference to Rorschach is disheartening indeed. There is nothing about the recent experiments on psychopathological mechanisms and conditioning. Such techniques as that of Luria receive no mention. Hypnosis is completely neglected as is the work on the experimental neuroses in animals. The important researches in psychosomatic medicine with their at least partially experimental and objective controls are not treated. Likewise, except for two references to work on tension systems, the approach of Lewin and the topological psychologists is absent. These omissions cannot be excused as lying without the field of the author's interests, because he does discuss intelligence tests, paper and pencil personality tests, conditioning, and the mechanisms underlying the psychological

tensions respectively. The present reviewer, an experimental psychologist, must stop the list of omissions here because here his competence stops. Other reviewers must judge whether the sections of the book dealing with organic medical problems are equally weighted.

These criticisms could not so well have been leveled against the first edition of this book which appeared in 1935. Many of the developments referred to have been those of the last few years. The reviewer believes that the 1935 edition was certainly in one way a better book than the revision. At the time it fairly adequately surveyed the field. The revision brings the original book itself up to date, but scarcely the science with which the book deals.

J. F. BROWN (LAWRENCE, KANSAS)

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CHILDREN'S REACTIONS TO THE WAR. (Including a Critical Survey of the Literature.) By J. Louise Despert, M.D. From the New York Hospital and Department of Psychiatry, Cornell University, Medical College, New York, 1942. 92 pp.

This study is based on the author's observations of a group of children in the Payne Whitney Nursery School. In the course of observation over a period of several years, an opportunity was afforded to compare wartime with peacetime behavior with special reference to anxiety manifestations. Replies to questionnaires sent to parents, observation in the nursery group, and special play sessions with the psychiatrist furnished the material for the study which was made intensively on fifteen children.

It became evident that all children manifesting anxiety in relation to the war had previously presented anxiety problems. But not all children with a history of anxiety developed increased anxiety under war conditions. Dr. Despert finds that even marked peacetime anxieties which disappeared prior to the war do not necessarily recur during wartime. Further, children in acute anxiety states of peacetime origin do not necessarily suffer exacerbations because of war. Dr. Despert also offers the observation that aggressive behavior is more successful than compulsive symptoms as a defense against anxiety. In other words, anxiety-aggressive children were less subject to anxiety arising from the war than anxiety-compulsive children.

In addition to her own investigation Dr. Despert offers a comprehensive review of the literature of children in wartime. Most of the reports come from England and deal with the effects of evacuation during the ordeal of 1940–1941. Blitz or no blitz, if England had it to do over again there would probably be no evacuation. The nervous disorders due to separation from home, so marked in the case of young children taken from their mothers, have been far more ominous than neuroses arising out of the blitz itself. Moscow appears to have handled the children differently. Judging from the brief reports now available, this account should some day prove revealing.

The most important of Dr. Despert's recommendations for the emotional care of young children in wartime is her recommendation of the 'nervous family' rather than the 'nervous child' as the center of interest. Women are now going into industry in increasing numbers, thereby making the intelligent day-care of young children one of our most urgent home-front problems. Without careful regard for the maintenance of sound parent-child relations, such centers will be nothing better than emergency stopgaps and a golden opportunity for constructive social planning will have come and gone.

ANNA W. M. WOLF (NEW YORK)

OUR CHILDREN FACE WAR. By Anna W. M. Wolf. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942. 214 pp.

The special circumstances of the present war cause surprisingly little change in the basic structure of a parent-child relationship. Whatever can be said in peacetime about the profound importance of the way this relationship is developed is equally applicable in wartime. Nevertheless it is of the utmost moment that whatever can be said, be said convincingly, repeatedly, and in specific reference to current events.

Mrs. Wolf, the author of the superb Parents' Manual, has met this need with another wise and informed distillate of the most valuable data from the field of child study for popular consumption. In this book she discusses such topics as the education of children to the realities of strife and danger, the reaction of the child to the father's 'going away to war', the timid adolescent who fears cowardice, war work for mothers, and many other topics

of current significance. The question of how to handle the problem of aggression and the concept of 'hate' for an enemy is delicately and wisely dealt with from the vantage point of a sound psychoanalytic and sociologic background. Throughout, the author has taken advantage of the lessons learned from Britain and the war work of Anna Freud, Susan Isaacs, and others. At the end of the book is a valuable reading list for both parents and children on America and the things and people it is fighting for and against.

Every reader will appreciate Mrs. Wolf's effortless literary style. What many readers may not appreciate is the typically upper middle class tone which pervades the book from cover to cover despite the author's obviously sincere attempts here and there to get away from this unrepresentative attitude. The author may feel that the psychological problems dealt with cut across class lines. In this most psychoanalysts would agree, but a large potential public which should be reached might mistakenly adjudge these discussions inapplicable because of their prettied-up context. This would be a most unfortunate miscarriage of an otherwise excellent venture.

JULE EISENBUD (NEW YORK)

CRIMINAL YOUTH AND THE BORSTAL SYSTEM. By William Healy, M.D., and Benedict S. Alper. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1941. 251 pp.

This is a description and critical account of the English system of care of youthful criminals. The discouraging results of American reformatory and correctional practices impel the authors to an inspection of the presumably more successful English methods. They compare these with the current American efforts at management and treatment of youthful offenders. Illustrative case histories, giving accounts of eight young criminals, some neglected, some successfully treated, are intended to show the scope of the problem and the range of the treatment efforts. Complete neglect in treatment is contrasted with the effects of a thoughtful plan of treatment, including psychotherapy.

Borstal is an English village which gives its name to the prison for boys, and to the system of training which is in use there. The Borstal idea dates back to 1894, when a Committee on Prisons called attention to the fact that large numbers of youth pass

through the prisons yearly, that for the most part they were injured rather than helped by the experience, and that habitual criminals became established in criminality between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one years. There followed the establishment of separate institutes for the care of young criminals and shortly afterward, an organization for after care of those released from the so called Borstal Institutions. This organization, the Borstal Association, under private sponsorship, yet liberally subsidized by the Home Office, constitutes an important element in a general treatment plan.

A perusal of this account of the Borstal Institutions will not reveal anything surprising or particularly new in principle to the student of criminology. What *is* impressive is the relatively effective application of principles rather well understood but thus far applied only in most limited degree in American correctional practice. If one considers the single factor of size of institution, it is to be noted that for the care of some 2,200 inmates, no less than eleven Borstal Institutions, none with a population over 350, are provided. One American institution for youthful criminals houses over 2,600 young men. No one is under the slightest illusion that young criminals can be dealt with en masse, with expectation that significant modification of their behavior or personalities will be achieved. Yet only to the most limited extent is there provision in America for the individual treatment of youthful offenders.

The Borstal Institutions are not only organized to deal with relatively small groups of young men but they are also highly diversified in physical makeup, nature of location and type of activity constituting the program. One Borstal was erected about a project in which waste marshland was reclaimed from the sea. This calls for considerable physical hardihood, since work was carried out despite the wind and weather of a bleak English coast area. The young men sent on this project had to be somewhat hardier than those assigned to institutions where less physical hardship and arduous labor were encountered. Initially, the young men created the establishments in which they lived or in some instances rebuilt or modified old prison plants turned over for the Borstal purposes. 'Open' and 'closed' institutions exist (or did, until the outbreak of the present war disrupted the Borstal program).

The greatest emphasis is placed on personnel, since it is recognized that upon the establishment of a personal relationship with the delinquent or young criminal hangs the possibility of modifying his attitudes. The several governors of the institutions each seems to have his own idea as to how best to win the interest and confidence of the boys. In all Borstal Institutions there is adequate opportunity for frequent individual consultation between inmates and the governor or other member of the staff.

The personnel of the Borstal Institutions includes men of highly diversified experience. Half of them are university trained; they are drawn from armed services, business, education, engineering. Some were artisans. Emphasis is placed on breadth of experience, on maturity and on demonstrated ability to get on with people. Young university graduates are advised to 'knock about the world' for a year or two before being considered for service with the Borstals.

In some instances contact with the life of the community is an important element in the experience of the Borstal inmates. Attendance at church or educational classes of the community and participation in civic activities by the Borstal group sometimes is possible. The after care (or parole) is carried on intelligently and thoroughly by members of the Borstal Association with whom the young men become acquainted before discharge from the institution. The members of the Borstal staff may visit their former charges and maintain an interest in their subsequent careers. Borstal boys are accepted in military services if they have a good record for one year after discharge. Many young men are trained for services at sea and for many other locations during their Borstal tenure.

Healy and Alper report a considerably greater degree of success of the Borstal system in reduction of recidivism than that achieved by American correctional methods. This is easy to believe, particularly since no extravagant claims are made for the Borstal schools. American diagnostic studies obviously are much more penetrating than those reported for the Borstal group. American emphasis upon treatment has been much too limited to offer possibilities of success on any large scale. The American criminologists may know objectively more about their delinquent and criminal population, but they do less about it than the English whose investigations seem more superficial. The Borstal approach

could well be supplemented by development of more adequate provision for psychotherapy. On the whole, however, the Borstal procedures are far in advance of those actually current in the haphazard methods of dealing with young criminals in most of our state institutions. The Youth Correction Authority Act, recommended by the American Law Institute, is a step toward a plan for more effective dealing with youthful criminals. The correctional services would have to be rescued from politics and able young persons encouraged to find careers in this field.

Healy and Alper's book can be read profitably by all students of delinquency. A small but excellent bibliography is provided.

GEORGE J. MOHR (CHICAGO)

YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK STATE. Albany: Legislative Document No. 55, 1942.

This is a final public report of the Joint Legislative Committee to 'examine into, investigate and study the existing facilities for the care and treatment of children'. This committee has been in existence for five years and has, from time to time, submitted drafts of enactments, none of which have been ratified by the legislature. This report of three hundred pages is a hodge-podge of previously submitted proposals and new recommendations. There is also a review of the present state of affairs regarding the treatment of young offenders in New York State and elsewhere which contains some extremely valuable information mixed with much else. There are many overlapping considerations, such as the extension of the juvenile court age and the enactment of new laws to take offenders above sixteen out of the juvenile court jurisdiction. The value of special courts for youths is emphasized. The section on The Adolescent contains very poorly digested material concerning the emotional life of that period. Critical readers will recognize that this report was written to order by Mr. B. S. Alper, Research Director to the Committee. Our guess is that if he had not been compelled to follow along the lines laid down by the committee he would have produced a very different document.

WILLIAM HEALY (BOSTON)

PSYCHOLOGY. The Third Dimension of War. By Carroll C. Pratt. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. 29 pp.

The Nazi plan for total war has three major divisions: military, economic, and psychological. In Number 6 of the Columbia Home Front Warbooks, Pratt, who is Professor of Psychology at Rutgers University, gives a condensed statement of the historical and political background, and of the development of the German military propaganda machine, its third dimension of war.

R. G.

WAR MEDICINE: A Symposium. Edited by Winfield Scott Pugh, M.D., Commander (M.C.) U.S.N., Retired. Edward Podolsky, M.D., Associate Editor. Dagobert D. Runes, Ph.D., Technical Editor. New York: Philosophical Library, 1942. 565 pp.

In fifty-seven chapters, many written by one or more United States or British medical officers who have had direct experience in the present war, the First World War, or both, a variety of topics ranging from gunshot wounds of the heart to physiology and high altitude flying and 'athlete's foot' are covered. With few exceptions the chapters are written to give direct, practical, and concise information, although each reader may find that, as is usual with such topical compilations, the treatment of his specialty is incomplete and uneven in the value of the contributions to it. It is divided into three sections—Surgery, Aviation and Naval Medicine, and General Medicine. Unfortunately, there is no index.

Three chapters at the end of the book are allotted to psychiatry. On the subject, Malingering, Lieutenant Colonel Hulett gives many valuable guides to the detection of malingering but seems never to have asked himself why a particular man is a malingerer. It may be necessary in the exigencies of war to treat malingering as a criminal offense, but it is more moralistic than psychiatric to write of the malingerer: 'It is indeed devastating to recognize, as we must, that all men are not possessed of manhood, and that the "yellow streak" down the backs of some of our fellows is invisible to the unaided human eye'. Major William H. Dunn contributes an excellent psychiatric review and summary of the problem presented by The Psychopath in the Armed Forces. In Selective Service Psychiatry, Dexter M. Bullard gives some practical

suggestions bearing on the diagnosis of registrants who are schizoid, have latent affective disorders, or psychopathic personalities. The examining psychiatrist is handicapped by having no means of obtaining an accurate life history of the registrant.

R. G.

A EUGENIA NO DIREITO DE FAMÍLIA. (Eugenics and Family Law.) By Teodolindo Castiglione. São Paulo: Saraiva & Cia., 1942. 247 pp.

The author is a Brazilian lawyer; he discusses first the civil code which deals with such matters as prenuptial examinations, consanguinity, bars to marriage because of age, illnesses, feebleminded-ness, etc. The second, smaller, part of the book takes up eugenics among the Brazilian Indians. The author inquires in each matter he discusses whether the motives of the legislators were primarily eugenic or whether custom and morals determined the legal restrictions and qualifications. Since he quotes from the writings and speeches of many of the legislators who framed the laws, the effect of his discussion and the inconclusiveness of the answers in certain cases are revealed clearly and the interplay of various motives comes to light. The code is the result of all sorts of compromises between rationalizations. The eugenic motive is present, but also evidently as a rationalization. In this connection the remarks about marriages of near relatives make interesting reading. Although various authorities are cited as to the pros and cons of marriage between uncle and niece (common among the early colonists), one irate authority, a Protestant, launched a tirade against the Catholic priests who gave special ecclesiastic consent to such marriages, branding this practice as a 'license to incest'.

The medical authorities cited for the support of laws on insanity, are chiefly the old timers of the French school, chiefly Kraepelin and Max Stade among those not French, and most of them support the degeneracy theory. Indeed the eugenic ideas propounded are chiefly concerned with the rôle of heredity, alcohol and syphilis in weakening the 'race'. As if to analyze the unconscious motives behind the legislation, the author provides a section called 'Eugenics among the Brazilian Indians'. The Indians of Brazil are lauded for preserving a high standard of racial strength, health, and beauty in spite of the damage done them by alcohol and syphilis, both of

which are common among them. Their eugenic method is very simple: they kill all infants who are deformed, illegitimate, or who are female twins. With this go taboos against marriage till after puberty, and incest taboos rather more stringent than those of the civilized folk. The eugenists here are still indistinguishable from the primal fathers.

B. D. L.

THE MOUNTAIN ARAPESH, II. SUPERNATURALISM. By Margaret Mead. Anthoropological Papers of the American Musem of Natural History, Vol. XXXVII, Part II, 1940, pp. 310–454.

Any publication by Margaret Mead is important for two reasons. One reason is that the author is one of the best anthropological field workers; consequently the facts recorded by her are bound to be both abundant and significant. The other is that in her theoretical approach she is willing, with certain reservations, to make use of psychoanalytic insight and therefore her conclusions interest us quite as much as her facts.

We are familiar with the general attitude of the Arapesh from the author's book on Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935). The Arapesh are the people who exclude, or seem to exclude aggression from the approved forms of behavior. They are kind and loving and altruistic and concerned mainly with making everything *grow:* children, pigs, yams, and so on. Dr. Mead emphasizes that the character of the Arapesh is oral and brings conclusive evidence in support of her view. Arapesh children play with their lips far in excess of lip play observed elsewhere. Conflicts are expressed in terms of food. A wife belongs to her husband and obeys him because he has 'grown her' by feeding her from a preadolescent stage. Too passionate sexual activity and 'eating carelessly' are equated (pp. 330, 332). 'The Arapesh have a very vivid sense of the contribution which food makes to the body and of its intimate connection with the body.' A piece of food left over is therefore suitable material for sorcery because it is tied to the victim by a living bond. Fæces and urine are not used for this purpose except in the case of little children when they become smeared on the skin and so partake of its nature (p. 347).

There is probably a direct link between this oral emphasis and the outstanding trait of their culture, the *growth* idea. An oral

personality or culture is obviously based on the mother-child relationship, and the idea of caring for everything, of tending things that grow is clearly maternal in its origin. Sex is a danger but 'good blood' and the parental use of sexuality is the basis of society. In this version sexuality becomes asexual and entirely unaggressive and cherishing, which leads to the birth and health of children, the growth of crops and pigs, the finding of game (p. 357). In a paper on North American Indian chiefs, Mrs. Bálint pointed out many years ago that the idea of chieftainship in these tribes was patterned on the maternal ideal,[1] and that in general the idea of the good, protective father represents a fusion of male and female qualities. The *esa esa* of Normanby Island as I have described him[2] is typically the distributor, the giver, i.e., the mother.

Perhaps we should be content with this conclusion. The Arapesh are essentially oral and their personality and culture is based on the mother-child relationship. However I think we can go further than this. Margaret Mead tells us that a man's relationship to his own sexuality is symbolized in the ritual letting of blood from the penis, and insertion of small sharp twigs in the urethra. Small boys start doing it in imitation of their elders. In the initiation ritual it is done by a man disguised as a cassowary. This is continued also in later life. 'During adolescence it may be regarded as a direct self-punishment for any feeling of guilt, especially for the feeling of sexual desire forbidden to boys until their full growth is attained' (p. 346).

Now if we find that in a given culture guilt is expressed and abreacted by wounding one's own penis I think it will be obvious that castration anxiety must be a significant factor in the structure of that culture. After the first intercourse the couple separates, the boy cuts his penis, lets the blood on the ritual leaf and pronounces the formula *Ye-yek* which means 'depart' (p. 348). Most of the cases enumerated by the author as causes for the ritual incision (cf. p. 347) can be understood as based on one formula: when anybody has proved himself emphatically as a man he castrates himself. I think it is very probable therefore that like Duau culture (Normanby Island), this culture is also based on a denial

[1] Bálint, Alice: *Der Familienvater.* Imago, XII, 1926, pp. 292–304.

[2] Róheim, Géza: *Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types.* Int. J. Psa., XIII, Parts 1 & 2, 1932.

of aggression and maleness.[3] The author arrives at the same conclusion when she states that 'their whole attention has centered upon an internalized struggle between man and his human nature which is conceived as dual, one part symbolized as "bad blood", the aggressive sexuality leading to death' (p. 357).

These castration rites are closely connected with guilt, with the superego, with aggression turned inwards. But evidently, as in Wogeo, they are also a kind of male menstruation. The marsalai (spirits) are hostile to menstruating women, pregnant women and men and women after intercourse. They follow the woman and copulate with her until she dies (p. 392). It is evident therefore that anxiety and aggression is called forth in the men by the sight of the menstruating woman. When they are transforming themselves into menstruating women they may be dealing with this anxiety on the basis of an identification.

We may gain further insight into the structure of the defense mechanisms called culture if we follow the lead of the cassowary. The sons kill their mother, the cassowary, and her body turns into yams which they eat (p. 364). Subsequently the cassowary-mother castrates the guilty adolescent: in other words, castration anxiety is based on an archaic body destruction fantasy (Melanie Klein). It is easy to understand why the boy should suffer the talion punishment for his body destruction fantasies on his penis. The pleasure giving organ is his powerful weapon in the struggle against these anxieties, the basic element in his own beliefs in restitution; therefore the original anxiety reappears as an attack against the eros-restitution function.[4] If these conclusions are valid then the great goodness of these people is partly, at least, a reaction formation based on their body destruction trends.

The book should be studied by everyone who is interested in anthropology and psychoanalysis.

GÉZA RÓHEIM (NEW YORK)

WOLF CHILD AND HUMAN CHILD. By Arnold Gesell, M.D. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1941. 107 pp.

This book is an interpretative study of the life history of a female child, Kamala, who was reportedly brought up by wolves to the

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

[4] *Cf.* Klein, Melanie, and Riviere, Joan: *Love, Hate and Reparation.* Psycho-Analytical Epitome, No. 2. London: The Hogarth Press, p. 73.

age of nine and by humans from then until her death at seventeen (1929). Dr. Gesell's study of the child's life is based on the diary kept by the Rev. J. A. L. Singh of Mindapore, India (near Calcutta) in whose orphanage the child grew up after her rescue from the wolves. Another girl, Amala, six years younger, was also rescued at the same time and place but died shortly after. Dr. Gesell's attention was directed to the diary by Dr. R. M. Zingh of the University of Denver who stated[1] that 'the publication of the valuable document, Dr. Singh's diary account of some 150 pages of the rescue and life in human society of the two wolf children of Mindapore, has been held up for about three years by me while working with many other interested scientists making every effort to check the account'. Until the appearance of the proposed publication of Dr. Singh's diary, the student interested in the actual background data of Dr. Gesell's book will naturally have no opportunity for first hand information.

We have to admire Dr. Gesell's courage and imagination in trying to reconstruct some of the earlier aspects of the child's life when she was still reportedly among the wolves. The reviewer, however, leaves it to physiologists to evaluate some of the changes which Dr. Gesell considered might have occurred: 'She perspired scarcely at all, she tended to pant and to extrude her tongue in the sun.' 'Her nostrils were somewhat enlarged and rounded from frequent dilation. . . .' 'Her ears quivered slightly in excitement. . . .' 'In darkness a glow is said to have emanated from their eyes.' 'Her canine teeth were said to be longer and more pointed, her lips somewhat thicker, the lining of the mouth was blood red.' A very interesting finding was that Kamala developed a quadrupedal posture and gait which she gave up only gradually in living among humans.

Kamala's physical and mental growth in her adaptation to human society is skilfully and convincingly interpreted with regard to objective criteria. An analytically minded person, however, would probably feel disappointed that Dr. Gesell did not have access to material revealing the fantasy life of the child. Dr. Gesell finally discusses Kamala's life history in terms of the inborn and acquired characteristics and comes to the conclusion that 'the reciprocal relationship between heredity and environment would

[1] J. of Psychol., LIII, 1940, p. 487.

not, however, blind us to the priority of hereditary factors in the patterning of human behavior'.

The book is illustrated with some photographs showing the growth and development of Kamala at the orphanage.

HERMAN SHLIONSKY (EAST ORANGE, N. J.)

LA VERDAD, LA CIENCIA Y LA FILOSOFIA. (Truth, Science and Philosophy.) By Francisco Javier A. Belgodere, Mexico: Published by the Author, 1939. 257 pp.

This book is concerned with the theological and transcendental nature of truth. The concept is the revival of the old mediæval opposition between faith and knowledge. To arrive at the conclusion that 'the truth is not of this world' the author assumed the Herculean task of reviewing the history of human thinking.

The author does not make it easy for the reader to follow him in his flight through the centuries. A few pages suffice to cover the period from Protagoras to Bergson and from Pythagoras to Einstein. His critical arguments, however laconic, are shallow and naïve. Bergson is said to have reduced the human being to 'an automaton of memory', whereas Freud made man a slave of his libido. To psychoanalysis he refers jestingly as the mystery of the trinity in every individual (ego, superego and id).

The author originally stated that he would refrain from personal criticism and endeavor only to show the discrepancies and divergences of opinion which have always existed among scientists. We regret that he went beyond his original intention.

PAUL FRIEDMAN (NEW YORK)

BASIC PROBLEMS OF BEHAVIOR. By Mandel Sherman, M.D., Ph.D. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1941. 440 pp.

This book is an elaboration of the author's previous Mental Hygiene and Education (1934). Its purpose is to give the background material for courses in mental hygiene by 'presenting the clinical, experimental, psychological, and psychiatric data of a number of basic problems of behavior'. It promises further to present and evaluate current theories. Since the book includes emotions, motivation and frustration, personality adjustment, attitudes, conflicts, delinquent behavior, the neuroses, and mental abnormalities, this is a big order indeed.

Sherman's eclecticism, more arbitrary than synthetic, results in a book which can only be described as very sketchy. The psychologies of G. Allport, H. Murray, Thurstone, Kurt Lewin, Freud, Adler, Jung, and certain sociological theories of personality are covered in twenty-nine pages. Furthermore, Sherman scarcely ever takes a positive position or critically evaluates his material. Typically, the first sentences of the first four chapters read:

> 'The nature of the emotions has been variously described by different investigators.'
>
> 'The term motive has been employed with various meanings.'
>
> 'It is difficult to define personality, in large part because the term does not lend itself to a concrete definition.'
>
> 'Personality expresses itself in an infinite number of ways, and it is usually impossible to make accurate classifications of the methods of personality adjustment.'

At the end of the chapter the student is more than likely to feel as the author did at the beginning.

J. F. BROWN (LAWRENCE, KANSAS)

THE FURTHERANCE OF MEDICAL RESEARCH. By Alan Gregg, M.D. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. 130 pp.

From the intimate knowledge of men and women the physician, especially the psychoanalyst, develops a great deal of tolerance for human beings. His ideas about people take on a more 'realistic' tone and he is only too aware of the weaknesses of human nature. But even the psychoanalyst retains his private illusion, and that is research. He wishes sincerely and deeply that all of medicine would be more of a science and less of an art, and especially so, psychoanalysis. The modern, well-trained psychoanalyst is ambitious to make psychiatry and psychoanalysis respectable by applying to them the scientific method, the experimental techniques, etc. One must remember that it is the younger psychoanalysts who attempted to coördinate the psychoanalytic method with internal medicine through psychosomatic medicine. For such a group, Gregg's monograph provides special interest.

It is difficult to judge this monograph on its merits since it is both an appeal for research as well as a review of research as a practice.

In the first part of the book, the author deals with research as a 'business proposition'. To the naïve, he explains that if large funds are to be put into research, the investor should get his money's worth. The thirty-three foundations dealing with medical research have a total capital of $818,000,000 with an average income of $27,000,000 a year. Medical research is therefore big business, and is treated as such by the author. The author explains that, in order to obtain the best 'yield', certain rules have to be observed. He describes the mechanics of the organization of research the same way that one would describe the organization of a large industrial plant.

There are many good and useful observations, a lot of sound advice, and many practical points which anyone interested in research would appreciate. One must understand that this first chapter, in which the author describes research in general terms, is obviously intended for prospective donors of large funds, and that this is the reason why the author interprets research in terms of industrial management. To be sure, research, like all activities, needs a great deal of fundamental support, but it also needs a tremendous amount of understanding. It is for this reason that the reviewer objects to the treatment of research in the mechanistic fashion in which the author presents it. It all sounds like an 'educational campaign' to sell more and better groceries or better scouring powder.

The second chapter deals with the relationship between the foundation and the universities. In this chapter the author argues for large foundations supporting long time research projects because here one finds the advantage of large funds, trained personnel, and capable administration. Small foundations can only provide limited grants-in-aid. They cannot commit themselves to any sustained support of a scientific project. The reviewer wonders if this is really true. Time and again, one sees large grants given to universities rather than to individuals, grants given to titles rather than to capable workers, with the usual sterile results. The infrequent visits of three immaculately groomed young men, all graduates of good universities, whose job it is to look quietly intelligent and not to ask too many embarrassing questions, is hardly evidence that the foundations ever really know what is going on. On the other hand, one knows of small foundations with modest

sums at their disposal, where the director knows intimately the men of the field, where the money is spent on people who actually do the work rather than on institutions, and where, in the author's own terms: 'a much higher yield is obtained'.

The third chapter on the research worker is very much alive. Here the author identifies himself with the investigator and shows how inadequate our society is in stimulating, developing, and supporting research workers. The author gives interesting observations on the personality of the medical research worker, which ought to be of especial interest to the psychoanalyst.

As a popular presentation of a rather difficult subject, the author has achieved his aim.

J. KASANIN (SAN FRANCISCO)

THE ÆSTHETIC SENTIMENT. By Helge Lundholm, Ph.D. Cambridge, Mass.: Sci-Art Publishers, 1941. 223 pp.

Helge Lundholm approaches his subject almost entirely from the standpoint of the psychology of consciousness. His book is written as a response to Samuel Alexander's Beauty and Other Forms of Value, in which artistic creation and the enjoyment of artistic work are considered as essentially one and the same, or rather in which the latter is regarded as a shadow of the first, whereas Lundholm expresses the opinion that they are fundamentally different. His study is most methodological and careful, but the subject is approached with insufficient means. To the psychoanalyst the book is of little importance; he will be disappointed by the academic method of approach to the problem of the value and the emotional effect of the work of art. Psychoanalysis contributes far more to a comprehension of the effect of artistic creation upon the artist, as well as upon the person enjoying the creation. The emotional discharge through the work of art, its magic effect, the instinctual satisfactions gained through the æsthetic qualities of artistic work, are problems to which analysts have many important clues. With a knowledge of these one feels disappointed by any approach which is made merely from the conscious level.

RICHARD STERBA (DETROIT)

ABSTRACTS

Einige Analogien in der Verhaltungsweise von Vögeln und psychischen Mechanismen beim Menschen. (Some Analogies Between the Behavior of Birds and Psychological Mechanisms in Man.) Hans Lampl. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXV, 1940, pp. 399–408.

Psychoanalysts who study animal behavior are far too exclusively interested in the 'neuroses' of animals and they rely too much on studies of domesticated animals. Observations of normal animals in their habitat shed more light on some of the problems of psychoanalytic theory, especially the *Triebtheorie.* Lampl aptly defends these theses of his by reporting and discussing stimulating facts which are presented in a book by Konrad Lorenz: *Der Kumpan in der Umwelt des Vogels* (The Partner in the Environment of Birds). The facts selected refer to the 'fixation' of the newborn bird to its mother, the feeding pattern, the reaction to loss of the partner, 'activity' in mating and communications among birds.

SIEGFRIED BERNFELD

Entwurf zu einem Brief an Thomas Mann. (Outline of a Letter to Thomas Mann.) Sigmund Freud. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXVI, 1941, pp. 217–220.

Thomas Mann, in his speech [1] at Freud's eightieth birthday, spoke about the 'lived vita', according to a mythological model. On November 29, 1936, Freud wrote an outline of a letter to Thomas Mann in which he stated that he had asked himself, after having read Mann's *Josephs Legende,* whether there is any historically important figure in which 'the Joseph fantasy was effective as a secret demonic motor behind his complex life picture'. Freud is of the opinion that many a circumstance is in favor of the hypothesis that this was the case with Napoleon who had an elder brother named Joseph whom the young Napoleon hated intensely. He later identified himself with Joseph and changed this hatred into an intense love, simultaneously displacing the hostility towards other innocent persons. Napoleon also loved his mother very much and tried to take the place of his father in caring for the siblings. He married a young widow named 'Josephine' and was never able to turn against her even though she treated him badly. The Egyptian expedition may have expressed a desire for the realization of the Joseph fantasy which was later fulfilled in Europe: 'He takes care of the brothers by raising them to princes and kings. The good-for-nothing Jerome is perhaps his Benjamin.'

OTTO FENICHEL

A Contribution to the Study of Fetishism. W. H. Gillespie. Int. J. Psa., XXI, 1940, pp. 401–415.

Freud has shown that the fetish represents the penis of the mother and that fetishism in principle, like every perversion, is rooted in the castration complex,

[1] Mann, Thomas: *Freud und die Zukunft,* Imago, XXII, 1936, pp. 257–274.

while its aim is that of denying the possibility of castration. This theory certainly does not exclude the possibility that the special forms of the castration fear and the defenses against them are determined in a much earlier, i.e. pregenital, phase. In fact the significance of pregenital factors in fetishism have been stressed by various authors.

Gillespie asks, 'Is fetishism primarily a product of castration anxiety, to be related almost exclusively to the phallic phase, and concerned to maintain the existence of a female penis; or does the main dynamic force really come from more primitive levels, which undeniably contribute to give its ultimate form to the fetish?' However, after a detailed description and discussion of a very interesting case history of a uniform fetishist, Gillespie also arrives at the conclusion that the problem should not be put as 'either—or'. He says, 'I would suggest that fetishism is the result of castration anxiety, but of a specific form of castration anxiety, a form produced by a strong admixture of certain oral and anal trends'. According to him, the pregenital function of the fetish is seen in the fact that the fetish tries to protect the introjected objects against the dangers of the patient's sadism.

OTTO FENICHEL

On the 'Longing to Die'. Kate Friedlander. Int. J. Psa., XXI, 1940, pp. 416–426.

Several papers about the psychology of suicide have shown that the dynamics of suicide are not always the same as that of melancholia, in which aggression against the ego means aggression against an introjected object or aggression by an introjected object, but are often the expression of libidinal strivings. The important thing to understand is the patient's unconscious conception of 'death'.

Kate Friedlander confirms this with the case history of an infantile young man of twenty-nine who made repeated serious suicidal attempts with gas and veronal. He was driven by the wish to sleep through a time during which he experienced a loss of love in the hope that after his awakening the loving mother would be present again. The suicidal impulses also represented the idea of punishing his mother and his brother and of compelling them to love him again. (Friedlander quite rightly remarks that this is the psychology of Tom Sawyer's and other children's suicidal attempts. 'At least when I'll be dead, they'll feel sorry.') The patient demanded love of an oral nature and the details of his suicidal attempts were attempts to satisfy oral instincts. 'To sum up, the factors involved in this suicidal mechanism are revenge, satisfaction of his strong oral desires, and the fantasy of being saved by his loving mother.' The fact that libidinal tendencies of this kind brought about objectively dangerous, self-destructive actions was due to a disturbance in his reality testing and to the persistence of his narcissistic belief in omnipotence.

OTTO FENICHEL

Time and the Unconscious. Marie Bonaparte. Int. J. Psa., XXI, 1940, pp. 427–468.

Man is probably the only being who, in his experience of time, knows about his imminent death. This knowledge is in full contradiction of the 'timelessness' of the unconscious which cannot conceive of the idea of being dead.

Marie Bonaparte tries to investigate the conflicts between the conscious knowledge of time and death on the one hand, and the unconscious timelessness on the other. The child, who is relatively more directed by his unconscious, feels time in quite another way than the adult; time for him is an unlimited process. Dreams, daydreams, being in love, states of intoxication, and mystical ecstasies bring back the childish type of time perception. All these states have one thing in common: 'their effect, or rather their essential nature, is to unlock the floodgates of the unconscious, which in normal and so-called reasonable people remain more or less safely closed under the conditions of waking life.' Wherever the unconscious reigns, man becomes 'timeless' again.

Marie Bonaparte discusses what this timelessness actually consists of; certainly not of an absolute inability of the unconscious to be influenced by time. Freud himself who at first believed in such an inability, later said that the unconscious also changes in time, though very slowly. Timelessness really means 'that the unconscious fails to *perceive* time, that it receives absolutely no impression of it whatsoever'. The ability to measure time during sleep (waking up at the hour one has resolved to) is not an achievement of the unconscious but of a preconscious part of the personality which had not participated in the person's sleep. The derivatives of the unconscious know time to a certain degree but the unconscious itself does not.

Conflicts between the knowledge of time and unconscious timelessness make their appearance in compulsion neuroses and psychoses in various forms. Under normal conditions conflicts of this kind can be observed in the general (magic) valuation of medicine, in the multiple manifestations of the longing for immortality, in religions and in philosophies.

Marie Bonaparte stresses Kant's thesis of the apriority of time. The reviewer, who once had tried to show that the so-called 'timelessness' of the unconscious is not incompatible with the thesis of the apriority of time,[1] was especially interested in the following sentences: 'In a conversation which I had with him after he had read this paper, Freud confirmed that his views were potentially in agreement with those of Kant. The sense we have of the passing of time, he observed, originates in our inner perception of the passing of our own life. When consciousness awakens within us we perceive this internal flow and then project it into the outside world.'

The analytical finding that an exaggerated fear of death and longing for immortality are usually rooted in unconscious murderous impulses is not mentioned by Bonaparte.

OTTO FENICHEL

A Clinical Note on Social Anxiety. M. Ralph Kaufman. Psa. Rev., XXVIII, 1941, pp. 72–77.

The author's purpose is 'to deal with one special facet of anxiety, that of social anxiety which is a situational reaction always involving the presence of other people'.

The analysis of a young man suffering from lack of initiative, passivity and

[1] Fenichel, Otto: *Psychoanalyse und Metaphysik.* Imago, IX, 1923.

impotence bares the intricate interplay of projection and incorporation which follow one another in a vicious cycle. His dangerous father must be destroyed by incorporation (intake of food), although he must again be eliminated because he would destroy the patient. Yet the fæces might be eaten by people who would then become dangerous like his father and therefore the elimination must be compulsively undone.

One period of the analysis was dominated by a series of persecutory ideas. The pivot of the patient's disease is the instability of his identification, which compelled him to project the incorporated father onto the environment. In this respect he is like a phobic and he defends himself against the phobia by avoidance and by reincorporation. The environment becomes dangerous 'through incorporation of the patient's projection'. The similarity with persecutory delusions is stressed.

K. R. EISSLER

The Ontogeny of Anxiety. Lawrence S. Kubie. Psa. Rev., XXVIII, 1941, pp. 78–85.

In contrast to Greenacre,[1] Kubie is of the opinion that 'the fœtus lives in an almost de-afferented world; for him suddenness as an experience practically cannot occur'. Therefore, a special disposition to anxiety cannot be acquired during intrauterine existence. Anxiety is looked upon as 'a bridge between the startle pattern and the dawn of all processes of thought', and the 'startle pattern' does not begin before birth. 'In truth the infant and the startle pattern are born in the same moment.' Waiting, postponement and frustration begin with birth, and these are the prerequisites for conditioning processes. The later thought processes are based on the same prerequisites as anxiety and their task is identical. 'Anxiety and the thought process arise out of the same *Anlage* only to differentiate from their common source and from each other with the passage of time.' This differentiation varies markedly among different persons. Kubie holds that psychologists do better not to speculate too much about those differences as long as the basical neurophysiological problems are still unsolved.

OTTO FENICHEL

Symptom Intensification Following Memory Recovery: A Clinical Discussion. John Milne Murray. Psa. Rev., XXVIII, 1941, pp. 130–138.

This paper deals with the problem of why the recovery of the memory of an incident upon which symptoms have been founded is not always followed by clinical improvement. After twenty-one months of analysis, characterized chiefly by a strong dependence and a negative transference (the object of the projection of all wrongs), a woman patient recalled for the first time her emotional reaction to the sight of a newly born brother at her mother's breast. It was a highly destructive fantasy of an oral nature, directed toward the mother's 'insides'. The recollection occurred after the patient became aware

[1] Greenacre, Phyllis: *The Predisposition to Anxiety.* This QUARTERLY, X, 1941.

of her wishes to kill her husband (and the analyst) and then dreamed of her mother as a poisoning old witch.

There was no consequent improvement, but rather a five-month period of increased sickness, acting out, and marked ambivalence toward the analyst. The author makes clear that the recollection itself could not have any cathartic value as long as the rigid defenses created by the infantile episode had not been worked through in the transference. In response to the intense unconscious guilt and fear of the loss of a beloved person, the patient defended herself by a devaluation of the mother (analyst) and a projection of her destructive tendencies.

CAREL VAN DER HEIDE

Time—Its Relation to Reality and Purpose. C. P. Oberndorf. Psa. Rev., XXVIII, 1941, pp. 139–155.

This paper deals with the clinical appearance of depersonalization and 'derealization', and it analyzes the interrelationship between time, reality, and purpose. The sense of time develops in connection with repetitive bodily stimuli ('intrasomatic acquisition of the sense of time') and is maintained by a sufficiently strong appreciation of reality which, in turn, is dependent upon the amount of feeling towards the body and the outer world. The sense of reality is strengthened by purposive strivings, but purpose will always be weak if reality appreciation is disturbed. As illustrated by a psychoanalytic history, purposes in life and the appreciation of time are dependent upon the type of superego. Depersonalization ('a loss of emotional investment in the ego which may occur psychologically as a result of long continued repression of an aggressive emotion, such as hate') is always accompanied by a distorted sense of time, ultimately by timeless living.

CAREL VAN DER HEIDE

'The Man Moses' and the Man Freud. Hanns Sachs. Psa. Rev., XXVIII, 1941, pp. 156–162.

In this little study Hanns Sachs traces the connections between Freud's emotional reactions to the heroes of his youth and the development of that part of his character which appeared in his attitude towards his own work and towards success in general. In his younger years Freud's heroes were men who were leaders in the war against injustice and oppression. As a Semitic leader, Hannibal was a particularly appropriate hero during Freud's *Gymnasialjahre* when he first experienced antisemitic tendencies directed against him by his classmates. His daydreams centered around the idea of becoming a fighter, and later on a political leader and statesman, who would gain justice for the racial minority to which he belonged. These ideas underwent a definite change when, under the influence of Goethe's essay *Natur,* he decided to turn to the study of medicine and 'for the medical man the career of a minister is out of the question'. After his first analytic findings had been rejected by the medical profession he took a further step in this withdrawal from early ideals. He then decided 'that science during my life time would take no

notice [of his work], but that some decades afterwards someone else would without fail be brought face to face with the same facts, which then, being more in harmony with the trends of his time, would find recognition'.[1] Hanns Sachs points out that this parallels the fate of Moses, another great man of the past, who, according to Sellin's theory, was killed by the people he had liberated, but was later spiritually revived by the prophets and worshipped as the great hero of his people. However, Freud avoided identifying himself with Moses although such an identification would certainly have been in accordance with his boyhood fantasies. Instead, he completely abandoned the hero ideal and in his last book, Moses and Monotheism, he made an attempt to analyze the origin of the hero myth surrounding Moses, thus partially destroying it.

RICHARD STERBA

Thinking and Motility Disorder in a Schizophrenic Child. J. Louise Despert. Psychiatric Quarterly, XV, 1941, pp. 522–536.

The author gives a good clinical description of what is undoubtedly a case of juvenile schizophrenia. The patient has been under observation between the ages of four and eight years. Evidence is given to prove that the psychotic process began at about the age of three years. Organic disease of the central nervous system has been ruled out. Disorders of thinking and perception, deviations in language and speech, alternations of stupor and excitement, negativism, impulsive behavior and primitive motor discharges were present in the forms characteristic of a malignant adult process. Progressive mental deterioration occurred.

Despert believes that it is most important to emphasize the point that 'severe behavior disorders, associated with regressive characteristics, are not uncommon in young children with acute emotional disturbances', but that, '. . . in the absence of affective dissociation the diagnosis of schizophrenia cannot be made'. Difficulty in the discovery of affective dissociation in children is due to the '. . . present lack of knowledge of early intellectual function and the relation of emotional factors to symbolic structure at various developmental levels'.

The evidence on which the author bases the presence of the pathognomonic sign in this case lies in what she calls 'dissociation between language-sign and language-function'. The child was able to retain and use many difficult words at an early age but their use was autistic and not for the purpose of communicating with other people. 'The significance of this affective dissociation, as reflected in the anomaly of language development, has not been emphasized enough and should be recognized and further investigated, since the use of early language in the child represents his first attempt to employ an adult means of communication with his environment.'

M. GITELSON

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[1] Freud: *Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung.* Ges. Schr., IV, p. 427.

Dynamic-Concept Test: Quantitative Modified Play Technique for Adults. A. Nordeman Mayers and Elizabeth B. Mayers. Psychiatric Quarterly, XV, 1941, pp. 621–634.

This is the report of an attempt to verify psychoanalytic theory by 'simple factual experimental data'. Thirty-three schizophrenics and ten 'normal' controls were requested to tell short stories appropriate to five given titles, each of which was expected to elicit material from one 'major psychosexual division'. The material was classified into three groups, 'function', 'partial function', and 'dysfunction', according to whether the stories were relevant, partially relevant, or irrelevant to the titles. The largest number of relevant responses was obtained to 'A Story About a Hero' and to 'A Story of a Child of Five', while stories about 'An Ideal Family', 'Best Friends', and 'Romance' produced very few 'function' responses. The authors conclude that they have obtained 'significant experimental proof of the theory that in telling a story schizophrenics will tend to function best in a purely narcissistic environment and that the capacity to function decreases as the more mature levels of psychosexual development are reached'. The classification of the few stories quoted seems quite arbitrary and the authors' knowledge of psychoanalysis is so elementary that one suspects a strong subjective bias in their results. Their technique appears primarily to test ego functions and has much more in common with the thematic apperception and similar tests (to which no reference is made) than to any known play procedure.

A. H. VANDER VEER

The Organic in Psychotherapy and Psychogenesis. George S. Sprague, Psychiatric Quarterly, XV, 1941, pp. 715–723.

This is a thesis on orientation and is concerned with the methodology of psychotherapy. It is demonstrated that there is much unclear thinking about psychogenesis because of terminological barriers and that actual living matter is the stratum affected in psychiatric study. The mind is defined as the functional appreciation of meaningfulness or 'the sum of those brain activities in which symbolism occurs'. An excellent understanding of semantic and linguistic concepts is applied.

It is pointed out, in regard to therapy, that any agent directed from outside the patient can have no other mode of influence than an organic one. In short, words are received only as auditory impressions, and associative elaboration, which produces psychotherapeutic results, is carried on entirely within the brain of the individual being treated.

STEPHEN KRAMER

Prognostic Criteria in Schizophrenia. A Critical Survey of the Literature. Louis S. Chase and Samuel Silverman. Amer. J. of Psychiatry, XCVIII, 1941, pp. 360–368.

This review is an attempt to clarify the significance of criteria in the establishment of prognosis in schizophrenia. A survey of the available and relevant literature revealed that varying degrees of prognostic value were attributed

to the following criteria which are of the greatest import in the assessment of prognosis in schizophrenia.

The prognosis is most favorable when: (1) the duration of the illness is short, (2) the type of onset is acute, (3) exogenic precipitating factors are obvious, (4) the element of confusion or clouding of consciousness and atypical symptoms (especially manic-depressive symptoms) are prominent in the early symptomatology, (5) process symptoms are minimal. Conversely when these conditions are reversed the prognosis is least favorable.

There are certain other significant factors whose relative importance cannot be clearly evaluated at the present time, i.e., (1) patients with a history of a previous episode of illness have a better chance of remission, the more so the longer the interval between attacks and the more complete the recovery during the preceding remission; (2) the asthenic body-type is unfavorable; (3) the pyknic body-type is favorable; (4) extravert temperament and adequate prepsychotic life adjustment offer a more favorable outlook in contrast to introversion and inadequacy of reaction to life situations; (5) the catatonic type offers the best prognosis and paranoids the worst, with the simple and hebephrenic type in an intermediate position; (6) acute cases which are so atypical as not to allow classification under any of these five types are especially favorable prognostically; (7) a progressive hospital course is ominous, whereas improvement or fluctuation is indicative of a more favorable outcome; (8) sex, education, abilities, psychosexual history seem to have no prognostic significance. Age at onset of illness is also of no prognostic significance except that relatively late age offers an unfavorable prognosis.

ARNOLD EISENDORFER

Unity and Continuity of the Personality. Arthur P. Noyes. Amer. J. of Psychiatry, XCVIII, 1942, pp. 662–667.

Approaching personality problems from a genetic and dynamic point of view, one must seek to understand the individual in terms of his own life history with its specific emotional problems. Even psychotic manifestations can be understood as specific aspects of consistent psychological developments. All symptoms are natural and logical within the personality structure. The patient's life history will show that the psychological techniques of the premorbid personality are fundamentally the same as those which later create the psychotic symptom. Characteristics which serve as mechanisms of defense and which are known as reaction formations, can scarcely be called pathological unless they function with unusual force or frequency.

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

A Psychological Study of Eczema and Neurodermatitis. Milton L. Miller. Psychosomatic Med., IV, 1942, pp. 82–93.

After giving a summary of the psychoanalytic literature on eczema and neurodermatitis, the author reports two cases of his own.

The first was a patient who hopelessly tried to defy his father, to outdo him without ever accepting the necessity of first developing his own ability. In a parallel way he wished 'to make a world's record' by analyzing himself

in a few weeks. Longing for the good mother and the concomitant attempt to compete with men, brought about fear of men's hostility. He then tended to submit to men but his masochistic femininity frightened him. He felt too guilty to exhibit himself in a successful manner. This conflict finally drove him to exhibit himself, not as a successful male, but as a defeated and sick person. The severe eczema was a part of this pathetic exhibitionism. After the exhibitionistic defenses had been mobilized in the analysis the skin erupted severely. During the analysis he gradually began to understand the deeper conflicts and there was some improvement of the skin condition.

In the second case, a similar narcissistic need was expressed in a more realistic way. In both patients the skin disease offered an expression of chronic unsatisfied emotional tensions which could not be discharged in other ways because of a deep conflict. The exhibitionism which expressed the patients' competitiveness and the defense against it also served their need to impress and to command attention by showing others their diseased skin.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Some Psychoanalytic Observations in Surgery. Helene Deutsch. Psychosomatic Med., IV, 1942, pp. 105–115.

The material gained by Helene Deutsch from the study of patients' reactions to operations while under analysis has reinforced her critical evaluation of the concept of the female castration complex. The rôle which is ascribed to penis envy in female psychology still needs some reorientation. In surgical patients the greater anxieties and the reactions connected with them refer predominately to purely feminine processes in which the castration complex plays a less important rôle. Fear of delivery stands in the dynamic position held by the fear of castration in men. This anxiety has a double content: it is the talion anxiety in which the destructive impulses once directed toward the mother are turned against the self, and it hides the deep longing for the mother at the threshold of death. In men the castration complex stands in the center of anxiety. When the passive tendencies predominate in a man, the operation can be experienced as a delivery, just as it is in women. In general, the relationship to the surgeon as a father or brother figure seems to determine the man's manner of reacting to the operation.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Nescience, Science, and Psycho-Analysis. Montague Francis Ashley Montagu. Psychiatry, IV, 1941, pp. 45–60.

In a recently published article Róheim tried to show that the so-called nescience or ignorance of the relationship between coitus and childbirth exhibited by such native Australian tribes as the Arunta (Aranda) and their neighbors is not due to any failure in their sciential processes, but to a process of repression whereby the conscious knowledge of this relationship is rendered unconscious, and is replaced in consciousness by a symbolic superstructure. Why do these natives repress the knowledge of the father as the agent of procreation? Because, explains Róheim, 'The identity in their minds of the child with a being who was killed by the father before the child was born is an expression

of the unconscious hostility between father and son, that is, of one aspect of the œdipus complex. The unborn child protects large game from the father's spear, because in the father's unconscious mind the large game he kills is identical with the unborn child.' Róheim's theory can at best, according to Montagu, only be applied to a particular belief. It cannot be extended to embrace those cases in which the father actually dreams or finds the child, or to those many other cases in which the child enters the woman independently of any activities on the part of the father. Hence, Róheim's theory cannot be accepted as a general explanation of the aboriginal nescience of physiological paternity without doing violence to the facts. While it is possible that aboriginal children know that coitus is a necessary factor in the production of childbirth, such children realize after they have undergone initiation into the esoteric beliefs of adulthood that it is by no means an important factor and that it is certainly not the cause of conception. What they believe to be the truth as adult thinkers is that immigration of spirit children from a source independent of the bodies of a particular man and woman is the cause of conception and childbirth. Such adult knowledge is really an extension and clarification of the childhood notions relating to procreation, not a suppression or obfuscation of them. There hardly seems to be any necessity to invoke the mechanism of repression here. In any event, if children actually know that coitus and seminal fluid make babies how are we to explain the alleged fact that these children have already succeeded in repressing (for this is what Róheim suggests) the knowledge of their physiological relationship to a particular man? Or are we to understand that repression occurs only later, during or after initiation? If the mature aboriginal is convinced that coitus is not the cause of childbirth, whatever he may have believed as a child, and whatever the elements involved in the development of that conviction, we can not do otherwise than accept his own testimony to that effect.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Ambulatory Schizophrenias. Gregory Zilboorg. Psychiatry, IV, 1941, pp. 149–155.

Dereistic thinking is the main symptom of ambulatory schizophrenia. It is a thinking away from things and as such it is really not thinking insofar as every thought is normally related to some object. The theoretical and practical problem in these cases is that of effective reintegration. These persons are not hopeless as far as therapeutic results are concerned. Some are apparently cured; a number of them only show improvement which, however, is considerable at times; others either remain untouched or show a tendency toward episodic exacerbation. The therapy of choice is psychoanalysis which is usually tedious and prolonged. At times the treatment proceeds almost as an eventless series of monologues, interspersed with seemingly endless silences of impotent rage, without content or change.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Psychiatry and the National Defense. Harry Stack Sullivan. Psychiatry, IV, 1941, pp. 201–217.

A minimum psychiatric inspection of registrants for the selective service system is outlined. Three main problems are discussed: the mobilization of psychiatric

competence, the unification of diagnostic viewpoints and practices, and the education of the local board physicians in eliminating the unfit from the armed forces.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Intimidation of Others as a Defense Against Anxiety. Robert P. Knight. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, VI, 1942, pp. 4–14.

Knight points out that people who feel driven to intimidate others are usually defending themselves against anxiety. These people have a strong need for love which they are unable to admit. Their aggressive attitude provokes hostile responses which increase their anxiety and consequently the need for more aggressive behavior. Thus a vicious cycle is established which can only be broken by analyzing the anxieties. In a very interesting case Knight brings out the decisive factors which produced anxiety by analyzing the transference resistance. The patient, who came to treatment in a catatonic excitement, belonged to this group of belligerent personalities. The deeply repressed passive homosexual longings were the decisive factor in the illness.

RALPH R. GREENSON

The Danger of Propaganda. A. Kris. Amer. Imago, II, 1941, pp. 3–42.

In order to investigate the dangers of propaganda, Kris first reviews the psychoanalytic theories on suggestion and hypnosis. The term, suggestion, generally designates the fact that man can be influenced by determined actions of others without being fully aware of it. Expressed in psychoanalytic terminology, suggestibility refers to conditions not under the control of the adult ego. Psychoanalysis understands suggestion and hypnosis as regressive phenomena in connection with unconscious libidinal processes. Psychoanalysis has also studied the conditions which increase and decrease suggestibility.

Having reviewed these theories, Kris tries to apply them to a better understanding of the effect of totalitarian propaganda. It is for example a common psychoanalytic statement that disappointment increases the readiness to accept suggestions. A child who is disappointed by being forced to realize that his parents are not omnipotent, is looking for other persons who might be more powerful. Something similar probably takes place when social events shake the confidence of the masses in their leaders. In such a situation the suggestibility of the masses increases; they are easily influenced by 'prophets' who promise salvation. Suggestibility increases in proportion to the disturbance of social equilibrium.

However, the opposite may also occur under similar circumstances. Kris analyzes a certain scepticism towards all propaganda which may be compared to a state of saturation by overadvertising. Such a scepticism is not only directed against foreign propaganda but also against propaganda from one's own groups. This condition may even indirectly help the foreign propaganda. If weariness results in an unconscious wish to give up, the propaganda of the dictators may find willing listeners. It states that the powers of the dictators are irresistable and if that is true resistance would be senseless. This, says Kris, is an aspect of the danger of propaganda because of our suggestibility.

Kris instructively characterizes the paramount features of totalitarian propaganda. It usually leads from persuasion to hypnotism, from mutual understanding to the victory of magic formulas. The reaction which they try to obtain is panic or an extremely masochistic attitude. Totalitarian propaganda copies the methods of modern advertising to a certain extent in its repetition and variation of slogans and its hammering in of formulas. In the totalitarian state propaganda also has another function. It must achieve a displacement or redirection of emotions. The repressed tendencies to rebel which have accumulated during a time of social hardships have to be transferred to other objects. The 'enemy' and minority groups like the 'Jews' have to serve as scapegoats.

Kris then compares the propaganda methods of democracies with the totalitarian technique. Democratic propaganda does not intend to convert all human beings into anonymous masses without personal meaning and without individual will. Totalitarian propaganda has the aim of transforming human society into a crowd which has only one function, to fulfil all the commands of the leader.

Kris's paper is a promising start in the important field of psychoanalytic psychology of propaganda. He does not repeat the mistakes of previous authors who underestimated the autonomy of social factors and thereby blocked their insight into the interrelationship between those factors and the psychology of individual minds. Kris's paper proves that psychoanalysis has important tasks in the fight against Hitlerism.

GEORGE GEROE

Some Problems Presented by Freud's Life-Death Instinct Theory. George B. Wilbur. Amer. Imago, II, 1941, pp. 134–196, 209–265.

After introductory remarks concerning the analogy between psychoanalytic and mathematical procedure in scientific speculation and preliminary methodological warnings, the author tries to determine how far modern biology substantiates Freud's Life-Death Instinct Theory.

The 'steady state' theory is currently applied in modern biology. This does not refer to states of equilibrium such as are found in machines. Steady states in living beings are characterized by constant expenditure of energy in one direction even in the resting state. The author arrives at a dynamic formulation $S \rightarrow (O) \rightarrow Z$ which describes the constant flux from source (S) to organism (O) to sink (Z). The organism (O) is enclosed in a membrane and tends to maintain a steady state. Disorganization of the system means death to the organism. The formula $S \rightarrow (O) \rightarrow Z$ is repeated myriads of times within the organism, and the organism in its growth incorporates part of S and Z into itself. Originally S and Z were the sea; now the blood bears a resemblance to the sea in chemical composition. Failure to maintain a steady state in the internal environment results in death. But it is in the nature of living organisms to maintain their steady state, and this may be termed a manifestation of the life instinct.

Organisms tend to increase in complexity but if the more complex organisms break down, the smaller, component ones, tend to go on. After a certain

amount of independence of the environment is achieved by an organism, there is spontaneity of action and apparent external motivation in various actions.

In the human being, the steady state both breaks down and synthesizes. These are two aspects of the same process; one is not the cause of the other.

Living things, as for instance the embryo, exhibit the synthesizing, integrating tendency. Formlessness, or nothingness, is the other extreme. Living organisms have a tendency to duplicate themselves but anything that tends to disrupt the form can be called a manifestation of the death instinct. Death is a return to the formless. Since we know only form, death has no psychological representative except in terms of its opposite, life.

Too much narcissism may cause death by cutting the organism off from its environment. The steady state principle, if it results in complete self-dependence for the organism by cutting it away completely from source and sink, results in death and may be called the 'death instinct'.

The tendency to autonomy in a steady state system is shown in the psychological as well as physical plane. The death instinct would lead to an attempt to find satisfaction in a world of 'spirituality' rather than reality.

Wilbur then discusses the ambiguity of the words 'pain' and 'pleasure'. He deals with the tendency toward repetition of former situations as described by Freud. Freud's statement that the unconscious does not know death is discussed.

There follows a discussion of neuroanatomical patterns and their connection with sexual hormones and then an analysis of the preconscious. The preconscious is secondary to the unconscious system. The preconscious is the result of an overflow of energy from the unconscious, and both are consequences of 'Eros'. An arrest in development in the primary state would lead to death and it would be possible to hypostatize a 'death instinct' to explain it.

Repression leads to the creation of an abstraction. Pain is cathected from the abstraction. Abstractions kill individuality and are therefore less painful. The creation of Freud's Life-Death Instinct Theory is the 'creation of a tool which has the aim of reaching a higher abstract conception of something we can only know and experience as a concrete, and in the main wholly personal something'. We use this tool as a guide, a check, and it acts as a sort of externalized preconscious. It is generalized, not personal. Freud really was investigating the psychological aspects of a biological tendency to incorporate significant portions of the milieu. The tendency to dream, form a superego, etc., shows a drive toward autonomy which if carried to an extreme might destroy the organism. Life and death instincts need not contradict but only oppose each other.

Dreaming does not really satisfy, and therefore it is necessary to act in reality. But in our culture, in life, we go after the object manifestly dreamed about. Satisfaction is still not complete and its lack gives rise to a tendency to set aside or destroy such objects. Therefore aggression is connected with the strivings to achieve real satisfaction. Aggression is directed toward destroying an 'impoverishing culture'. This may be experienced as a desire to destroy oneself.

In other words, starting with the idea that there was only a life instinct,

the author demonstrates that in the incorporation of the external world man incorporates the self-destroying tendency which has the appearance of an internalized death instinct due to man's relation to the outer world.

This paper, Wilbur believes, is a development and restatement of the implications contained in a hypothesis with which Freud started originally. The death instinct is the result of the organism's attempt to substitute a matrix constructed in its own image for the original matrix. Because this would eliminate the necessary relationship to the original matrix it would result in death.

Freud eventually gave up the stress on the pleasure-pain principle and instead emphasized the 'tendency to reinstate a former condition' as the stability principle. Modernizing the stability principle in accord with modern logic would mean, instead, the tendency to maintain a steady state.

MILTON L. MILLER

Learning: Its Sadistic and Masochistic Manifestations. Edward Liss. Amer. J. of Orthopsychiatry. X, 1940, pp. 123–128.

By means of nine brief clinical examples, the author demonstrates the various impulses which can be canalized into the drive to acquire knowledge. Among these motivations he particularly notes sexual curiosity, sibling rivalry, and aggressive, overcompensatory reactions to feelings of intellectual or physical inferiority. The wish for parental approval may also constitute a strong motive. The child's early life is organized around the acquisition of motor skills with accompanying physical competition. When the child cannot compete physically on an equal basis with his fellows, he often turns prematurely to the field of intellectual competition. If the child's reaction to frustration is violent, then the drive to intellectual achievement may be too highly colored by hostile components and academic success may precipitate a neurosis through activating the sense of guilt. The author's cases are somewhat too brief and his psychopathology is too elliptical to completely clarify his opinions.

A. H. VANDER VEER

Psychoanalytic Experiences in Public School Practice. Hans Zulliger. Amer. J. of Orthopsychiatry, X, 1940, pp. 370–385, 595–608, 824–840, and XI, 1941, pp. 157–171, 356–370.

This little volume by the well-known Swiss psychoanalyst and pedagogue is presented in English translation. Zulliger describes how his analytic training changed not only his attitude toward his pupils by increasing his understanding of their misbehavior, but also his philosophy of education. He believes that education should not be so much a matter of formal inculcation of knowledge but rather a preparation for living, and that one of the functions of the educator should be to free the pupil as much as possible from some of his more superficial repressions and inhibitions. The author's technique consists in very little formal analysis but rather in a group approach through the medium of written compositions on such subjects as dreams, feelings while being whipped, etc. The author also discusses such matters with the class as a whole, including any parapraxes and misbehavior that have occurred in the school

room. He supplements such general discussions by individual talks with disturbed pupils, utilizing a modified analytic technique. He describes many instances in which he has recognized anxiety through distorted handwriting and he gives many examples of the surprisingly frank expression of the children's hostility toward their parents, in their compositions. He also shows again and again how such hostility and the resultant anxiety is transferred from the parent to the teacher. The children who attended his school came from middle class and peasant stock and as a whole were subjected to a good deal of punishment at home. He is thus able to describe those factors which stimulate the child's hostility with numerous examples.

The last part of the volume is devoted to individual cases, among them examples of masturbation, obsessional thoughts, disturbed handwriting, sudden failure in academic work, various parapraxes, instances of self-punishment, diarrhœa cured through the withdrawal of the secondary gain, and one case of an animal torturer who was treated quite intensively. He devotes a good deal of discussion to the question of punishment, on the one hand, discoursing violently against the use of corporal punishment in the school, and on the other, describing the way in which punishment serves as a bribe to the child's conscience.

A. H. VANDER VEER

Neuroses and Crime. Emil A. Gutheil. J. of Criminal Psychopathology, II, 1941, pp. 444–455.

Gutheil attempts to systematize Stekel's views on the problem of criminality in the neuroses. Criminal impulses are regarded as a special phylogenetic precipitate which in the course of development go through the same viccissitudes as do other instincts. There is an abundance of descriptive clinical material presented in the characteristic Stekelian manner.

RALPH R. GREENSON

The Field-Theoretical Approach to Criminology. J. F. Brown and Douglas W. Orr. J. of Criminal Psychopathology, III, 1941, pp. 236–252.

The authors state that criminal behavior, like every form of human behavior, has to be studied from three viewpoints: the biological, the psychological and the sociological. They call an approach which considers these three aspects 'a field-theoretical approach'.

The paper quotes a classification of criminals which has been worked out in the Menninger Clinic and which seems to be clear and useful. The authors give some short case histories in order to illustrate the complex nature of criminality. They point out the importance of a knowledge of the social situation for the understanding of crime although a knowledge of the social situation alone is not sufficient. The case history of a juvenile delinquent from a very respectable middle-class family, who attempted to rape an eleven-year-old girl, shows the limits of the sociological viewpoint. This case could not be understood without careful psychological, that is to say, psychoanalytic investigation.

GEORGE GEROE

The Criminal Complex in Compulsion Neuroses. Emil A. Gutheil. J. of Criminal Psychopathology, III, 1941, pp. 253–271.

The author gives a number of examples of various forms of compulsions and their symbolic significance. He discusses the fact that compulsion neurotics do not express their impulses overtly, as in the case of criminals, but express them in the form of the neurosis. However, there seems no more point in emphasizing 'the criminal complex in compulsion neuroses' as opposed to other forms of neuroses.

The paper does not state any more than was stated long ago by Freud who discovered the asocial nature of unconscious impulses which are repressed but cause neurotic symptoms.

MILTON L. MILLER

Homeostasis as an Explanatory Principle in Psychology. John M. Fletcher. Psychological Rev., XLIX, 1942, pp. 80–87.

The concept of hemeostasis (the principle of stability in physiological systems) originated by Cannon after many years of fruitful research, is applied by this author to the psychological realm. Spinoza, Smuts, and Whitehead had noticed this phenomenon in psychology and Fechner was given credit by Freud for emphasizing it. The author states that the psychology of color vision or of the after-image of motion, as well as certain aspects of nystagmus, are evidences of the existence of such a tendency toward psychological equilibrium. Fletcher adds 'likewise most if not all of the so-called defense mechanisms which represent reactions of human personality under conditions of disturbed status can be better understood if referred to a single, general explanatory principle than if merely described as symptoms or set up as isolated principles in themselves.'

MILTON L. MILLER

The Sociological Implications of Neuroses. Paul Schilder. J. of Social Psychology, XV, 1942, pp. 3–21.

Economic factors do not fundamentally influence the manifestations and symptomatology of neurosis. The economic setting has importance in some forms of neurosis, especially the compensation neurosis. The basic structure of neurosis among white people belonging to the present culture is not different in various white races, although their cultural background is different. Neuroses are more frequent among Jews. In Negroes, Malays and generally in more primitive economic, racial and cultural situations, hysterical pictures of a particular type prevail.

Hereditary and constitutional factors may play a part in neuroses. The real value of these factors is unknown. They probably give the dynamic value to the psychological conflicts underlying the neurosis. Psychological conflict is basically dependent on the small sociological units in which the child gets love and protection, the family in its widest sense. The libidinal structure of the family is of fundamental importance. Society acts on the child at first through the family unit and its ideologies.

Cultural and economic processes once created are a part of the outer world and follow their own laws. They are no longer dependent on the psychology of the single individual. World, Organism, and Psyche are interrelated and will have to be studied. One should respect World and Organism no less than the Psyche.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Administrative Organization for Mental Hygiene. Victor H. Vogel. Public Health Reports, LVII, 1942, pp. 537–542.

With mental and emotional disorders as the cause of half of all human disability, the writer considers it important that each community have a mental hygiene center where preventive information is disseminated and where early assistance may be obtained. It is now fairly well established that at least one third of all the problems presented to the better child guidance clinics are solved and that another third are improved. Two brief case histories from the Indiana Mental Hygiene Service show how psychotic patients who otherwise would have needed institutional care were adequately supported by clinical psychiatric treatment over a period of four or five months. A mental hygiene clinic unit consisting of one psychiatrist, two psychiatric social workers and a clerk will serve a population of about 100,000. Only twenty-two of the state and territorial health departments have any type of mental hygiene activity. A special mental hygiene department in each state health service and a mental hygiene unit in each community health department are needed for an effective program.

BERNHARD BERLINER

The Nature of Shyness. Hilde Lewinsky. Brit. J. of Psychology, XXXII, 1941, pp. 105–113.

The author describes shyness as a state of hyperinhibition, accompanied by certain physical symptoms. It is characterized by feelings of inferiority and self-consciousness. A strongly ambivalent attitude is the rule, the wish to avoid others struggling against the wish to be with them.

Shyness in childhood may be considered normal because it represents a partial adaptation to reality (dependence upon adults), but in adults it suggests a weak, egocentric personality.

Shyness and boastfulness are compared, the latter being merely an aggressive, uninhibited way of disguising the former. In shyness the aggression is inhibited by fear. The relationship between shyness and boastfulness is clearly seen in alcohol or drug addiction in which the inhibited, withdrawn individual becomes cheerful and boastful under the influence of the drug. In a footnote the author states that overcoming of shyness by accepting aggression has been shown to have a beneficial effect in cases of functional enuresis in children.

The preoccupation and the infantilism of the shy individual, together with the characteristic mistrust of others, leads to the formation of a rigid, narcissistic character. A possible connection with castration fear is indicated in some languages (Icelandic and Swedish) in which the same words mean 'to snub' or 'to castrate'.

The author feels that the combination of involuntary mental suffering and impaired relations with the environment, a combination which is characteristic of psychoneurosis, indicates that shyness is a psychoneurotic syndrome.

Summarizing, the author states that 'shyness is a state of hyperinhibition through fear, shame, and mistrust, directed partly against the environment, partly against the subject's own impulses: mainly aggression and sexuality'.

DORA FISHBACK

Don Quixote y Sancho Panza Como Tipos Psychológicos. (Don Quixote and Sancho Panza as Psychological Types.) Walter Blumenfeld. Rivista de las Indias, 2a, 38, 1942.

Blumenfeld starts by contrasting the psychological types represented by Don Quixote and Sancho Panza by comparing their respective interests in remote and near-by things. A more detailed psychological study, however, shows these contradictory attitudes to be two methods of handling the same difficulties. The main point in Blumenfeld's 'detailed psychological study' is the interpretation of Don Quixote's dreams in the cave of Montecinos. Don Quixote, according to the author, is characterized by a conflict between an immense ambition and the fact that he is actually poor and decrepit and unable to satisfy the needs of his girl whose inclinations are of the courtesan type. Don Quixote's psychosis decreases the mental tension rooted in his conflict; in obedience to a severe superego, it changes the sexual love of which Don Quixote is afraid into a platonic one. The rather ridiculous and masochistic character of the knightly adventures also contains a jibing component against this superego.

Psychiatrically, Sancho Panza is to be looked upon as a case of *folie à deux*. He represents a kind of double of Don Quixote. To obey his superego (represented by Don Quixote) he renounces all genital pleasures by leaving his wife and regresses to pregenitality. His apparent stupidity is of the type of pseudodebility, and brings him several advantages.

Blumenfeld's paper stresses in a very interesting way certain elements in Don Quixote's story which have not been properly recognized by previous authors. Helene Deutsch's paper on Don Quixote [1] is not quoted.

ANGEL GARMA

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[1] Deutsch, Helene: *Don Quixote and Don Quixotism.* This QUARTERLY, VI, 1937, pp. 215–222.

NOTES

At the forty-fifth annual meeting of the AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION held at Detroit, May 9th to 12th, 1943, the following officers were elected: Honorary President, Dr. A. A. Brill (New York); President, Dr. Leo H. Bartemeier (Detroit); Vice-President, Lt. Col. M. Ralph Kaufman (Boston); Secretary, Dr. Robert P. Knight (Topeka); Treasurer, Dr. Flanders Dunbar (New York).

The following Associate Members of the AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION are to be added to the list of members now serving in the armed forces of the United States of America:

Eugene C. Milch (New York)
Mark Kanzer (New York)
Norman Reider (San Francisco)

The SECTION ON PSYCHOANALYSIS of the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION has now sixty-six members. It met on Wednesday, May 12th, for morning and afternoon sessions, in Detroit. The officers of 1942–1943 were continued for another year.

The SAN FRANCISCO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY held its semi-annual meeting on April 17th and 18th, 1943, and the scientific program was as follows: Dr. S. Bernfeld: Early Psychosomatic Theories of Freud; Dr. E. Simmel: Self-Preservation and Death Instinct; Dr. M. Romm: Aggression in Fetishism; Dr. O. Fenichel: Theory and Therapy of Neuroses; Symposium on the Clinical and Therapeutic Aspects of 'Acting Out', Moderator, Dr. E. Windholz, Discussants, Dr. D. Macfarlane, Mrs. O. Fenichel, Dr. E. Simmel, and others; Dr. J. Kasanin: The Acceleration of Psychoanalysis Through the Mediation of War; Capt. Joseph C. Solomon, M.C.: Observations on Emotional Reactions to Battle Situations; Dr. E. Simmel: Reflections on Soldiers' Morale and Military Discipline.

At a meeting held June 7, 1943, the PHILADELPHIA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY elected the following officers: President, Gerald H. J. Pearson, M.D.; Vice-President, George W. Smeltz, M.D.; Secretary-Treasurer, LeRoy M. A. Maeder, M.D. The following compose the Educational Committee: Doctors Sydney G. Biddle, LeRoy M. A. Maeder, G. Henry Katz, O. Spurgeon English, and Lauren H. Smith. Dr. Kenneth E. Appel was elected representative to the Executive Council of the American Psychoanalytic Association, and Doctors Sydney G. Biddle, George W. Smeltz, and LeRoy M. A. Maeder were elected repre-

sentatives to the Council on Professional Training of the American Psychoanalytic Association.

The ARGENTINE PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY has recently been accepted as a branch of the International Psychoanalytic Association. To celebrate this occasion, they have decided to start the publication of a quarterly journal. We believe this is the first psychoanalytic journal to be published in the Spanish language.

At the ninety-ninth annual meeting of the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION held in Detroit, May 10th to 13th, 1943, the following officers were elected: President, Edward A. Strecker, M.D. (Philadelphia); President-Elect, Karl M. Bowman, M.D. (San Francisco); Secretary-Treasurer, Winfred Overholser, M.D. (Washington, D.C.); Auditor, Ralph C. Hamill, M.D. (Chicago); Councillors, Thomas A. Ratliff, M.D. (Cincinnati), Arthur H. Ruggles, M.D. (Providence), Raymond W. Waggoner, M.D. (Ann Arbor), G. Alexander Young, M.D. (Omaha).